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This special issue on Social Control in Health and Law in Hawaii edited
by Jeffrey J. Kamakahi and Deanna B. K. Chang continues to reflect on some
basic and valued practices established by the founders of SOCIAL PROCESS IN
HAWAII. Students, both undergraduate and graduate, have been key to the
development and publication of specific issues. The student status of the co-
editors at the inception of the project is indicative of the value placed on student
participation in developing and completing publication work. The recipient of
the Bernhard L. Hormann Prize, Paul Shaner III, is recognized in a work
published in this issue. Without the painstaking editorial and technical assistance
of Associate Professor Michael Weinstein, Keith Nagai, and Lloyd J. Kuniyoshi,
the guest editors would not have been able to move the project along to
completion. We all owe a great debt of deep appreciation for the work done.
The focus on how health and law are organized and administered over
time and in Hawaii today also is made within a comparative and general
framework. Comparative work in other settings can enrich the growth of
knowledge, perspectives, and methods and techniques in the study of social
relations and persons across diverse ethnic and social contexts. Such contrasts
will continue to uncover the more general from the variant aspects of social life




This volume of Social Process in Hawaii presents a sample of the wide
range of topics and approaches to the study of social control in Hawaii
undertaken by past and present faculty and students of the Department of
Sociology. In their "Introduction" the guest editors discuss the origins of the
concept of social control and its changing scope and meaning through time. The
first five chapters of the volume deal with current problems in Hawaii while the
last three concern 19th century Hawaii. Chapter 6 is a transition between the
two sets.
In "Risk Assessment and Rearrest on Probation" Keith Nagai and Gene
Kassebaum investigate the degree to which the Wisconsin Model predicted the
future arrests of probationers in Hawaii. Then they find the extent to which the
often found differences based upon gender, ethnicity and caseload size
disappeared when the risk scores were taken into account.
David Heaukulani's "Critical Mass: Observations on Prison Overcrowd-
ing in Hawaii" analyses the actual contributions to Hawaii's prison overcrowding
made by a variety of the popularly attributed reasons, e.g., more severe statutes,
longer minimum sentences.
Deanna B. K. Chang, in "A Domestic Violence Shelter: A Symbolic
Bureaucracy," looks at what happened organizationally within a small program
for abused women when that program was incorporated into a larger organiza-
tion.
"Patient Consent: Issues in the Legal Regulation of a Client-Professional
Relationship" presents Eldon Wegner's investigation of the asymmetrical
character of the doctor-patient relationship in mastectomy-cancer consultations
and the contradictory dimensions of social control in that dyadic relationship.
Albert B. Robillard's "A Social Semiotics of Nursing" argues that the
shortage of nurses is the consequence of the manner in which modern capitalist
society controls the social reality of nursing by controlling the definition of the
profession. The Hawaii case is a manifestation of the global perspective.
Jeffrey J. Kamakahi's "Hospitals and Social Control During Hawaii's
Kingdom Era" is an interesting transition to the articles dealing strictly with 19th
century Hawaii. Making use of data on hospitals in Hawaii during the period
of the kingdom, he develops a general model for simultaneously examining the
social controls within such institutions and the social controls of these institutions
from outside.
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Peter J. Nelligan and Harry V. Ball, in ':Etl~nic JUriesi~~it~t~::i~~
1825-1900 " describe the establishment and the termmatlo.n of the .
the ethnic jury system in Hawaii and the relationship of this system to questions
of sovereignty.
In "Juvenile Commitments Under the Kingdom:. 1~65-1886" Lloyd ~.
. h· d H V Ball describe the social charactenstlcs of the you~gsters
~:;~~t~e~~~ Ha:~ri's ·first reformatory and the grounds for their commitment.
P I H Sh
aner Ill's "Gambling, Lotteries and the Law in l?th Century
au . . _. I fl ct over the
Hawai~" ~escri~esththe s~cidal sfigthneifi~~~gC~o~ :~ ~~v~~~~al ~~v~rnment, the
amblmg Issue m e peno so' .
iepublic and the first years after annexation by the Umted States.
The Editors
December, 1991
JEFFREY J. KAMAKAHli AND DEANNA lB. K. CHANG
The notion of social control has enjoyed a central place in sociology
(Wolff, 1964; Pitts, 1968). Although the term has recently come to be narrowly
associated with the intentional employment of sanctions between actors, it has
been the position of this publication that the concept extends much beyond that.
Here, social control has been used in very broad fashion to refer to socially
produced parameters which contextualize and situate social activity.
Social control does not refer just to a particular act or relation, but rather
to particular acts or relations within a larger complex of social and material
circumstances (see Duncan, 1962). For example, the initial employment of
sanctions between agents I implicates an entire array of social processes. There
is an implied differentiation of acting agents and supporting agents. The identity
of the "recipient" and the "sanctioner" must be elaborated within some
meaningful context. The motivation behind both acts of transgression and acts
of sanctioning must be placed within some discursive social order.
Concomitantly, the sanctioning agent must be legitimized and empowered
through some social mechanism. Valences for the act of transgression and their
appropriate sanctions must be "determined." The sanction itself must be
presumed to vilify the morality of the social order by the sanctioner; and, at the
same time, the sanction must be seen as punishment for the recipient. The
sanction itself, then, is but a small part of the complexity of "the act. "2
As viewed here, social control is a sensitizing concepe which can be
employed at any level of analysis because every act indexically implicates other
social relations. Furthermore, social control is not a static external phenomenon,
it is a non-recursive process which cannot be isolated and/or located in any
particular mediative level. In other words, we can speak of instances of social
control without ever being able to definitively pinpoint its ultimate "source."
A montage of other sociological concepts can be said to overlap the
broad parameters of the concept of social control as used in this essay. Concepts
such as power and authority (see Weber, 1946; Homans, 1961; Parsons, 1964),
social order and social system (see Durkheim, 1954; Duncan, 1962; Garfinkel,
1967; Foucault, 1971; Strauss, 1978), political-economy (Marx and Engels,
1947; Baudrillard, 1981), culture (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977), and
ideology/knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; O'Neill, 1989), among
others, may be said to permeate the domain of social control. The notion of
social control suggests that there are socially constructed significations associated
with all practical social actions; and that these "taken for granted" assumptions
are often accepted a priori. In essence, our acts only "make sense" viz-a-viz
some set of socially constructed parameters which may be said to partially
!J
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control us as much as we control them. This latter aspect of social control is
perhaps most conspicuous in writings which ques.tion or highlig~t "the order of
things" (see Mead, 1934; Foucault, 1971; Baudnllard, 1975; Giddens, 1981).
SOCiAJL CONTROJL J[N HEAJLTH AND JLAW
The substantive areas of the Sociology of Health and Illness (Medical
Sociology) and the Sociology of Law and Deviance are arena~ in whi.ch the
broad conceptions of social control merge with the purposive levymg of
sanctions in practice. Pitts (1968) points to the strong tradition of social control
studies in the two substantive fields - in which the specialties themselves may be
outgrowths of the concept:
Social control was once a concept which covered many areas that
later became independent specialties - areas like penology,
medical sociology, and the sociology of law. (p. 394).
Many theorists have explicitly or implicitly demonstrated the nexus
between the substantive specialties. Parson's (1951) notion of the sick role, for
example, can be seen as a form of temporary, but legitimized, deviance. Once
legitimacy is removed, however, the condition no longer enjoys the status as
"sickness" but as "willful deviance." Foucault finds that the same "theory of the
body" comes into play whether we talk about the developm~nt an~ ~aintenance
of prisons (1977), mental health institutions (1971), or medical clllllCS (1973) ~s
discourses of social domination. Goffman (1962) classifies as examples of hiS
ideal type "total institutions": prisons, mental hospitals, and lepr.osaria .. In the
study of mental health institutions, the distinction between what IS medical and
what is legal often collapses entirely (Szasz, 1963).
This journal issue also conceives of the areas of sociology of health ~nd
illness and sociology of law and deviance to be intermeshed. The subst~~tlve
interest in health and illness invariably refers to legal/polltlcal-
economic/normative orders with regard to medical expertise and authority (i.e.
legitimation), the organization of heath sectors (i.e. institutionalization), and the
maintenance of social status (i. e. structural reproduction). The passage of
legislation, the allocation of government monies, the existence of health
insurance schemes, the certification of health practitioners, and so on are all
"legal" aspects of health.
Likewise we find there to be a concern with torts (i.e. the assessment of
injury or harm) underlying the sociology of law and deviance. Bo~h ~ri~inal
and civil law assesses the degree to which injury or harm, whether to mdlvlduals
or to an amorphous aggregate (e.g., "the people", "the State"), has transpired.
The parameters of retribution or punishment are socially constructed in light of
the amount of harm perpetrated as well as some notions of the limits of
acceptable treatment of deviants. Standards of confinement and punishment have
changed as have the historicity of ideas of health and illness that have been
linked to "cruel and unusual punishment," "sub-human" conditions, and so on.
The demarcation between deviance and illness, between responsibility
and happensta-tlce, between punishment and rehabilitation/treatment and so forth
are inde~d ~enuous and ~ultural. These cultural dialectics, though, ;eem to hinge
on the slgmfied congrmty of health, equilibrium, normality and legality. These
are the background assumptions of functionalism's "needs" as well as the
practical "taken for granteds" in the structuralist notions of reproduction. The
cultural dialectics also provide the foundation for critiques of functionalist and
structuralist orientations; where the focus has been to question the static status
quo and its validity viz-a-viz underlying signifieds and signifiers.
mSCUSSliON
Since ~e construct of social control was our point of departure, we can
say that the articles contained within this issue applied the construct toward the
~nalysis ~f substantive concerns. This allowed for a wide range of
mterpretatlons of the concept as well as a variety of theoretical orientations and
methodologies.
For some, the open-endedness with which the editors have chosen to treat
the notion of s~cial control may be disconcerting. That is, some might be more
comfortable With a specific "real" definition or exhaustive set of denotative
examples. Such a stance, though, would have contradicted our intent and
resulted in our greater social control in the form of arbitrarily setting
(unnecessary) communicative parameters. Our point was to discuss social
control and not to needlessly enhance it!
. We ,,:ere tacitly addressing Pitts' (1968) contention that the seeming lack
of mterest m the concept of social control was "rooted in the structural
conditions of sociology as an intellectual enterprise" (p.394). The articles in this
journal issue have demonstrated that social control is an integral part of
sociological work.
. . We concei:,e of social control as being among the fundamental organizing
prmclples of SOCiology. To live in a socially constructed world is to be
permeated by li~iting practical assumptions and, perhaps more importantly, to
reprod~ce them m the course of everyday activities. This is not to say that the
world IS ontologically pristine and/or that our cosmology his unitary and
. g
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unambiguous. On the contrary, there exists, at any given time, any number of
contradictory discourses and codes. One underlying implication of social control
is that we are both willing and unwilling co-participants in existing discursive
orders: many of which are opaque. In other words, we cannot "step out"
beyond our limiting assumptions to critique them without bias.
What, then, is social control? Is it a discourse? Or a structural relation?
A levying of sanctions? The list of possibilities is endless. In the broadest
sense, social control is a theory of limits. As a theory of limits, it serves to
demarcate the parameters of the "real," the legitimate, the acceptable, the moral,
and so forth from their "pseudo" counterparts. It does so not just as a
legitimizer of those limits, but possibly as a critique of them.
When one studies social control, ultimately one is faced with questioning
the validity of the limits imposed. This does not mean that the critique is itself
without limits, but that the background assumptions are themselves problematic.
Ironically, to critique social control means also to participate in some form of
social control: employing the background assumptions of some existing
discourse.
One dilemma that we face is that the same positive act is insufficient in
invoking a unitary interpretation of social control. For example, we may
conceive of the apprehension of a person participating in a sit-in by the police
as constituting harassment, a curtailment of the protester's freedom of speech,
a proper disposition of a public nuisance, a show of coercion by the
"establishment," the legitimate use of authority by a public servant (Le. the
police officer), and so on. The same behavior, even though seen as an
instanciation of social control, does not guarantee a consensus of assessment.
The assumptions of the assessment itself are latent aspects of an implicit,
discursive social control. Thus rests our apprehension in accepting a purely
behavioral iconic definition of social control: because often our "limits" are
nested within even broader and diffuse limits.
Can such a diffuse construct be useful in sociology? After all, we have
argued that social control is intimately intermeshed with other sociological
constructs: having no exclusive domain in that regard. Also, we have proposed
that social control is a decentered phenomenon; one whose "source" cannot be
definitively located. In addition, we were unable to provide a "real" definition
or an exhaustive set of denotative examples of social control. And finally, it was
noted that social control is an interpretive stance of "limits" within limits.
Social control, we argue, is such a fundamental organizing principle in
sociology, that it's status as a primitive, sensitizing concept is to be preserved.
$. PM S.
Attempts to restrict social control to onl' .,
bastardize the construct and to establish lu:~~:1n types ?f ~ltuatlOns serves to
the parameters of establl'shed d" commumcatlve controls Within
Iscurslve codes R d f .
control construct to particular b h . I . e uc lomsm of the sociale aVlOra acts or to pre s . d" . .
only serves to reproduce limits rath th . . - cn~te motivatIOns"
them. Blanket explanatory sch er fan t? Identify, question and/or critique
emes 0 SOCial control th' k ..
background assumptions of one disco d . . run e ns of relfylngurse an Imposing them upon another.
Our suggestion is to allo th th . .
identify instances of social contr~ e
d
eoretl~al onentatio~s of practitioners to
relevant mechanisms and d' o.an to exphcate the speCific and situationally
. Iscurslve elements of th t I"
circumstances the concept of . I a app IcatlOn. In these. ' socia control can be a . . ..
sensltlzing concept and stl'll . .. n orgamzlng prinCiple, a, maintain ItS fie 'b'I't ~ .applications. XI I I Y lor vanous research
NOTES
1. We are using the term agent as opposed to actor be .
that the agent is a participating mediat th t d cause the connotatIOn of the former is
than being simply a facade for "pre_do~ a prdo "uces and reproduces social "reality" rather
e ermme , scnpted scenes.
2. The definition of what constitutes "the a t" . .
practical interpretation. Mead's c
l
. diS a matter for senous theoretical interest and
. genera Ize concern with the t r
contexts, Giddens' interest in structuration d O'N '11' .. empora Ity and meaning
body" are among the myriad of sociolo ican el s the~nzmg on the "communicative
social "reality." g al works that pomt out parameters in defining
3. The term "sensitizing concept" is used in Blumerian fash'
that are not easily definable but who h h . h IOn to refer to abstract constructs
IC elg ten one's aware t dour perceptual field. ness owar certain aspects of
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1 Risk Assessment and Rearrest on.
Probation!
JKEnH NAGAli AND GENE KASSEBAUM
THE PROBLEM
Risk assessment is the attempt to avert possible future adverse events by
making predictions from correlates of the anticipated event. The risk posed by
criminal offenders may be in terms of the magnitude of the possible loss (the
"stakes" involved in risk prediction) or the probability of some event (the" odds"
involved). For example, a decision involving a repeat of writing a bad check is
low stakes but high odds. A decision involving a possible murder or rape is
high stakes even though low odds. Risk assessment in probation is the effort to
classify probationers on the likelihood of committing an offense while in the
community. By focusing on risk, current public and legislative emphasis on
community protection rather than an earlier priority on personal reformation is
in the forefront of probation management. 2 This study reports risk classification
on adult probation data collected in Honolulu.
Risk assessment is done by "The Wisconsin Model," a standardized
scoring of eleven questions about the offense, prior criminal record, successful
adjustment to conventional life expectations and record of drug and alcohol
problems. After a classification, supervision is allocated to the probationer
proportionate to risk. By such differential allocation of surveillance, risk is
managed. But is risk management successful? We approach this by showing
that risk level is correlated with rearrest in an adult probation population. Risk
level is a predictor after effects of gender and ethnicity (each long known to be
predictors of recidivism) are controlled. We then see whether probation officer
caseloads composed so as to allocate more supervision time to higher risk
probationers still show the correlation between risk level and recidivism. They
do. Risk level continues to correlate with rearrest. The effects of risk, gender
and ethnicity are summarized in a multivariate analysis at the end.
RliSK MANAGEMENT liN PROBATiON SUPERVliSliON
The Wisconsin Model's strengths lie in its completeness, its simplicity,
its utility to management, and its attention to details which if overlooked could
obstruct risk management. The Wisconsin model has four basic components:
risk and needs assessment; case management classification for appropriate
casework strategy; a management information system; and a work load
deployment and budgeting plan (Baird 1981, also Wright, Clear and Dickson
1984).
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The total number ofpoints scored th l' '
sheet made up the rl'sk 1 Th on e c lent s assessment/reassessment
, c ass. e actual numbe f' .
depends on how the client responds t th. . r 0 pomts a chent receives
Points are scored for each item Th ~. ~ mt~rvlew by the probation officer.
three categories. The Adult Proba i e l.st~l?utlon o~ total scores is divided into
classifications of minimum d t on DIVIsIon ~lasslfies probationers into 3 risk
, mo erate and maXImum.
METHODS OF DATA COLLECnON AND ANALYSJfS
JlN TOO PRESENT SnIDY
The data were collected at th Ad 1 P b' . . .
Hawaii The 0 " 1d . e u t ro atlOn DIVIsIon in Honolulu
. ngma ata set contamed the cl' t' . k '
Scores and the leading charge on wh' h th ~en s ns and needs assessment
during the fiscal year 1985/86. The ~~tal s:~hent was. sentenced to probation
each transformed into interval s that det r' thof ~e r,lsk.and nee~ sc~res are
adjustment program. For this stud o~tl~e .e chent s nsk classIficatIOn and
items were excluded fr h yo' Y t e nsk Scores were used (The need
items, and total scores ~: ~i:ka:J~~e~ecau~~ they tend to overlap with the risk
is done 6 months after the initial are 19h1y correlated). A reassessment
die?t is reassessed every year ~~~~ss:::ent. After one .year has elap~ed, the
expIration of the probation sentence a fi e
l
sentence expI~es. Followmg the
, ma reassessment IS done.
The risk score variables were selected b d . .
demonstrating a probability that th r " ase. on charactenstlcs
probation. All of the risk item sco e ~ le~t WIll hkely fall the conditions of
interview plus the official reCOrd)r::~ :~;~d from the cli~nt's response t~ the
greater risk are given a larger weighted sco;e~ed. Those Items that predIct a
Cases belonging to officer case loads of 100
172) were selected for study H £ or larger (the largest was
their cases dropped out b~cau~;e~r, ~r ~o~e probation officers, a few of
Acceptance of Guilty Piea" whO h ey I a. een .sen.tenced on "Deferred
. IC resu ts m a dIsmIssal
completIOn of probation. A total of 1130 upon successful















Percent Distribution Risk Category of Probation Client
Score/Risk Cat.
Table 1
The study reported here examines only one aspect of the introduction of
the risk classification/case management model in adult probation division. We
review risk classification in relation to rearrest, looking at the effects of gender,
ethnicity and caseload on this relationship.
Researchers still do not know what the ideal size of an officer's case load
ought to be. The President's Commission of Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice concludes, caseload size ought to be 35. This,
however, is far from reality because caseloads are much higher in all regular
probation offices. Caseload size remains an open question. Law makers
continue to operate as though the relationship between caseload size, work and
performance is understood and taken for granted. But interrelationship among
other variables influences the theoretical framework of probation supervision
through manipulated caseload size, thus affecting client's and probation officer's
performance (Adams & Vetter 1976).
The use of classifications in corrections is not a new development. The
movement from punishment to rehabilitation in corrections prompted the use of
classifications for the purpose of gaining an estimate of probable response to
treatment. However, classification appears to be more than an instrument to
measure the client's response to selected treatment plans. It serves as a
management information tool designed to collect information for evaluation and
planning purposes. The case management classifications must be evaluated in
relation to utility and not only in the reduction of criminal activity. The system
works if the administration, officers, and staff come to a better understanding of
the purpose of the classification system and intended use. This allows probation
officers to make independent decisions based on their own findings through
interviews with their clients, to make the appropriate referrals to service
agencies, to establish better communications with their supervisor. This will, in
the long run, contribute to the probation officer's confidence, own job
performance and satisfaction and allow for the system to flexibly redefine its
criteria to effectuate significant improvements in community corrections
(Kratcoski 1985). Correctional administrators, treatment staff, and professional
association leaders have long maintained that reducing case load size will
enhance the treatment and handling of clients sentenced to probation. Several
studies show that reduced case load size in probation departments are effective.
Others, such as the SIPU studies in California, showed caseload size by itself is
not correlated with reduced recidivism (See Adams 1976). The probation agency
studied had recently reorganized officer workloads according to risk management
and stipulated requirements for different levels of supervision to different risk
classes. The idea was that higher risk probationers should receive more
supervision than lower risk probationers.
4
The Client's Sex
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Normally, the client's sex is not recorded in the Wisconsin model. The
data shows more males than females sentenced to probation. The final data set
contained 891 males and 231 females.
Table 2 Percent Distribution Sex of Probation Client
The third part of the research record consisted of measures of recidivism.
The term recidivism for these probationers is defined as any recorded criminal
activity from 7/1186 to 6/30/88, a period of two years. The capture date for
criminal activity was extended to two years. There were 4 variables collected
from the Offender Based Transaction System (OBTS) that were coded to













1. The number of arrest episodes by tracking number4
2. The most serious arrest charge
3. The disposition of the most serious arrest charge
4. The severity of the most serious arrest charge
In this paper, only the number of rearrest episodes is ·discussed. Table
4, represents the percent distribution of risk classification by the number of
rearrest episodes. Nearly all of those who were never rearrested (82.8%) came
from the minimum risk classification. Repeated rearrest (2-3 times) increased
as risk classification increased. Those who were rearrested 4+ times were much
more likely to be classified as maximum or moderate risk rather than minimum
risk.
The Client's Ethnicity
The data indicate a likelihood of certain ethnic groups being sentenced
to probation and being rearrested more frequently than other ethnic groups. In
the data set there were 72 Blacks, 139 Filipinos, 312 Hawaiians, 126 East
Asians, 66 Samoans, 312 Whites, 82 Others, and 21 Unknowns.3 East Asians
and Filipinos were combined to form the category "Asians." Hawaiian/part
Hawaiian, Samoans, and "Other" were combined to form the "Pacific Islander"
category. There are fewer Asians and more Blacks and Hawaiian/Pacific
Islanders than would be expected from the general population of the State of
Hawaii.
Tablle 4 Percent Distribution of JRisk Classification by The Frequency of
JRearrest Episodes
The Frequency of Rearrest Episodes
Table 3 Percent Distribution Ethnicity of Probation Client








































Tables 5 and 6 represent rearrest by risk classification controlling for
sex. The percent of both males and females never rearrested decreases as risk
classification increases.
There were 239 females and 891 males in the study. For each gender,
the probability of rearrests is to some extent measured with risk level. For men,
there are more rearrest· episodes as risk classification moves from minimum
(80.7%), to moderate (56.9%) and maximum (57.5%). Those with 1 rearrest
episode appeared frequently in the moderate (19.3%) category as opposed to the
maximum (16.0%) category. Likewise, those who fell in the 2 - 3 rearrest
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Percent Distrilbution of Sex by Risk Categoryepisodes category reported similar findings with 4.7% classified as minimum,
14.5% classified as moderate, and 9.5% classified as maximum risk. Those
who reported 4+ rearrest episodes increased as risk classification increased.
Only 2.6% of the minimum risk probationers had 4 or more rearrests. Of those
who were classified as moderate, 9.3% had 4+ rearrests, while the maximum
















TabHe 5 Percent Distrilbution of Risk Classification by The Frequency of
Rearrest Episodes ControUKing For Sex = Male
Etlmicity, Gender, Recidivism and Probation Supervision

























Ethnicity is not one of the variables for calculating risk in the Wisconsin
Model. The ethnicity variable is unacceptable legally and politically as a part
of indication of risk control, but the data shows that there are differences across
the various ethnic groups in the risk of rearrests (See Table 8).
Percent Distribution of Risk Classification by The Frequency of
Rearrest Episodes Controlling For Sex = Female
The Frequency of Rearrest Episodes
Overall, Pacific Islanders are a higher percentage of higher-risk
probationers, while the Whites and Asians have more moderate risk probationers
and the Blacks have the highest proportion of low risk probationers and the
lowest moderate and maximum risk probationers. These findings contrast with
mainland figures and should be researched further as to possible interpretations
on what accounts for the major differences. Violent offenders are more often
sentenced to prison, and in Hawaii there are few black permanent residents,
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Table 8 Percent Distribution of Etllmicity Iby Risk Category
Sometimes it is held that women are sentenced more leniently than men,
that is, women are more likely to get probation than confinement. Our data do
not support that view. Women on probation have lower risk scores than men on
probation. For supervision purposes, the risk measurement predicts recidivism
for women as well as it does for men.
Risk Category
Sex Minimum Moderate
White N = 312 70.5% 22.4%
Black N = 72 77.8% 19.4%
Asian N = 265 69.1% 23.8%
Pac. Isle. N = 460 52.0% 36.0%
Unknown N = 7 71.4% 22.2%













Table 7, represents the percent distribution of risk category by sex of the
client. The percentage of females who are classified as minimum risk is greater
than for males. Likewise, the percentage of females who are classified as
maximum risk is lower than for males. Males are arrested more frequently for
violent types of crimes. Probably for this reason males have higher risk
classifications than females.
*Chinese, Filipinos, Indo-Chinese, Japanese and Koreans make up the "Asian" category.
Hawaiians, Samoans and Other make up the "Pacific Isle." category.
Tables 9, 10 and 11, show the distribution of rearrest episodes by sex,
controlling for risk category. On the whole, more men than women are
rearrested at least once within the 2 year period. The differenlfs occur due to
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arrest/rearrest and sentencing patterns that classify clients on the basis of the
nature of the commitment offense. Fewer females receive a maximum risk
classification as opposed to men. The likelihood of rearrest for women is much
lower than it is for males. None the less, for both men and women, risk
classification predicts rearrest.
Tables 12 through 14 show that rearrest differs more across risk
categories than between ethnic groups. Compared with the low risk group, in
which each ethnicity varied only between 79% and 89% never rearrested,
moderate and maximum risk probationers cluster in the range from 53 % to 64 %
rearrested.
Table 9 Pel"Cent Distribution of Sex by The JFrequency of Reanest
Episodes ControlRing JFor Risk Category = Minimum
Table 12 Percent Distribution of Ethnic Composition by The JFrequency





The Frequency of Rearrest Episodes
Gender
The Frequency of Rearrest Episodes







































PelTent Distribution of Sex by The JFrequency of Rean-est
Episodes Controlling JFor Risk Category = Moderate





















N = 703 Missing = 8
Percent Distribution of Ethnic Composition !by The JFrequency
of Rem-rest Episodes Controlling JFor Risk Category =
Moderate
The Frequency of Rearrest Episodes
N=314 Missing = 5
Table 11
N=319
Percent Distribution of Sex by The JFrequency of Rearrest



















































Table 14 Percent Distribution of Ethnic Composition by The JFrequency
of Rearrest Episodes Controlling JFor Risk Category =
Maximum
The Frequency of Rearrest Episodes
Gender continues to show a relationship to recidivism after controlling
for Risk, but much diminished. Ethnicity differences virtually disappeared when
risk measure is controlled. While ethnicity can be ignored if risk is taken into
account, gender continues to show an effect, with women less likely to be
rearrested than men even at higher measured risk levels.
Ethnicity No Epis. 1 Epis. 2-3 Epis. 4+ Epis. Total
Asian N=19 52.6% 31.6% 15.8% 100.0%
Whites N=22 59.1% 9.1% 18.2% 13.6% 100.0%
Blacks N=2 100.0% 100.0%
Pac.Isle. N =55 56.4% 14.5% 10.9% 18.2% 100.0%
N=99 Missing = 1
~
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Caseload, Risk and Recidivism
SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAU Nagai and Kassebaum RISK ASSESSMENT AND REARREST
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
n
The purpose of this paper was to examine the workings of the Wisconsin
Risk/Need assessment model and to see whether the distribution of caseloads
balanced out on risk category to optimize probation officer's work performance.
Table 15 represents probation officer's work unit by risk category. The
following tables are presented with the intention of showing the performance of
the probation officer in terms of case load size, risk classification and
recidivism.
Within caseloads, rearrest is predicted by the risk scores. Those in the
minimum risk are less likely to be rearrested. As risk level increases, the
percentage of clients rearrested increases. The moderate risk category seems to
contain many repeat property offenders; previous violence puts probationers into
the maximum risk category. The charge on which the probationers are
rearrested indicates the need for intensive supervision of those classified as
moderate and quite possibly, the maximum risk category.
Table 15 Percent Distribution of Caseload by Risk Classification of Those
Reanested
Rearrested ]Percent Rearrested by Risk
Caseload Percent Total N Minimum N Moderate N Maximum N
1 21% (92) 17.2 (58) 28.0 (25) 22.2 (9)
2 23% (92) 19.7 (56) 31.5 (19) 23.5 (13)
3 32% (101) 22.1 (77) 61.9 (21) 66.7 (3)
4 5% (112) 4.6 (109) 50.0 (2) (1)
5 28% (95) 19.3 (36) 30.0 (40) 42.1 (19)
6 38% (106) 26.3 (57) 43.0 (30) 63.2 (19)
7 27% (67) 15.4 (13) 19.0 (42) 66.7 (12)
8 38% (73) 23.9 (46) 65.2 (23) 50.0 (4)
9 34% (103) 23.5 (68) 56.7 (30) 40.0 (5)
10 19% (107) 10.5 (67) 27.8 (36) 75.0 (4)
11 19% (80) 13.8 (58) 33.3 (21) (1)
12 24% (102) 19.7 (66) 36.7 (30) (6)
N=1130
Even with presumably high contact hours in probation supervision, all
caseloads showed larger percentage of rearrest in either moderate and maximum
risk. Allocating of extra contact in the balanced caseloads does not eliminate
higher probability for rearrest of persons in moderate or maximum risk
categories.
These can be more tightly summarized in a weighted least squares
method proposed by Grizzle, Starmer and Koch 1969. This yields a linear
equation that minimizes the weighted residual sum of squares for the model.
Three independent variables (risk category, gender and ethnicity) were
used as predictors to determine the probability of rearrest (See Table 16). The
variable risk category was recoded "0" for low risk clients and" 1" for moderate
and maximum risk clients. The risk category variable is important because it
determines the level of supervision for the client. The variable gender was
recoded "0" for females and" 1" for males. The variable ethnicity was recoded
"1" for Pacific Islanders "0" for All Others. (Neither the gender nor ethnicity
variables are used in the assessment or reassessment of the client. Gender and
Ethnicity were included in the statistical analysis, along with risk category, to
determine the independent effect these variables have on rearrest).
The dependant variable, rearrest episodes, was recoded as "0" for no
rearrest and "1" for rearrested at least once. The three independent variables
generate sub-groups ("samples") from the population. Sample 1 is made up of
"low risk" clients, female and "Non Pacific Islanders." Sample 2 is made up of
"low risk" clients, female and "Pacific Islander." Sample 3 is made up of "low
risk" clients, male and "Other." Sample 4 is made up of "low risk" clients,
male and "Pacific Isle." Sample 5 is made up of "high risk" clients, female and
"Other." Sample 6 is made up of "high risk" clients, female and "Pacific Isle."
Sample 7 is made up of "high risk" clients, male and "Other." Sample 8 is
made up of "high risk" clients, male and "Pacific Isle."
The analysis of the individual parameters in the main effects model
shows the estimated probability of not being rearrested diminishes by .20 from
the intercept when risk category is included. Risk category has the largest effect
on the study population, where at a .0001 probability, we can predict that .20
of those who are high risk (as opposed to those who are low risk) are likely to
be rearrested. When gender is included in the model, the independent effect on
the probability of not being rearrested diminishes by .13 for those who are male
as opposed to those who are female. Finally, the independent effect of ethnic
composition on the intercept shows that Pacific Islanders are more likely to be
rearrested by .03 as opposed to those who fall in the "All Other" category at a
.2031 probability. The ethnic composition variable has the weakest effect on the
intercept when accounting for the probability of no rearrest. However, weak as
the variable may be, we can predict that being Pacific Islander will increase the
chances of being rearrested (net of the effect of risk and gender~.
I
I·
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The probabilities listed below take the dependant variable, frequency of
rearrest episode, and place the values into one of two categories called
responses.
rearrest by .13. Based on risk and gender these two variables predict
independent of one another, the likelihood of rearrest by .20 and .13 respectively
from the intercept of .93 at a .0001 probability. If we take a look at Table 17,
those in profile 6 who are high risk, Pac. Isle., female have a significantly large
residual.
Analysis of The Individual Parameters Based on :Risk Category,

















The expectation that males traditionally recidivate more than females does
not hold true in this instance. Profile 6 indicates an under-prediction of high risk
females who are Pacific Islanders. Closer supervision of high risk women who
are Pacific Islanders is needed to balance out the effects of the model. The data
does not support the preconceived notions of female criminality for women who
are high risk and Pacific Islander.
The net effect of risk in relation to the frequency of rearrest episodes
does indicate that the Wisconsin Model over-predicts the likelihood of rearrest.
Response 1 represents "no rearrest" while response 2 represents "at least
1 rearrest." Table 17 shows the probability of no rearrest versus the observed
frequency of no rearrest.
The structure of the data indicates risk and gender are good indicators
that predict recidivism. However, when ethnicity is added, there is no
significant improvement in prediction.
Table 17 Observed and Predicted Response Probabilities of Reanoest
Episode of The Population Sub-Samples Based on :Risk
Category, Gender and Ethnicity
Three possible reasons why ethnicity did not enter in as a significant
variable: first at the police stage, the booking officer may score ethnicity as to
what is observed. To avoid legal challenges, the probation officer may overlook
ethnicity to maintain fairness and impartiality when establishing a treatment
and/supervision program.
The predicted values from each profile determined how well the analysis
of the individual parameters predicted our samples. In profile 1, the observed
value, .90, of low risk females who are Non-Pacific Islanders comes close to the
predicted value of .93, leaving a residual of -.03. Therefore, at the intercept
where the sample is low risk, All Other, females, the prediction of not being
rearrested is almost perfect with a slight over-prediction of .03. In profile 8, the
observed value, .57, for high risk males who are Pacific Islander comes close
to the predicted value of .58. Therefore, we could say that the probability of a
high risk, Pacific Islanders, male not being rearrested is predicted at .58 leaving
a residual of -.01.
However, in profile 6 the observed value, .84, for high risk females who
are Pacific Islanders does not correspond to the predicted value of .71.
Therefore we could say that the likelihood that high risk females who are Pacific
Islanders not being rearrested is under-predicted by .13. This is where the
model does not predict very well. The residual of .13 under estimated the
likelihood that females who are high risk and Pacific Islanders would remain
rearrest-free. This is inconsistent with the rest of the observed and predicted
values for the other 7 samples in the model.
The variables RISK category and GENDER confirm expectations that
being male and scoring a moderate or maximum risk affects the likelihood of
rearrest while on probation supervision. Aside from risk category, GENDER
emerges as a significant independent indicator to predict the likelihood of
Population Profile
Low Risk, Female, All Others N=87
Low Risk, Female, Pac. Isle. N=70
Low Risk, Male, All Others N =372
Low Risk, Male, Pac. Isle. N = 169
High Risk, Female, All Others N =37
High Risk, Female, Pac. Isle. N =38
High Risk, Male, All Others N = 153
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Two, there is an unequal number of clients sentenced to probation across
ethnic lines. The percentage of those within the 4 categories of ethnicity showed
more Pacific Islanders are sentenced to probation than any other ethnic group.
Three, the probation population is a highly selective population. The
majority of those sentenced to probation are usually minimum risk. Ethnicity
may be related to recidivism in the parole population.
The study tables feature minimum risk clients as remaining rearrest free
within the 2 year fiscal period. There are differences across sex and probation




1. The authors acknowledge with great appreciation the cooperation of Nathan Kim, then the
Administrator. Adult Probation Division, 1st Circuit, State of Hawaii. Conclusions in this
paper are ou; own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Adult Probation
Division.
2. There is a great deal of ideological and largely rhetorical writing on probation. Harris and
McAnnay's chapters in McAnnay, Homson and Fogel (1984) are good reviews of
contemporary policy issues, Petersillia (1985) and Petersillia and Turner (1986) provide
summaries of evaluation of probation effectiveness and Guynes (1988) discusses operational
problems resulting from a decade of rapid expansion.
3. Asian includes Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Indo-Chinese. The "other" category include
persons of Portuguese ancestry or persons of mixed ancestry.
4. A "tracking number" is a number attached to the police "rap" sheet on the report.
This report has presented data from a study of 1130 probationers on
probation in 1985/86 and followed on probation through June 1988. Risk,
measured by an eleven item scale, predicted rearrest, even after case workload
was presumably allocated to give higher risk probationers more supervision time.
Risk was correlated with gender and ethnicity. The data shows risk is lower for
women than for men and risk is higher for Pacific Islanders than for all other
ethnic groups. Risk predicted rearrest net of the effects of gender and ethnicity.
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DAvm HIEAUKULANI
Editor's note. Dr. Heaukulani served as a member of the
Governor's Corrections Task Force and undertook this research
in 1987for this committee. He expected to include it in the final
report by the Task Force. When the committee chair announced
that no report will be issued by the committee, he delivered his
findings to the 1989 conference of the Hawaii Sociological
Association.
THE PROBLEM
A class action filed in the U.S. District Court of Hawaii on September
14, 1984 alleged, among other things, that "severe overcrowding at both the
Oahu Community Correctional Center and the Hawaii Women's Correctional
Facility not only exacerbates but, in fact, is frequently the root cause for the
many deficient conditions at the prison" (Spear v. Ariyoshi, 1984). The National
Prison project of the ACLU was leading the challenge. Within the same month,
former Governor George Ariyoshi appointed a Corrections Task Force to
address the overcrowding issue.
The task at hand was formidable. National prison data listed Hawaii as
having the highest inmate density out of 50 states and the District of Columbia
as of June 30, 1984 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986). Hawaii had a density
rating of 31.3 square feet per inmate which was well below the American
Correctional Association's minimum standard of 60 square feet of bed space per
inmate. I In another national report, Hawaii· was listed as having the highest
capacity percentage at 182 percent in comparison to the other 50 states and the
District of Columbia (Greenfeld, 1986). To compound the issue, the state
practiced triple bunking, i.e., two inmates on a double bunk and one on the floor
in a cell space designed for one inmate. Some prison administrators refer to this
as maximum capacity adjustment. 2 Despite the adjustments, Hawaii's prison
population definitely outgrew its rated bed capacity by 1978 as depicted in
Table 1.
The situation became acute enough by 1984 to justify a federal court
action. Faced with an increasing inmate population and the trend of federal
court decisions in other states, Hawaii opted to enter into a consent decree by
October 1, 1985 rather than risk a probable adverse court ruling. The consent
decree required the state to meet certain conditions within a reasonable time.
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The conditions were directed towards improvement in the facilities and services.
The plans and programs to meet those conditions were to be monitored by
several panels of experts. Throughout the succeeding years, the state has been
unable to satisfy the experts in many cases and the issue remains problematical.
The current remedy that has surfaced as of May, 1989 is to appoint a corrections
master.
A corrections master is not a panacea. The appointment of a master
indicates that the inmate population problem is beyond the control of local
resources. For the purposes of this paper, the problem of prison population
control is the subject of discussion. Popular assumptions to explain the
overcrowding problem will be examined to determine the direction for further
research.
field. The observations here merely represent a preliminary examination that
was conducted to determine the direction of further research into the problem.
Relative to the crime rate, some observers consider the level of crime to
covary with the level of incarceration. Austin and Krisberg (1985) report that:
Historically, an inverse relationship between crime rates and
imprisonment or other criminal sanction has been consistently
reported. Thus, as crime rates increased, we witness decreases
in the rates of persons put under correctional supervision.
Similarly, correctional caseloads seem to grow when crime rates
were declining. This relationship continues to the present.




























































Similarly, local police and prosecutors believe that the incapacitation of
offenders will tend to decrease the crime problem. 3 From the standpoint of
prison crowding, it is suggested that increased police and prosecutorial activities
will result in a spillover effect on the corrections system. For example, the
campaign against drunk driving has increased the DUI court workload and the
corollary jail sentences have taxed the weekend jail spaces. 4 Other collateral
issues involve policy issues such as Act 104, Session Laws of Hawaii 1979
which funded prosecutorial efforts to target career criminals.
The demographic relationship to prison population reflects a pattern of
age, sex and race. According to national data, the prison population tends to be
between the ages of 20 and 29, male, and Black (Langan, 1985; Bureau of
Justice Statistics Bulletin 1984; Beck and Hester, 1986). In Hawaii, the
population at risk appears to be between the ages of 20 and 29, male and
Polynesian (State Intake Service Centers, 1985).5 The assumption relative to
demographics suggests a positive correlation between an increase in the at-risk
group in the general population and the increase in incarcerations.
I
Source: Martha Torney, Program Planning Report, DSSH Corrections Division (Jan. 1985).
ASSUMPTIONS ON PR][SON OVERCROWmNG
The assumptions selected for observation in this paper do not represent
the total possible range of explanations for the prison situation. These are
merely slices from a whole realm of factors. The factors under consideration
were selected, in part, by a subcommittee on the State Corrections Task Force.
These include the incidence of crime, police activity, prosecutorial activity,
demographics in terms of age, sex, and race, economics in terms of
unemployment, sentencing patterns, and the planning process by the corrections
The economic relationship is an assumption that criminal activity
increases as unemployment rises. McGahey of New York University (1986)6
voices a common observation regarding this relationship:
Many people who are arrested for common street crimes are poor
and unemployed, as are most prison inmates. Offenders and
prisoners are much more likely to be poor and unemployed than
the general population.... It may seem logical to conclude that
unemployment and poverty are major causes of crime and that
crime could be reduced substantially by employment programs.
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Sentencing is another assumption to explain prison overcrowding. The
relationship to sentencing and prison overcrowding can be observed in several
ways. Mandatory sentencing is the automatic way to fill up correctional
facilities. A convicted class "A" felon will receive a mandatory 20-year sentence
without discussion. Of course, the legislature must share the responsibility for
crowded conditions if mandatory sentences are driving up incarcerations as the
legislature amended the penal code each year from 1976 to 1982 with respect to
sentencing. 7
Another way that the sentencing variable is observed is the assumption
that the judge's discretion has a lot to, do with who goes in and who stays out.
Indeed, in one survey of 29 jurisdictions, Hawaii had the third highest median
sentence at 117 months for the crime ofrobbery (Minor-Harper and Greenfeld,
1985). And yet, only 6 jurisdictions in that survey had a lower violent crime
rate than Hawaii. Moreover, at the height of its population crisis, Hawaii had
the highest overall length of stay (time served in prison) in the nation at 48
months (Adams, 1987).
The final assumption is directed at the planning efforts of the corrections
division. Given the observed linear crime trends, normal population growth,
possible changes in the economy, observed emphasis by police, prosecutors,
legislators, and possibly judges, why is there a shortfall in terms of facilities?
The Corrections Director argues that the Corrections Department is not
responsible for sending people to prison (Falk, 1988). This is a valid statement.
However, the administrators responsible for correctional facilities must respond
to the question in terms of their planning efforts.
Given these assumptions, the discussion must turn towards the
examination of available data to verify or refute these popular explanations for
the crowding situation. It should be noted that these explanations are not
exclusive to the problem. Nor is it suggested that this examination will give
absolute answers. This is merely an attempt to examine selected variables that
may have some association with the problem of overcrowding.
METHODOLOGY
To examine the relationship between crime and incarceration, selected
offenses over a 13-year period were correlated with the annual mean inmate
population. The selected offenses were murder, rape, robbery, burglary and
theft for the state of Hawaii. The 13-year period included the years from 1973
through 1985. The data set of offenses were selected arbitrarily. The 13-year
period represents the time period before, during, and after the overcrowding
crisis.
The time period and the annual mean inmate data were divided into 3
subsets each. The annual mean inmate data subsets were given a I-year lag
difference. Accordingly, the first subsets consist of a 12-year selected offenses
group for 1973-1984 and an annual mean inmate population group for 1974-
1985. The 8-year subsets comprise the 1973-1980 offense group to be compared
to the 1974-1981 inmate group. Finally, the 6-year subsets contain the 1979-
1984 offense group and the 1980-1985 inmate group.
The data were divided into subsets of different time periods to
demonstrate that different correlations can be obtained for different time frames.
This is intended to present the several perspectives or results that can be obtained
if crime trends are utilized to explain incarceration trends.
Another crime data set of the traditional crime index total, violent index,
property index, and drug-related offenses from 1976 through 1986 was likewise
compared with the annual mean inmate data. The lO-year period from 1976 to
1985 of these offenses was compared with the lO-year period of 1977 to 1986
of the inmate group with a I-year lag difference.
Examination of the police activity focused on two limited areas: actual
offenses reported to the police and the number of adults arrested and charged.
The data were compiled for the 1973 through 1985 calendar-year periods. The
data compilation was limited to information obtained for the Honolulu Police
activity. The Honolulu Police activity represents approximately 80 percent of
the total state crime data. A simple correlation analysis was conducted between
the police data and the annual inmate population data.
An examination of the prosecutorial activity was limited to the first
judicial circuit (Honolulu county) which accounts for approximately 80 percent
of the crime activity. This circuit was selected arbitrarily because the Honolulu
prosecutor articulated a campaign of vigorous prosecution, no plea bargains, and
priority to incarcerating all convicted offenders.
The record of grand jury true bills via the Honolulu prosecutor was
tabulated for fiscal years 1978 through 1984. This time frame coincides with the
prosecutor's first term in office and with the start of prison overcrowding. The
grand jury process is a fair indicator of the prosecutor's initiative. The grand
jury data were correlated with the annual mean inmate population data, as well
as the crime index, and first degree arrests and charges for robbery, burglary,
and drugs. These last three offenses were selected arbitrarily as they represent
the barometer that the crime analysis unit of the Honolulu Police Department
applies to the community's crime problem in terms of violent crime, property
crime, and vice activity.
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a State total for murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and theft.
b Annual mean is for fiscal years.
Sources: Crime in Hawaii, (Honolulu: Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center), Annual Reports
1973-1975; Crime in the United States, FBI Annual Reports, 1973-1985; Corrections
Division Operations: Summary Datafor Fiscal Year 73/74-84/85, undated report; and
Martha Torney, Program Planning Report, (January, 1985).
Selected Offenses and Annual Mean Inmate Population, by Year
Pearson Coefficients for Annual Mean Population and Selected
Offenses, by U-Years, 8-Years, mull 6-Years Subsets
An examination of the traditional crime index plus drug-related crimes
compared with the annual mean inmate population will give lI;1' yet another set
of correlation figures. Table 4 depicts the crime data. In this data distribution
The demographic variables were examined in terms of age and race. The
age for felons at time of commitment to prison was tabulated for the years 1976
through 1984. This was compared to the census of males in the age cohort of
20-29. The distribution of incarcerated persons by race was compared to the
general population by race categories as reported in the 1980 census.
Examination of sentencing patterns were limited to official court data for
the fiscal years 1980/81 through 1985/86. This period represents the
overcrowding time frame. The four judicial circuits of Hawaii were compared
with each other to determine if dispositions were similar. If mandatory
sentencing removes discretion from judges, we would observe similar
dispositions if all things are equal. Should there be significant differences in
dispositions between circuits, it would indicate discretionary decisions are more
of a determinant than legislated mandatory sentences. The annual statistical
supplements published by the Hawaii State Judiciary were used as the primary
source. The court caseload for Part I crimes being processed by the judiciary
was selected for analysis. The key variables to be compared are incarcerations
and probations.
To assess the planning responsibility of the corrections administrators,
planning documents and/or budget documents will be reviewed. The purpose is
to determine if the corrections field anticipated the increased level of the inmate
population.
JFKNDKNGS
Table 2 illustrates the distribution of selected offenses and the annual
mean daily inmate population for a 13-year period. As noted in Table 1, the
inmate headcount began to exceed rated bed capacity in the 1978-1979 fiscal
year. The inmate population continued to rise accordingly in contrast to the
frequency of the selected offenses. The reported crime frequency reached its
peak in 1980 and started a reverse trend thereafter.
The distribution was examined in terms of three different time periods.
The purpose was to display the different correlations that can be obtained from
three different perspectives. That is, from a 12-year, an 8-year, and a 6-year
span respectively. Table 3 illustrates the differences. Thus, if we were to
observe the crime distribution for the 6 years after the overcrowding began in
1978-1979, we would get a correlation that supports the Austin and Krisberg
observation. On the other hand, if we examine the 8-year or 12-year span that
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we observe that the total index, the violent index, and property index peaked in
1980. The drug-related offenses peaked in 1981.
specific crimes. It should be noted that correlations are merely statistical
treatments of the data and do not indicate causal relationships.
Pearson Coefficients for Annual Mean Population and 'rotal,
Violent, and Property Crime Indexes and Drug-Related
Offenses, by lO-Year Subsets
'rable 4 'rotal, Violent, and Property Crime Index and Drug-Related
Offenses, by Year
Year Total Violent Property Drug-Related
1976 56,039 2,031 54,008 2,956
_1977 58,549 2,009 56,540 4,059
1978 63,934 2,419 61,515 4,391
1979 66,245 2,647 63,598 4,663
1980 72,102 2,887 69,215 4,992
1981 64,060 2,424 61,636 7,011
1982 65,448 2,542 62,906 5,486
1983 59,432 2,579 56,853 6,999
1984 56,913 2,408 54,505 6,420
1985 54,814 2,313 52,501 6,389
1986 60,230 2,604 57,626 n/a
Sources: Annual published reports of Hawaii, Honolulu, Kauai, and Maui county police



















A correlation analysis on the data in Table 4 produces different results
as illustrated in Table 5. With a lO-year base period we observe a moderate
inverse correlation among the total crime index, the property crime index, and
the annual mean inmate population. These inverse correlations compare
favorably with the Austin and Krisberg observation. Conversely, there is a
slight positive correlation for the violent crime index and a high positive
correlation for the drug-related offenses.
Therein lies a contradiction of sorts. One explanation for the Austin and
Krisberg observation is that crime tends to decrease because a greater number
of offenders responsible for criminal activity are incapacitated. The high
correlation between drug-related offenses and inmate population tend to offset
this argument. We do know that Class "A" drug offenses carry a mandatory
prison sentence and that this offender group receives special attention by the
police and prosecutors in Hawaii.
In any event, the relationship between crime and inmate population
increases is not as clear as Austin and Krisberg purport. The Hawaii data give
partial support to the observation, but it also points out some contradictions for
The police activity for reported offenses and adults arrested and charged
is presented in Table 6. Similar to the crime index and selected offenses
reported above, the actual offenses reported to the police reached its highest
point in 1980 and tapers off thereafter. However, the activity relative to adults
arrested and charged depicts a steady increase overall. Where the 13-year period
indicates a 4.3 percent increase overall for actual offenses, the adults arrested
and charged had a 7.8 percent increase. In comparison, the annual mean inmate
population experienced an 18.1 percent increase for the same period. There is
a moderate correlation (r= .55) between actual offenses and inmate population.
Similarly, there is a high correlation (r= .95) between adults arrested and
charged and the inmate population increase.
If we examine the arrest data for drug-related offenses that were
tabulated in Table 4, we observe a high correlation of .87 with the inmate
population. Likewise, there is a .67 correlation with violent crime arrests and
a .73 correlation with property crime arrests. Therefore, it would appear to be
an expected observation that inmate population would increase~as the police
activity increases.
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Indeed, the overflow of weekend prisoners has been attributed to the
increase in weekend sentences for DDI (driving under the influence of alcohol)
which is directly related to the active DDI selective enforcement by the police
over the past five years. Accordingly, the police activity should be taken into
account in determining any impact on the corrections end of the criminal justice
system.
'fabRe 6 ActuaU Offenses and Adults Arrested and Charged, 1973
through 1985
incarcerations, the greater the increase in the prison population. One could
argue the Austin and Krisberg observation. That is, the higher the incarceration
rate, the lower the crime rate. Therefore, if there is no crime problem, then
there are no police and prosecutor workloads. The police data contradicts this
as mentioned above. The police did increase its workload although the crime
index decreased correspondingly. Again, this is not to say that this analysis
gives a causal explanation. Moreover, grand jury true bills may not, as stated
above, be a fair indication of prosecutorial priority efforts to fight the crime
problem.
Source: City and County of Honolulu, Annual Reports, fiscal years 1978-1983




























































Source: Honolulu Police Department, Annual Statistical Reports, 1973-1985.
Table 7 contains the distributions of grand jury true bills for the First
Circuit of Hawaii for fiscal years 1978 through 1984. It is interesting to note
that the true bills during the first term of the newly elected prosecutor did not
approach the high point of 1,641 true bills registered by the previous appointed
prosecutor. Moreover, the low point of 1,121 occurs at the end of this first
term. There is a slight inverse correlation between the true bills distribution and
the annual mean inmate population (r=-.26). There are also inverse
relationships between the true bills returned by the grand jury and the crime
index (r=-.09), burglary (r=-.56) and robbery (r=-.71). Conversely, there is
a slight positive correlation of .14 between true bills returned and the arrests and
charges for dangerous drugs.
Similar to the police experience, it would be expected that a pOSItIve
correlation would be observed between prosecutorial activity and incarceration;
that is, the greater the emphasis on achieving convictions and subsequent
Table 8 Age at 'fime of Commitment for Felons in the Hawaii Prison
System, by Year
Age Group
Year <20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 >44 Unk.
1976 39 123 86 39 17 7 9 29
1977 36 124 102 38 16 9 8 50
1978 47 155 110 43 20 13 12 18
1979 57 150 120 47 21 19 12 18
1980 60 220 149 75 29 21 20 52
1981 50 232 166 76 30 23 24 99
1982 50 306 198 90 43 34 37 95
1983 51 282 204 117 62 41 49 161
1984 74 383 266 139 91 48 63 112
Source: Hawaii's Felons: A Statistical Report On Hawaii's Prison Population, Report No. 85-
001, State Intake Service Centers (August, 1985), p. A-6.
The demographic variable in terms of age at the time of ~ommitment to
the Hawaii Prison System is depicted in Table 8. The data illustrate the fact that
the age cohorts of 20-24 and 25-29 represent the plurality at 33 and 23 percents
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respectively. Collectively, the combined age cohort of 20-29 represents the
majority at 56 percent. This compares favorably with the national data on
inmate demographics.
Table 9 denotes the census distribution of males for the ages 20-29 from
1976 through 1984 which corresponds with the time period of Table 6 above.
A high correlation (r=.91) is obtained when the 20-29 age group of felons is
compared with the census of the same age group for the 1976-1984 time period.
This would indicate that the population growth of the at-risk group of young
males moved in the same direction as the commitment of felons in the 20-29 age
group. This does not necessarily mean that the incarceration of the at-risk
population kept pace with the general population of the 20-29 group. For one
thing, the mean annual percent increase in the commitments of the 20-29 group
is 14.12 as compared to 1.21 percent for the census data. The age variable
alone cannot explain the incarceration excess.
Census of Males, Ages 20-29 in the State of Hawaii, 1976-1984
1986 Data Book, and Statistical Report #179 on annual averages, Department of









































Table 10 Hawaii Felon Population By lRace: 1976-1984
Percent figure in parentheses. Percent is rounded off and may not sum to 100.
Sources: Hawaii's Felons: A Statistical Report On Hawaii's Prison Population, Report No. 85-
001, State Intake Service Centers (August, 1985), p. A-7; and 1980 Census Of
Population and Housing: Honolulu, Hawaii, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1983), Table P-7.
It should be noted that the Hawaiian/part-Hawaiian population figure is
probably considerably higher than the figure of 80,172 reported in the 1980
census. The census definition took the race of the mother if a person had
parents who were not of the same race. The estimates used by the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs is about 117,000. Nonetheless, the Hawaiian/part-Hawaiian
group in the State of Hawaii tends to be associated statistically with the negative
aspects of social life such as crime, imprisonment, poor health, and educational
and economic disap.vantages.
compare with the same observations on Blacks and incarceration in other areas
























With regard to the race variable, Table 10 indicates that the Blacks are
just 2 percentage points over its comparative general population figures. This
does not match the national data regarding Blacks as an at-risk racial group. It
appears that the Hawaiians/part-Hawaiians and Samoans are much more over
represented in comparison to their general population distributions. It has been
common knowledge in corrections circles that the Polynesian group comprises
the plurality of incarcerated felons, especially the Hawaiian/part-Hawaiian
category. However, race should not be considered as an independent variable.
The author found socio-economic status to be a determinant for the relationship
between crime and the Polynesian group (Heaukulani, 1987). This would
The economic factor and its relationship to prison overcrowding was
examined in terms of the unemployment factor. Table 11 shows the number of
unemployed persons and the rate of unemployment for the Hawaii civilian labor
force for the 13-year period from 1973 to 1985. The mean annual percent
change for the unemployment frequency is -0.8 as compared to an 18.1 percent
mean annual change for the inmate population. When we compare the rates of
unemployment and inmate population with the civilian labor force we can
observe a statistically significant inverse correlation (r=-.61). This finding will
tend to reject the assumption that increasing unemployment dfii~es up the crime
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rates which will result in a greater probability of arrests, convictions and
incarcerations. In the Hawaii case, the unemployment has dropped to
unprecedented low levels and the economy is healthy. It does not follow that
incarceration should reach excessive levels as a result of low unemployment
rates.
are incarcerated as opposed to the use of alternatives. The noted differences also
tend to dispel mandatory sentencing as a prime cause. In fact, a Crime
Commission study in 1984 could not find conclusive evidence that the increasing
rate of imprisonment is attributed to the mandatory sentencing of Class A felons
(Hawaii Crime Commission, 1984).
Sources: 1986 Data Book, "Employment Status of the Labor Force," Table 353; and 1985 Data
Book, Table 329.
A salient point to note is that the Second Circuit had a higher Part I
caseload at 835 as compared to the Third Circuit at 731. More importantly,
when this writer asked Second Circuit court Judge Mossman in 1986 why the
Maui county had a low incarceration rate, he replied that he does not send
people to prison unless he absolutely has to. This is important because it
indicates that sentencing discretion may be a prime determinant as to how many
Table 12 is a distribution of the court data for the four judicial circuits
of Hawaii. It is observed that there are distinct differences in dispositions. In
the Second Circuit (Maui county), the use of probation exceeds the level of the
Part I caseload and incarcerations. In the Third Circuit (Hawaii Island), the use
of incarcerations exceeded probation since 1981. The results were readily
observed when the Corrections Task Force visited the Third Circuit's
Community Correctional Center in 1984. The headcount was over the rated
capacity and inmates used temporary sleeping areas in the recreation room.
When the Second Circuit was visited by this writer in 1985, the headcount did
not reach the rated maximum capacity and vacant sleeping areas were noted.
Table U Employment ])ata Of Hawaii: 1973-1985 Table 12 Part I Caseload, Probation, and JIncarcel"ation for Hawaii
Judicial Circuits: JF'Y 1980-1985
Fiscal Year Circuit Part I Cases Probation Incarceration
1980 1st 533 409 209
2nd 92 110 25
3rd 119 59 43
5th 24 44 19
1981 1st 653 336 229
2nd 108 191 29
3rd 109 42 57
5th 56 67 15
1982 1st 495 410 236
2nd 116 210 45
3rd 80 31 82
5th 46 45 18
1983 1st 1485 899 577
2nd 166 242 47
3rd 202 60 158
5th 68 45 9
1984 1st 929 817 467
2nd 219 288 51
3rd 116 27 152
5th 52 45 39
1985 1st 1263 699 363
2nd 134 267 48
3rd 105 19 155
5th 18 25 35
Note: There is no 4th Judicial Circuit in Hawaii.
Sources: The Judiciary State ofHawaii: Annual Report Statistical Supplement, fiscal years 1980
through 1985.
Finally, the planning responsibility of the corrections field was reviewed
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planners in the Corrections Department had made accurate estimates of future
inmate populations. The plan reported a projected inmate population of 1,970
adults for the 1985/86 fiscal year (Department of Social Services and Housing,
1982). As noted in Table 1 above, the actual mean annual headcount for fiscal
year 1985/86 was reported at 1,921. The projections were uncannily accurate.
However, the funding support to maintain those projections was not forthcoming.
Even the funding for the new medium security facility was cut in half. If the
new facility was constructed according to the rated capacity of the initial plan,
the current crowding problem would probably not exist.
CONCLUSION
The observations of this paper represent an attempt to examine some of
the popular assumptions attributed to prison overcrowding as it relates to the
Hawaii problem. The selections were made by a subcommittee of the
Corrections Task Force appointed by the Governor. These assumptions included
crime, police and prosecutor activity, demographics in terms of age, sex and
race, economics relative to unemployment, sentencing patterns, and planning by
corrections administrators.
Statistically significant correlations can be obtained between the crime
distribution and the annual mean inmate population. Depending upon the years
selected for the crime figures, positive or negative correlations can be observed.
There is support for the Austin and Krisberg hypothesis that crime decreases as
inmate population increases if the correlation is made for the six-year period
after fiscal year 1978/79 when the overcrowding began. It is not supported if
the correlation is observed for an 8-year or 12-year period that includes the years
prior to, and after, the overcrowding.
The observation between police activity and inmate population indicates
a positive correlation. Although the incidence of crime decreased after 1980, the
police activity continued to increase. A high positive correlation between adults
arrested and charged and the inmate population was observed for the First
Judicial Circuit which represents approximately 80 percent of the crime activity.
The activity of the Honolulu Prosecutor's Office was examined because
the assumption was made that the "get tough" policy of that Office may have had
an impact on the inmate population. The return of true bills from the grand jury
during the new prosecutor's first term of office did not, in any particular year,
reach the highest level of the previous prosecutor's last term in office. There
was a low inverse correlation between true bills returned and the increase in the
inmate. population.
The examination of demographic data tends to represent the same trend
that is observed in the United States. The at-risk population of males, ages 20-
29, represent the majority of incarcerated felons. If race is used as a variable,
the Hawaii observation indicates that Hawaiians/part-Hawaiians and Samoans are
at-risk as compared to Blacks in other areas of the United States. Race should
not be considered as an independent variable because socioeconomic status has
been shown to be the significant determinant that is correlated with crime and
the Polynesian group.
The unemployment assumption does not appear to be related to the
inmate population increase. As unemployment decreased in the state overall, the
inmate population increased. This inverse correlation goes against the trend of
thought because the popular explanation states that poverty breeds crime and the
increase in crime will be reflected in increased incarcerations.
Sentencing patterns indicate that judicial discretion can have an adverse
effect on the number of persons incarcerated. In a comparison between the
Second and Third Circuits, the Second Circuit had a higher level of probation
dispositions over incarcerations. Conversely, the Third Circuit had a higher
level of incarceration dispositions over probation. Moreover, the Second Circuit
had a higher caseload of Part I offenses. If all things are equal under the law,
sentencing patterns should be consistent in all Circuits.
Finally, the planning process of the Corrections Division for the
Department of Social Services and Housing cannot be faulted for not anticipating
the inmate population crunch. Accurate estimates were made for the decade of
1980.
This is not to say that fault or responsibility should be singled out. The
problem is complex and the responsibility to resolve it can be shared by all.
There are multiple reasons for the overcrowding problem (See The Edna
McConnell Clark Foundation, 1982). This paper represents a cursory analysis
of some of the popular reasons that are espoused. Further research into
differences in the sentencing patterns between Judicial Circuits is recommended.
NOTES
1. The ACA standard of 60 square feet per inmate bed space area is reinforced by at least one
court ruling, i.e., Pugh v. Lock, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) aff-d as modified 559
F.2D 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
-,L -------------------------
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2. Maximum capacity entails adjustments to the rated design bed capacity. In the case of
Hawaii, the design capacity for the new Halawa Medium Security Facility that opened in
1987 was set at 496. By administrative policy, the capacity was doubled to 992 and this
adjustment remains controversial to date. For a discussion on the design capacity and
maximum capacity in the Hawaii system, see Ault (1983). See also, Mullen (1985).
3. Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee by representatives of the Honolulu Police
and the Honolulu Prosecuting Attorney, Senate Hearings on Penal Code Refonn, 1986
Hawaii Legislative Session.
4. Statement by Deputy Corrections Administrator T. Sakai, March, 1985.
5. The Polynesian racial group is comprised of Hawaiians, Part-Hawaiians, and Samoans.
6. See also Thompson, et al. (1982).
7. Mandatory sentencing and related laws that coincide with the critical years of overcrowding
include Act 181 SLH 1976; Act 210 SLH 1978; Act 98 SLH 1979; Act 284 SLH 1980; Act
69 SLH 1981; Act 166 SLH 1981; Act 206 SLH 1982; and Act 246 SLH 1982.
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][NTR.ODUCnON
Recognizing the alarming magnitude of the spouse abuse problem
nationally, emergency shelters have developed across the country. Battered
women can now find temporary refuge in more than 700 shelters today in
America (McLeer and Anwar, 1989). The growth of this shelter movement,
however, has been met by little systematic and credible analyses of how shelters
operate or impact their resident populations (Berk, Newton, & Berk, 1986;
McEvoy, Brookings and Brown, 1983; Loseke and Berk, 1982).
One research theme, mentioned in the still sparse literature on shelters,
is, however, the perception of shelters among helping agencies and professions.
These perceptions range from seeing the shelter as "the only direct, immediate,
and satisfactory solution to the problem of wife abuse" (Martin, 1976) to not
seeing the shelter at all as an available community resource (Davis, 1984). A
second theme in the literature regards victim eligibility and in-house processing
by shelters. This processing of abuse victims highlights desirable and
undesirable resident attributions as perceived and acted upon by shelter staff.
Loseke and Berk (1982) noted that such interactions are often based on the
assumption
... that only those women who have made the decision to leave
their homes will contact shelters, and that once contact is made,
women will "automatically" enter as shelter residents.
Ferraro (1981), on the other hand, found the organizational philosophy,
beliefs, and actions of shelter staff were the "critical variables in the outcome of
battered women's contacts with the shelter." Ridington (1977-78), Rodrigues
(1988), and Chang (1988) specifically described how shelters with a feminist
perspective encourage residents' progress toward becoming independent
household heads or "self-savers," aware of their competence and capabilities for
decreasing their psychological dependency and subordination to men.
A third research focus concentrates on the relationship between resident
needs and available shelter services. In providing emergency services, shelters,
according to Giles-Sim (1983), have an empowering effect on their residents.
However, McEvoy, Brookings and Brown (1983) found such a positive impact
of shelters subverted by the shelter's inattentiveness to problems of public
awareness, staff burnout, and interagency communication. That abused women
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may experience this lack of correspondence between their perceived needs and
available shelter services was also found by Loseke and Berk (1982) who pointed
out that the presumption of any relationship between victim needs and shelter
services overlooks the reality that shelters may lack, because of their limited
resources and the diversity of victim needs, those support services, especially
those long-term, sought by prospective residents.
A fourth research focus concerns the cooptation of feminist shelters into
traditional social service organizations. Now a nationwide trend, such cooptation
tends to "individualize, medicalize and depoliticize" the spouse abuse problem
in order to comply with policies of most funding agencies (Rodrigues, 1988).
Despite such discernible themes, the available research on shelters and
particularly on their impact on spouse abuse
. ..has left policy makers with little on which to build effective
(and cost-effective) interventions. (Berk, Newton, and Berk,
1986)
This article addresses such a research lacunae by describing a domestic
violence shelter (hereafter called CA) in terms of its "symbolic bureaucratic"
(Jacobs, 1974) nature--an organizational feature that has critical implications for
the relationship between client needs and shelter services and for the future
development and implementation of shelter programs. The article argues that
CA's progressive institutional embedding in a large, conservative social service
bureaucracy (hereafter called SSA) resulted in its transformation into what Jerry
Jacobs calls a "symbolic bureaucracy"; this organizational incorporation has,
moreover, impacted significantly the shelter's original goals and its internal
structure and functioning.
THE SYMBOLIC BUREAUCRACY
Since the late 19th century, bureaucracy has been approached from two
points of view by classical sociologists like Weber, Mosca, and Michels
(Eisenstadt, 1959). According to one perspective, bureaucracy is any formal,
hierarchal organization which is rationally oriented toward stated goals that
define the manifest or formal purpose of the organization and that are
accomplished via formal structures of the organization (Taylor and Bogdan,
1980). As SUCh, a bureaucracy is seen as "an epitome of rationality and of
efficient implementation of goals and provision of services" (Eisenstadt, 1959).
An alternative and not necessarily contradictory view sees bureaucratic
organizations as primarily instruments of power, controlling individuals and
continually expanding its influence over many different areas beyond its original
purpose (ibid.).
Whether a goal implementer or power structure, a bureaucracy is
characterized by four essential features that have been identified by Blau as:
"... specialization, hierarchy of authority, system of rules and impersonality"
(Jacobs, 1974). However, Jacobs argues that sometimes bureaucratic structures
exhibit a symbolic nature, which arises whenever the organization deviates from
those four recognized prerequisite conditions of a bureaucracy while portraying
an image of its adherence to such ideals. Jacobs cites a welfare agency in which
he worked as exemplary of his concept of a "symbolic bureaucracy." How CA,
as a symbolic bureaucratic organization, also deviated from each of Blau's four
bureaucratic ideals is described below along with how its present parent agency's
bureaucratization of the shelter, through its administrative takeover, impacted the
shelter's originally conceived purposes, structure and overall functioning .
METHODOLOGY
The article employs an interpretive retrospective approach in analyzing
the author's observations and experiences as a shelter employee from 1980-1987.
In employing this method of analysis that is analogous to an interpretive
historical approach as defined by Skocpol (1984), the author specifically uses an
explicitly stated conceptual framework to define the central research concern of
the paper and to guide the selection and presentation of recalled events.
Given the possibility of recall bias, additional information were,
however, also derived from a review of published and unpublished materials
about the shelter in question and about its present and former parent agencies,
like annual shelter reports, program flyers, and staff communiques, made
available to the author.
Moreover, purposefully focused and partly open-ended, face-to-face
interviews with the author's former co-workers, employed during that above
period, were also conducted. Only eight such co-workers were locatable for
interviewing. Three were also former shelter residents and three were those
shelter staff carried over by the present parent agency of the shelter. Before
focusing on CA's characterization as a "symbolic bureaucracy," the paper briefly
presents that shelter's historical background to provide the context against which
its organizational transformation and accompanying effects must be seen.
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HISTORIICAL BACKGROUND
CA was an offshoot of community development efforts in one of the
more populated counties in the state in the 1970's. For prior to CA's creation,
comprehensive and coordinated support services for family violence victims,
especially abused spouses with children, were largely lacking in the state. Legal
services were particularly problematic; the police had no official policy for
arresting abusers and tended to view family violence as private or cultural, not
criminal, matters. Vigorous intervention by even the prosecutorial and judicial
systems was uncommon. Victim advocates for those wishing to prosecute their
abusers were few in number as well. Even the medical and health professions
were not adequately trained and staffed to recognize the "battered woman" and
tended to treat such clients from a biological Or mental health model of patients;
thus intervention from those health systems was minimal too. The trauma of
family violence for its victims was undoubtedly worsened by the lack of adequate
and coordinated support services in the community.
With the resultant heightened concern in the early 1970s over family
violence in the state, a large, private social service agency (hereafter called SSA)
helped organize a committee to review the problem and to propose
recommendations for closing the observed gap in available social services for
family violence victims. In particular, there was clearly a need for a safe,
transitional community-based setting to provide 24-hour emergency shelter
services for such victims. By the mid 1970s, the first of such shelters, CA, was
developed as a demonstration project in one outlying community. A selected
delegate agency (hereafter called DVA) was placed in charge of operating CA.
DVA was itself a small, grass-roots non-profit group incorporated to promote
health and family reconciliation.
As CA's initial parent agency, DVA set shelter policies and procedures
by establishing a planning or steering committee, comprised of representatives
from social service agencies, abuse victims, medical and legal professionals and
its own Board of Directors. As a result of their collective efforts, CA opened
up as a 24-hour emergency shelter to only abused spouses with children for a
temporary maximum stay of five working days on a first come, first serve basis.
Up to three stays were permitted as a rule for each resident. A central goal of
CA was to help women realize that they could make the decision to end the
abuse. Consequently, in promoting self-change, CA generally did not encourage
longer or more frequent stays by residents.
As a shelter with only 5 bedrooms, CA offered no direct services other
than providing bed and board, clothing, and in-house or hotline counseling in a
supportive, homelike atmosphere for which financial donations from residents
were welcomed, but not mandatory. Referral information to emergency
domestic violence services was also provided by CA's small and dedicated staff,
who comprised at first a resident manager, an assistant, two regular weekend
relief staff, and occasional volunteers. Initially staff comprised both male and
female workers and until 1981, achieved success rates, based on self-reports by
residents leaving abusive relations, of approximately 64%. Since its opening,
CA was virtually autonomous in its operations and decision-making. The
professionalization and hierarchal stratification of its staff were, moreover,
downplayed, facilitating thereby the ready development of primary group ties
among staff and between staff and residents.
By 1981, however, CA was administratively taken over by SSA, since
DVA was not a statewide social service provider and was therefore less capable
of handling the increasing paperwork needed to operate CA. SSA maintains
today the administrative responsibility for CA, which is presently identified as
an integral component of SSA's community-based residential group homes. As
CA's new parent agency, SSA has increasingly imposed its ever changing
organizational norms, practices, and philosophies on CA, although initially SSA
minimally interfered with the shelter's day-to-day operations and
decision-making. Public identification of CA with SSA was actually downplayed
until the mid-1980s when an executive order directed CA staff to identify SSA
as CA's parent agency in answering crisis calls to highlight thereby SSA's
forefront involvement in domestic violence intervention services in the
community.
SSA continues to develop and implement CA services and policies and
to provide for the ongoing funding of the shelter's program operations. Largely
through intensive lobbying, grant proposal writing, and agency fund raising
projects, SSA pursues that critical task. In the late 1980s, funds were also
derived from mandatory in-house "donations" from even part-time relief staff
and from residents (by then designated by SSA as "clients") who were assessed
daily rates for their residential stays. The latter funding source was necessitated
by the higher costs of maintaining SSA's expanded domestic violence shelter
program, which encompassed by 1987, three houses in which residents,
including now childless and single abused women as well, could stay up to two
months. Earlier program changes permitted stays of two weeks, one month, and
up to six months. SSA's expansion of the original shelter population and
residency duration partly developed in response to not only the acquisition of
new governmental funding contracts or private grants for different victim
advocacy services, but also to the growth of other shelters in the community
operated by other social service agencies, feminists, the military, and religious
groups. SSA's competition for the limited funds for shelters from both public
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and private sectors remains the most critical problem for CA apart from its
on-going legitimation and staffing needs (Chang,1984).
The article now addresses the unforeseen consequence of SSA's
administrative take-over of CA, notably CA's transformation as a "symbolic
bureaucracy," by evaluating Blau's four bureaucratic ideals in terms of their
functional and apparent adherence within CA.
SPECIAUZAnON
As the first of these ideals, specialization of role or job tasks was
implemented within CA after CA's structural integration into SSA's own
complex bureaucratic organization as the newest of its group home programs.
This organizational change reportedly aimed at facilitating the processing of
personnel matters for all of SSA's group homes' employees, even though a
clearly different residential population and set of victim needs were being
addressed by CA. Despite this significant difference, specialized positions
paralleling the division of labor in SSA's other group homes were assigned to
CA's carry-over staff. These positions were assigned formal titles like
"Director," "Child Development Aide," "Social Service Aide," and "Client
Social Worker," which was later relabeled "Client Advocate." Detailed role
descriptions for administrative use were drafted up by SSA as well for each of
those differentiated staff positions, whose numbers grew as more shelter services
were added, like the children's treatment component. Moreover, all of the
specialized positions, except those of the Director and Client Social
Worker/Advocate, became categorically known as "paraprofessional" in
counterdistinction to "professional"--the latter title SSA primarily reserved for
its social workers. This official status distinction created by SSA would
contribute by 1987 to staff fragmentation within CA, since SSA's surveillance
and control of CA's paraprofessionals became markedly greater over the
observational period.
SSA's imposition of specialized staff positions, however, did not preclude
CA's staff's exhibiting of extensive role or task sharing in running the shelter.
This was observed particularly in instances of position vacancies and of role
incompetence - commonplace events during the author's employment at CA that
jeopardized when they occurred the actual 24-hour provision of residents'
individualized treatment plans, transportation services, child respite care, and
psychoeducational counseling as envisioned in CA's new litany of formal goals.
The House Manager, Child Development Aide, and even the Client Social
Worker/Advocate roles were the most nonexclusively and irregularly performed;
at least five House Managers, seven Child Development Aides, and six Client
Social Worker/Advocates successively came and went during that time period.
This high turnover of key shelter staff not only led to limiting organizational
goals at those times, but also to working under extremely stressful conditions.
As one former resident-relief staff recalls:
When I was a client, staffing was problematic. CA services
were reduced to providing clothing, food, and a place to stay.
Developing close ties was difficult since she [the social worker]
was so busy trying to run the shelter.
SSA's heavy reliance on the employment of "Relief Staff" for shifts
lasting eight or more hours on weekdays and by 1987, up to 48 hours on
weekends also meant extensive role-sharing. These were paraprofessionals who
took over the shelter's operation after 4 p.m. or whenever the regular weekday
staff left CA's employ or went on scheduled or emergency leaves. Such staff
were to handle by themselves much of the role responsibilities of the above three
positions, however without those positions' formal titles and compensations,
including annual bonuses, to keep the shelter fully operational and presentable
24 hours. In labor shortage crises, even the Director engaged in role-sharing
and when that position holder was not available, SSA's other administrative staff
or CA' s House Manager took over temporarily.
On the whole, CA's staff positions were thus functionally interchangeable
rather than exclusively held and performed by particular individuals. Moreover,
despite SSA's emphasis on specialization, staff professionalization was not
mandatory. Only up to 8 hours of on-the-job training was given for
paraprofessional staff positions before the role incumbent soloed in contrast to
the minimum of 50 hours given to the State's suicide hotline workers. Much of
CA's in-service training was spent familiarizing the trainee with the official
processing of crisis calls and accepted residents, including the accompanying
paperwork involved in screening and doing resident intakes and transportation.
No lengthy formal training for counseling, child care-giving, or housekeeping
was given or even expected of such staff. Even staff development opportunities
were limited and far between during the observation period. So almost anyone
who applied, including paraprofessionals within and outside CA, were hired.
With minimal formal education and technical skills needed, CA's
paraprofessional staff were nevertheless publicly identified in its organizational
flyers as "[q]ualified staff in the areas of domestic violence" although coming
from widely diverse occupational and educational backgrounds, like fine arts,
social sciences, theology, accounting, secretarial arts, food service, home
economics, the military, construction, public transportation services,
cosmetology, and even domestic engineering. Direct or indirect exposure to
domestic violence or even previous shelter experience was also not required of
CA staff applicants.
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Consequently, as far as specialization with its presumption of
professionalization was concerned, it was more professed than realized; there
was simply an expedient division of labor, filled by SSA's liberal hiring and
cost-containing policies rather than the actual employment of professionals or
experts for those administratively recognized staff positions.
HiERARCHY OF AUfHORXTY
As the second bureaucratic ideal, a hierarchy of authority was also
instituted with SSA's administrative takeover of CA. Instead of a democratic or
relatively self-governing shelter as before, a formal hierarchy of control was
envisioned for CA to increase ideally its organizational efficiency and
accountability to the parent agency. This new top-down chain of command was
to reflect therefore the superordination of SSA administrators over CA's entire
carry-over staff; and within CA, to establish the supervisory position of the
Director, who had risen up the ranks as a social worker since the DVA days of
the shelter, over the rest of the shelter staff.
The relief staff, despite their functional indispensability, were noticeably
subordinate in this new chain of command. Minimal input from their ranks was
solicited in determining official shelter policies, particularly those affecting CA
personnel, clients, and program services; for example, in changing weekend
relief schedules from 24 to 48 hours, SSA gave less than one month's notice to
those staff members directly affected.
Those with social work degrees were now, however, pivotal in SSA's
decision-making as it related to CA. This hierarchal arrangement of CA staff
now meant the more visible minority group status of the paraprofessionals,
especially the relief staff, given their observable low organizational status,
economic disadvantage and relative powerlessness within CA. Such a status
difference was particularly highlighted when those individuals sought from SSA
collective wage adjustments in line with existing labor laws. SSA administrators
initially had urged those CA staff to see their work as also being "charity." The
loss of pre-SSA egalitarian and informal relations and the collective experience
of deprivation of justice on more than one occasion contributed to the increasing
social distance observed within CA toward SSA and to the marked lowering of
staff morale and cohesiveness by 1987. As one House Manager put it just
before leaving CA, "It was no fun working there any more. "
Though logically conceived by SSA, the chain of authority was
imperfectly staffed almost from the start; social work-oriented, SSA
understandably placed its MSWs as program administrators at the top of its
bureaucratic hierarchy, but those individuals did not always have administrative
training and successively came and went four times during the observational
period as SSA either reorganized itself for professed "New Beginnings" or as
those administrators simply left SSA's employ. These recurrent administrative
vacancies meant temporary accountability gaps in the established chain of
command, which inhouse replacements attempted to address. Such individuals,
however, tended to exhibit a limited understanding of CA's internal operations
and staffing needs along with a common penchant for new policies, philosophies,
and more paperwork. The latter were often simply revisions of earlier forms
like those for counting clients and the services rendered by CA staff. Useful as
staff surveillance and resident-service accounting techniques, all such paperwork
merely added, however, to the volume of what Hengerer (Gibbons,1987)
identified as time-and motion-filled, non-treatment activities, like report writing
and client transporting. Such activities were seen by staff as detracting from
their availability for intensive counseling and developing of close ties with their
residents.
CA's Director, moreover, was observed as lacking the administrative
capabilities of either a task- or socio-emotional-specialist during this same time
period. Since the mid 1980s, increasing staff complaints against that individual's
administrative shortcomings were aired singly or collectively to SSA superiors,
but resulted in little observable improvement in the Director's role performance
at CA. Negative attributions, like "burnout," "lazy," "wishywashy," and
"legislative goffer" were expressed in interviews with the author. The Director
may have been apt in pursuing administrative duties away from CA, especially
as SSA's organizational standard bearer, but as a policy maker responsible for
implementing and evaluating decisions affecting CA, the Director exhibited
questionable ability and loyalty to those staff most affected by such
decision-making. A specific illustration of that Director's inefficiency was the
inadvertent publication for more than a year of the shelter's actual location in the
State telephone directory through administrative oversight. Its discovery
intensified the social distance already felt toward that individuat', since security
problems had been repeatedly documented earlier by CA staff throughout the
observational period; unknown male prowlers and even relatives and spouses of
residents have unexpectedly entered the shelter's premises on a number of
occasions. One especially vivid event involving such territorial encroachments
occurred around mid 1987 when the shelter was literally under siege for at least
a month by a resident's distraught boyfriend. He terrorized the shelter day and
night; vandalized CA property by breaking windows, stoning staffs' cars, and
tramping through the bushes on that side of the shelter lacking a fence; and
brazenly paraded in front of the shelter gate, sometimes brandishing a stick or
going shirtless as a macho gesture. Apart from this instance of a security
breech, there were five incidents on the author's own shift where abusers
revealed when interrogated that they had located the shelter either through the
¢
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directory or an informant like a neighbor or even a resident. The Director's
inability to get long-standing repairs of shelter doors, windows, fences and gates
done quickly or to hire an additional night person did not go over well with
anxious staff and residents. Moreover, the Director's authorized purchase of
new office carpets, paint, and storage cabinets instead of the above needs
underscored staff perceptions of the greater priority of SSA' s maintenance goals
of personnel cost-containment and organizational impression management over
its implementation of its avowed goal of providing a 24-hour safe and secure
shelter for its residents.
Consequently, although there was a hierarchy of authority imposed on
CA's carry-over staff, giving CA the appearance of having a functionally
operative and necessary command hierarchy, the anticipated increased
organizational efficiency and accountability were less apparent.
R.ULES
As to the third bureaucratic ideal, every bureaucracy has its set of
standardized rules or official code of conduct to exert its "ideological control"
(Derber, 1984) over its personnel and program implementation and direction.
SSA's bureaucratization of CA after its administrative takeover also involved the
formulating of such regulatory norms to cover the shelter's provision of services
to the community. Staff were therefore given an official instruction manual that
was to be continuously updated in response to new contingencies and diligently
followed to expedite shelter services. It specifically detailed the handling of
crisis calls, resident transportation needs, intakes, house rvle violations, and
departures among other shelter procedures. Which forms, how many, when and
how to process those forms were all spelled out also on official memos to the
staff or at lengthy staff meetings, now mandatory for even part-time relief staff
and more frequently scheduled over the observation period as SSA tried to
address its intramural communication gaps.
Through these official pronouncements, standardization of shelter
procedures with its implicit assurance of impartiality to residents was the
expected outcome. However, this expectation was as well more of an
organizational ideal than a reality at CA. The instructional operational manual,
for example, was only sporadically updated since its initial compilation. Partly
responsible for this situation was that recurrent staff turnovers necessitated the
reallocation of the shelter's remaining staff to more pressing needs.
CA staff, moreover, have not always complied fully with SSA's growing
body of rules that developed in part from SSA's reaction to new situational
developments, like resident or sister program administrator's complaints about
certain CA staff. Those governing resident relations were frequently given
varying degrees of staff compliance; one SSA prohibition was that against the
staff's fraternization with residents or even former residents. Numerous
incidents of this rule infraction or subversion have occurred during the
observation of the program as it existed in situ. Apartment sharing, dating, even
attending resident or former resident's celebrations, like birthdays, weddings, or
open house parties, have been attended by some staff surreptiously via collusions
or openly. If the latter occurred, such socializing activities were readi ly
rationalized as resident "outreach" or "recreational" activities to inquiring
supervisors.
Other staff have even bent the resident eligibility rules at times, such as
when a former resident seeks re-entry, but is not in a life-threatening situation
at the time. If a room is available and she has been an "ideal" (no problem)
resident, she is then generally accepted as a "preventive" admission or as an
instance of staff's expected compliance with SSA's own Golden Rule to treat
residents as they would themselves like to be treated - an administrative mandate
that was promulgated repeatedly by SSA supervisors by 1987. At other times,
if the resident population was already high, staff have denied new entries even
though told that prospective residents could be temporarily couched in the living
room or placed in another resident's bedroom; desiring manageable caseloads on
their shifts rather than simply filling up contracted bed space quotas, certain staff
have, however, re-routed such crisis callers to other crisis lines or have put off
those callers until the next shift came on duty. The latter staff response was
commonly observed being reserved for those crisis callers desiring returns, but
who had been problematic as former residents. In any event, either tactic
(out-referrals or delayed admissions) was still in compliance with SSA's
expectation of rendering shelter services to all crisis callers. Overall, the
occurrence of such staff behaviors does create the illusion of abiding by the rules
and imparting to residents the impartiality implicitly guaranteed by those rules.
However, it also underscores further CA's characterization as a "symbolic
bureaucracy. "
liMJPERSONALilTY
As the last bureaucratic ideal, impersonality between ranks was also less
evident within CA. In particular, favoritism characterized especially two levels
of relations within CA: that between the Director and the last House Manager
with whom the author worked and that between CA staff and residents. The
lack of impersonality in the relationship between the Director and that House
Manager manifested itself in not only the paying of comp time money to the
latter, while requiring other staff, particularly the ~Client Social
Worker/Advocate, to take time off from work or to accept a flat monetary fee
[j-~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~-----
I
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for overtime payment, but also in the Director's continual overlooking of role
incompetence by that House Manager; for example, on a number of occasions,
time sheets were misplaced, incorrectly processed or undelivered by deadlines;
petty cash and emergency food money were forgotten or unbalanced; food and
household supplies were short on other shifts; SSA memos were misfiled; daily
logs and service forms were not regularly updated; and the general upkeep of the
houses, especially the kitchen and laundry areas, were problematic.
Nevertheless, these and other recorded examples of role incompetence were
generally overlooked despite numerous complaints by not just other co-workers
but also residents. The Director's formal designation of that individual as the
immediate supervisor of other paraprofessionals by 1987, however, was most
illustrative of this lack of impersonality on that level of shelter relationships.
Further staff fragmentation and lower morale not surprisingly were observed.
Favoritism toward certain residents, however, was more tolerable.
Clearly CA staff favored those residents who demonstrated friendliness,
compliance with staff and house rules, and particularly a willingness to end the
abuse. Such residents were more likely to be given greater staff interaction,
extended residential stays, airfares, rental deposits, monetary loans, household
items, food, and clothing to start new lives elsewhere. They were even hired as
paraprofessionals during the observational period. However, by 1987, the last
of such shelter staff was dropped by SSA just before her probation period ended
for exceeding SSA's computed average number of sick days per annum expected
of its employees, despite protests by her co-workers and residents at the time.
Her loss as an invaluable role model for residents and SSA's nonresponsiveness
to their collective protests noticeably affected further the already low staff
morale.
It was different, however, for those residents who exhibited none of
those desirable traits and who may additionally be known as substance abusers,
inattentive parents, emotionally disturbed individuals, and especially as residents
with infectious diseases like herpes or criminal lifestyles as prostitutes,
shoplifters, or welfare violators. A graphic example of how a difficult resident
was treated was recounted by one interviewee:
She [the resident] came in making trouble ... [and] felt the world
owed her a living ....She was guilty of welfare abuse... (and)
started throwing stuff over the kitchen; other women accused her
of being lazy, sloppy, not helpful. I had to call ... [the Director]
to take care of the bitch!
More typically, problematic residents were blacklisted or exited from the
program as quickly as possible. Sometimes, however, such clients would
directly or indirectly appeal to the Director or even to SSA administrators. The
latter, to avoid adverse publicity, generally overrode such CA staff's transactions
even in light of staff protestations. The" creaming" of prospective residents was
nevertheless still practiced as it is in other social service agencies (Wegner &
Jackson, 1985; Jacobs, McGahey, & Minion, 1985). However, the lack of
administrative support for staff decisions in those situations of rejecting
problematic residents has resulted in direct and sometimes hostile confrontations
with the Director and SSA administrators. The occurrence of such divisive
events led one former Client Social Worker/Advocate to candidly admit when
interviewed that she consequently "... found it disenchanting to be trying to
empower women while the level of staff morale was low along with high
turnover and minimum administrative supports."
The CA staff-resident relationship also entailed distrust rather than
impersonality; staff-shared experiences recounted those crisis callers who have
lied to gain entry by faking the abuse or even their.names. Yet other residents
have been recalled breaking house rules despite having signed contracts against
such activities. Re-entry attempts by such identified residents have generally
been met with reluctance by staff or by the latter's social typing of such
individuals in terms of Tannenbaum's "dramatization of evil" (Siegel & Senna,
1988). But perhaps the most dramatic instance of staff distrust involved the time
when a resident asked to see her file. Her request nearly precipitated an
administrative crisis since there was no official procedure for handling such
requests. Censorship of her file entries resulted and a sanitized version of staff
observations and commentaries was finally shown her by SSA administrators.
Given such examples, even the bureaucratic ideal of impersonality was not
always adhered to by CA staff or their administrative superiors in their relations
with each other or with residents.
CONCJLUSiONS AN][) iMPJLJICATJIONS
FOR 'fJHIJE "BUSJINJESS" OF SHEJL'fERJING
Obviously only a few of the many discrepancies between the avowed and
actual workings of CA as a "symbolic bureaucracy" have been presented above.
All of which are seen as stemming from SSA's administrative takeover of CA
as an extension of its residential group home programs in 1981. SSA's
progressive bureaucratization of the shelter did not, however, preclude either the
observed discrepancies from those four bureaucratic ideals envisioned by Blau,
namely, specialized positions, a hierarchy of authority, a body of rules and
impersonality, or those visible changes in the shelter's original goals or in its
internal structure and functioning.
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Given the validity of this organizational analysis, as primarily based on
a reconstruction of a seven-year shelter worker's career, the provision of future
shelter programs through traditional social service bureaucracies does not
necessarily guarantee a better fit between resident needs and shelter resources.
Generally recognized is that "[t]raditional social service agencies have been
widely criticized for being unresponsive to the needs of battered women... [given]
the imperatives of bureaucratic organization operating in contradiction to
women's immediate needs.... " (Loseke & Berk, 1982).
In this case, there appeared to be a lack of organizational incentives
within such a complex bureaucratic setting as SSA to institute quickly needed
safeguards (like improved security measures) and personnel changes (such as
adequate and truly qualified staffing and staff-affirming and -supportive
supervising). Both of which were clearly needed to actualize and maintain more
efficiently and effectively CA's avowed goals of preventing and reducing spouse
abuse through its promotion of victim advocacy and counseling on a 24-hour
basis in a safe and secure residential setting. Their presence would have,
moreover, helped to reduce staff burnout and alienation from the parent agency.
Market forces, cost-control orientations, and staff surveillance seemed especially
operative in delivering such avowed shelter services after 1981. The high
resident success rates of pre-SSA days and its strong staff solidarity were
noticeably lowered after the shelter's administrative takeover; by 1987, the
former was estimated to be 1 out of 50 to 1 out of 200 residents by those
interviewed and with the departure of the author in that same year, only the
Director remained of the original carryover shelter staff.
Moreover, as those above organizational orientations became dominant
in SSA's handling of shelter operations, including its personnel, the '" creaming'"
of prospective residents, the meeting of contracted shelter services, especially
bed counts, and the overall accumulating of statistics, rather than the active
promoting by staff of residents' empowerment as "self-savers" (Chang, 1988)
or actual organizational achievement of "quality" of shelter services appeared to
be new official directives in regulating staff-resident relations by 1987.
Effective domestic violence shelters, however, cannot be implemented
and operated with such perceived organizational priorities. Future planning and
development of shelters for abused women must contain the increasing tendency
toward the bureaucratization of shelter operations and relations within shelter
walls, since such an organizational process appears dysfunctional over the long
term for both shelter goal-attainment and overall functioning and structure. In
other words, "[i]t is important that a battered woman does not simply become
one more 'client' who needs to be processed through elaborate systems not set
up to 'help her'" (Ahrens, 1978).
Proposed as a structural alternative to the embedding of shelter programs
within large conservative social service organizations is instead the advocacy of
smaller scale, grassroots-developed feminist shelters. For within those settings
flourish relatively egalitarian and autonomous relations and extensive program
participation by staff and residents (Rodrigues, 1988) that encourage the
development of those intensive and affective ties between staff and residents
which the author (1990) sees as critical to helping abused spouses end the cycle
of violence in their lives. Whether such a shelter alternative is indeed a more
realistic and effective institutional response to the still growing social problem
of domestic violence in the state is presently being examined by the author.
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ELDON L. WEGNER
PAl'IENT CONSENT: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL REGULAnON OF
A CLIENT-PROFESSIONAL RELAnONSHIP
Role relationships in modern societies tend towards increasing
formalization, as noted in many of the classic works in sociology. Formalization
is characterized by replacing social bonds based on personal attachment and
diffuse obligations with impersonal, contractual ones based upon specific rights
and obligations. Role performances, furthermore, are to be accountable to
certain technical standards (Durkheim, 1964; Parsons, 1939; Simmel, 1950: 317-
29; Weber, 1958: 196-244). Recent changes in the legal status of patient rights
within physician-patient interchanges are a further manifestation of this tendency
towards formalization and rationalization in modern societies (Betz and
O'Connell, 1983; Matek, 1977).
Structural changes in the medical context have left patients open to
various forms of exploitation and neglect. This situation provides the
background for the development of legally mandated patient consent procedures
as a step towards greater formalization of the doctor-patient relation. The paper
addresses the limitations of law to transform the nature of the social transactions
between doctors and patients. This paper shows that implementation of legally
prescribed procedures is mediated by the cognitive understandings of actors and
the social conditions within which encounters take place. The paper concludes
with suggestions for alternative approaches to protecting the interests of patients.
In 1983 a new law was signed in the State of Hawaii to require all
physicians treating breast cancer patients to present a standardized patient
education form about alternative treatments. Following its passage, the author
explored the possibility of undertaking research on the effects of this law. The
research proved infeasible, but informal interviews were conducted with
physicians with major responsibility for treating patients with breast cancer in
four of the major medical centers in Honolulu, including two surgeons, one
oncologist and one nuclear radiologist. This paper is based on material from
these interviews along with experiences of the author as a member of the
research committee of one of the medical centers in Honolulu.
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'fRANSFORMAnON OF JDOC'fOR-PA'fIEN'f lRELA'fIONSnIPS
The analysis of patient consent must begin with an understanding of the
nature of the traditional professional relationship between doctors and patients
and the factors which have impacted doctor-patient encounters in the last several
decades.
'flhelP'~'ofessionaB Model
The traditional doctor-patient relationship was characterized by Parsons
as one of paternalism, where the patient assumes a role analogous to that of a
dependent child (Parsons, 1951: 428-79). The concept of the sick role
developed by Parsons further emphasized the passive-dependency of the patient,
including the obligation to cooperate with medical treatment. Doctor-patient
transactions are presumed to take place in a framework of patient confidence in
the expertise of physician decision-making and trust that the physician will attend
to the well-being of the patient.
The professional model, most thoroughly presented by Freidson (l97Gb),
further elaborated the basis for patient trust in the physician. Medicine is
granted the status of profession because physicians have mastered an esoteric
body of knowledge which underlies their right to autonomy in medical decision-
making. The profession, furthermore, is guided by a service ethic and a
conception of "medical responsibility" for the well-being of the patient. The
profession is also responsible for monitoring the actions of its members.
Doctors and Patients illl tll1e Medical MarketjDlace
Whether or not patients were ever as trusting or physicians as
disinterested as these formulations suggest, the context of medical practice has
undergone radical transformations in recent decades which have seriously
undermined such a simplistic model. These developments have been detailed by
other social scientists (e.g. Starr, 1982). Only a brief overview will be given
here.
First, the bureaucratization of the medical context has reduced the quality
of doctor-patient encounters. Physicians increasingly practice in groups settings;
patient contacts have been shortened in order to manage large case loads; and
relationships have become fragmentary and transitory as patients are referred to
specialists for specific problems. Despite the technical advantages of group
medicine, physicians rarely know much about their patients apart from their
specific medical complaints, and patients are skeptical that physicians understand
their problems or care about them (Mechanic, 1976a; 1976b).
Second, patients have become commodities in a medical-industrial
complex consisting of large medical centers, staffed by teams of specialists and
supplied by medical equipment and pharmaceutical interests. These entities have
vested interests in promoting particular kinds of treatments. Health is assumed
to be an entity which can be sold and purchased, and patients themselves have
exchange value as economic commodities in the health care market (Carlson,
1975; Illich, 1976). Medical decisions are not purely neutral, technical means
to assure patient well-being. They also entail benefits which accrue to members
of this industrial-medical complex. Medicine is big business (McKinlay, 1977;
Waitzkin, 1974).
Third, physicians are becoming "proletarianized," as they cease to own
the means of their productive activity. Physicians are increasingly employed by
or at least under the control of third-parties. The dangers of third-party
medicine as a threat to the professional autonomy of physicians has long been
recognized (Field, 1961; Mechanic, 1976a). During the past decade, the
concern with cost-containment has resulted in an explosion of health maintenance
organizations, preferred-provider contracts, cost-ceilings on hospitals, quotas on
medical testing and prescriptions, and other forms of med ical rationing.
Changes in the reimbursement practices, especially institution of payment
schedules based on the use of Diagnostic Related Groups, also impact on medical
practice. Medical decisions are not based solely on medical science and concern
for the well-being of patients, but increasingly the financial self-interests of the
organizations for which physicians work or insurance programs which pay their
fees (Mechanic, 1985).
The lP'robBematic Consequences of Medical 'feclmology
In addition to changes in the organization and political economy of
medical practice, a final set of changes within the technical sphere of medical
practice must also be acknowledged as critical to the emergence of patient
consent procedures. These changes regard the special consequences of new
developments in medical technology.
Expanding medical technology confronts physicians with more
problematic decisions. The normal mode of medical decision-making is one of
diagnostic classification, based on the presenting complaints and physical
examination of the patient, followed by the "normal course of treatment,"
suggested by the prevailing medical understanding of the diagnosed condition.
Medical technology, however, has complicated such decisions by increasing the
available diagnostic measures and treatment modes, thus making possible
alternative courses of action. Many of these measures, however, have uncertain
outcomes with risks of significant negative side-effects (Thomas, 1977).
~
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An additional problem stems from the trade-off between medical
outcomes and non-medical values. For example, in some cases medical
technology permits the extension of life under conditions which severely limit the
quality of life. What may be an acceptable outcome in purely medical terms,
may be unacceptable to the patient. While medical science may enable
physicians to make purely medical judgments based on scientific criteria, medical
expertise is insufficient as a basis to determine the appropriateness or desirability
of treatments as they affect non-medical, quality of life outcomes for their
patients (Wulff, 1981; Shingleton and Shingleton, 1980; Shain, 1980).
TIHIE DEVELOPMENT OF JP'AllENT CONSENT AS A LEGAL Rn:GHT
The changes in the organization and practice of medicine reviewed above
make it clear that it is simplistic to assume that medical decision-making is a
purely technical matter, where a physician, whose interest is the well-being of
the patient, undertakes a scientifically-based intervention. In addition to the fact
that evidence may be ambiguous regarding the most effective treatment, the
decision must take into account competing values. Physicians furthermore are
subject to external pressures by third parties, and they have vested interests in
undertaking particular treatments in terms of the possibilities for obtaining
financial, research, career development and other goals.
While the general public may not understand the details of these
developments, there is a general recognition that doctor-patient relationships have
changed. Physicians are often suspected of subordinating interest in the well-
being of the patient to their financial and professional goals. The explosion of
malpractice suits and the emergence of a consumers movement aimed at
reassuring patients their rights in medical transactions can be seen as a
consequence of this distrust and the breakdown of the traditional emotional ties
between doctors and patients (Mechanic, 1976b; Betz and O'Connell, 1983).
One means by which physicians are able to make decisions in their own
interests, is through the control of information. Not only do patients lack
medical knowledge by which to evaluate alternative modes of treatment, but they
are often deliberately kept ignorant regarding their own conditions and prognosis
(Davis, 1966; Waitzkin and Stoeckle, 1976; Fisher, 1984).
During the past two decades, the rights of patients to information and to
participation in medical decision-making affecting their well-being has been
established through a large number of court decisions as well as through new
laws enacted through legislation.
These rights are most conspicuously embodied in patient consent
procedures, which include informing the patient about the nature of the
treatment, possible side-effects, the risk ofthese side-effects, and the availability
of alternative treatments. Patient consent is usually implemented through a
doctor-patient transaction, during which the physician obtains the signature of the
patient on a patient consent document. In cases where the patient is a child or
is physically or mentally incapable of making decisions, a family member or
other person may represent the patient.
Litigation has continued as courts have faced the task of clarifying the
meaning of what constitutes acceptable patient consent. Some courts have ruled
that merely obtaining a patient's signature does not fulfill the requirement unless
the patient has a "reasonable" understanding and that "significant" risks and
other facts "material" to the decision-making are disclosed (Edelman and
Edelman, 1977).
Legal Developments in Hawaii
In the face of the growing number of court judgments extending the legal
rights of patients and the crisis created by the escalating cost of malpractice
insurance, state legislatures have enacted additional laws to tighten patient
consent procedures. The State of Hawaii passed a general law in 1976 requiring
the Board of Medical Examiners to establish reasonable standards of disclosure
of information to patients .and to require the written consent of patients for
medical procedures (Hawaii, 1976). Similar laws now exist in most other states.
Special attention has been given to the treatment of breast cancer. Breast
cancer is one of the most significant life-threatening risks for women. Treatment
decisions are problematic due to a proliferation of alternative treatments,
inclUding the surgical procedures of medical mastectomy, simple mastectomy,
and lumpectomy, and these may be combined with radiation therapy and various
forms of chemotherapy. In some cases there is also a decision to
prophylactically remove the other breast and/or perform a hysterectomy. There
are continuing ambiguities over appropriate criteria and the relative risks of
available alternatives, including risk to life, residual disability, and emotional
trauma due to perceived aesthetic and sexual implications of treatment (Shain,
1980; Moetzinger and Dauber, 1982).
In 1983, the State of Hawaii passed a new law specifically addressing the
decision-making for breast cancer based on a similar law passed the previous
year in California (California State Department of Health, 1983; Hawaii, 1983).
The Medical Board of Examiners was instructed to develop a standard form to
be employed by physicians which would provide patients with information
fI
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regarding the alternative treatments available for breast cancer, along with
descriptions of the possible consequences and risks associated with each
treatment.
The new law is intended to increase the patient's role in the decision-
making process. It goes beyond the more general requirement for patient
consent in that it standardizes what information the patient is given and how it
is provided. Thus this law formalizes the encounter between doctor and patient
and attempts to establish patient control of decisions as a contract for specific
medical services. From this perspective, doctor-patient transactions are placed
within the context of a larger body of legal opinion concerning consumer rights.
A patient is a responsible agent and a contractor for medical services and
therefore has a right to decisions about those services.
LIMITATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING PATIENT CONSENT
Patient consent requirements have the potential to shift significantly the
power of medical decision-making from the physician to the patient. However,
the usual implementation of patient consent is designed as a formality which does
not alter traditional doctor-patient roles. Despite legally mandated consent
procedures, physicians have consistently resisted increasing patient participation
in medical decision-making, and few patients exercise their rights to such
participation (McIntosh; 1974; Haug and Levin, 1981; Faden, et aI., 1981;
Laforet, 1976; President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982).
The remainder of this paper is devoted to understanding the limitations
of legal efforts to actually increase patient control. These remarks are based on
the author's interviews with several physicians with major responsibility for the
treatment of breast cancer as well as observations as a member of the Research
Committee of a major medical center. The limited suc.cess in changing doctor-
patient transactions rests on 1) the professional understanding of medical
responsibility shared by physicians and 2) the conditions of the doctor-patient
encounter.
The Physician Conception of Medical R.esponsibility
Physicians perceive a dilemma between the emerging legal rights of
patients and what they regard as the legal and moral responsibility they have as
physicians for the well-being of their patients (Laforet, 1976; Edelman and
Edelman, 1977). There are three components to this concern: physician control;
medical criteria for success, and avoidance of patient harm.
Physician control. First, and most fundamentally, physicians are legally
responsible for appropriate medical decisions which affect their patients.
Patients lacking in expertise and clinical experience presumably are incapable of
making good judgments about the efficacy of medical treatments (Laforet, 1976;
Aring, 1974).
To illustrate, the new law in Hawaii expands the information patients
receive about alternative treatments for breast cancer. One physician feared that
the effect of the new law would be to tempt patients, based on wishful thinking,
to insist on the least drastic mode of treatment. In some cases, this alternative
could prove to be inadequate and result in death. He rhetorically asked, who
was responsible for making the correct decision? Wouldn't the patient or the
patient's family subsequently blame the physician? Thus physicians perce~ve
themselves as legally and morally accountable for medical decisions. Defernng
to the judgement of patients would place them in a potentially vulnerable
position.
At the same time it should be noted that this physician, along with the
others interviewed, favored educating patients about the nature of the medical
treatment they were to receive and the reasons why that treatment was
appropriate. These physicians provide information as ~ s~ep to building .the
patient's trust and confidence in the treatment and achlevmg greater patient
satisfaction with the outcome. Their discomfort was based on any attempt to
dilute their exclusive responsibility for the medical decision itself.
Thus patient consent in the minds of physicians embodies two separable
issues: 1) patient education or informed consent, requiring that physicians
provide patient with reasonable information about medical procedures, and 2)
patient control, giving the patient control over medical decision-making.. Patient
consent procedures accomplishing the first of these purposes were beheved to
enhance clinical effectiveness. Giving the patient control, however, was
perceived as inconsistent with their medical responsibility and was the principal
source of opposition to the extension of patient rights.
Medical criteria for success. A second problem regards the criteria for
medical judgments. Traditional medical ethics are based on the principle of
beneficence __ doing whatever promotes well-being and not doing harm
(Shingleton and Shingleton, 1980). Physicians understand their responsibility to
do whatever is medically possible to prolong life.
Patient consent procedures threaten to compromise this criterion of
medical responsibility to the extent that patients emphasize values other than
longevity. Thus a medically responsible decision cannot accommodate the case
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of a woman who out of concern for appearance should refuse a mastectomy.
Physicians are troubled by the increasing dilemma posed by patient objections
to the possibility of prolonging life through new technology but at highly reduced
human capacities and quality of life.
New mOdels of decision analysis have been proposed for situations
offering alternative treatment modalities which would incorporate the values of
patients (Eraker and Politser, 1982). However formal decision analysis as a
replacement for professional clinical judgement has been resisted by physicians
(Schwartz, 1979; Brett, 1981). The logic-in-use in clinical situations continues
to be predicated on a view of medical decisions as objective and scientific rather
than incorporating patient values.
The author observed many instances of this problem in the deliberations
of a hospital research committee. Experimental cancer treatments, for example,
typically rely upon highly toxic drug regimens which carry high risk of
permanent organ damage and high levels of discomfort and disfigurement for the
patient. At best, the life of the patient may be extended a few weeks or months,
but at great sacrifice of quality, and possibly also at great financial expense to
the family. While members of the committee were aware of the problematic
aspects of such treatments, they seldom raised them in the context of evaluating
specific research proposals. Discussion was usually confined to the specific
medical procedures, possible effects on the tumor, soundness of research
methodology, completion of forms, and possible liability for the hospital.
On one occasion, a chemotherapy program was described for a specific
cancer which had particularly severe side-effects, including nausea and
permanent liver and kidney damage. The patients eligible for this program in
fact had advanced forms of their disease, which meant that their survival was
unlikely in any event. When asked by the author whether such patients might
be better off without such a treatment, the physician proposing the program
responded, "Other treatments have already failed with these patients. This
represents one more treatment which we can try. "
The response of this physician is indicative of what Scheff (1963) has
described as the operating decision-rule in medicine: when in doubt treat. It is
the duty of the physician to treat so long as a treatment is available. Physicians
believe they should not destroy the hope of the patient and the patient's family.
Indeed, patients and family members, initially and without much reflection,
typically express the desire that every measure be taken. Nevertheless,
increasing information about alternatives and giving patient's more control over
decisions would likely undermine the sole concern with medical outcomes since,
upon greater reflection, patients are likely to consider outcomes in the light of
other values.
Avoiding patient hann. Third, legally-mandated informed consent
procedures are viewed as contrary to the physician's medical responsibility to
avoid harm. Several physicians noted that complete disclosure of the possible
negative side-effects of treatments, even if these are low risk possibilities, may
heighten the patient's anxiety and may be therefore detrimental to the well-being
of some patients. A complete disclosure of information may result in
unnecessary psychological distress, a refusal to undergo needed procedures, and
even suicide.
Indeed, studies have found that there are important differences among
patients in their desire for and reaction to information (McIntosh, 1974; Shain,
1980). Some patients experience confidence and a greater sense of control by
knowing the details of their disease and the nature of treatment procedures.
Other patients, however, respond negatively to such information and prefer
simple comfort and reassurance from the physician. These patients place their
trust in the doctor's medical judgement. Legally mandating consent procedures
undermines the clinical judgement of the physician regarding how to approach
patients who differ radically in their desire for information and ability to cope
with the complexities and ambiguities of medical decisions.
Several of the physicians interviewed about the new consent procedures
for breast cancer patients noted that even many well-educated women had asked
them to omit the details and simply "do what you feel needs to be done."
Discussing their disease and the nature of medical procedures was highly
distressing for these patients and from their perspective unnecessary, since they
trusted the physician to make the best judgement.
Aside from increasing patient anxiety, physicians believe that the new
requirements to provide detailed information about alternative treatments, have
the potential to undermine patient confidence in physicians and thereby threaten
good medical care and patient well-being. The fact of legal regulation itself
implies that somehow physicians cannot be trusted to make decisions which are
in the best welfare of their patients. Furthermore, forcing patients to participate
in medical decision-making risks undermining the belief in physician competence
and the efficacy of treatment. While medical decisions often entail a degree of
uncertainty, physicians believe that the patient is better off maintaining trust that
the doctor is in fact doing what is medically most appropriate in the situation
(Aring, 1974; Laforet, 1976).
£ UQ
62 SOCIAL PROCESS JIN HAWA][][ Wegner PATJIEN'f CONSENT 63
The Doctor-Patient Encounter
The above discussion shows that physicians have serious reservations
about patient consent procedures which threaten their medical authority.
However, the conditions of the doctor-patient encounter have greatly limited the
impact of legal efforts to establish the rights of patients and increase their control
over decisions. The structure of doctor-patient transactions is such that
physicians are able to effectively constrain the level of patient participation in
decision-making.
Physician control of the clinical encounter. Physicians control medical
encounters with patients through verbal and non-verbal conditions in the
situation. One obvious set of factors involves the high level of expertise of the
physician relative to the patient and the esoteric nature of the medical language
which disadvantages the patient from meaningful participation. In addition, the
physician controls many other features of the situation, such as the imposition
of time constraints on the interaction and the general syntax of doctor-patient
discourse. Physicians exercise control over initiating the various phases of the
encounter, turn-taking, and interactional opportunities for the patients. As a
consequence patients have highly constrained opportunities for contributing
information and for raising questions (Drass, 1982; Fisher, 1984).
The typical manner of presenting the patient consent form forecloses
patient control over decisions. Despite the requirement that consent forms be
comprehensible, they are often 4 to 6 pages long and contain highly technical
descriptions of procedures and their possible consequences. Patients are given
little chance to examine the details, besides which they are highly anxious and
not in the frame of mind to carefully weigh the alternatives. The forms indicate
the general availability of other treatments but provide no details about
alternatives or specifics about the actual differences among them. The option of
obtaining no further treatment is virtually never seriously presented to patients.
Physicians usually present their intended treatment before presenting the consent
form to patients; and indeed, sometimes the patients are already hospitalized
before being asked to sign the consent form (Presidents Commission, 1982).
Thus, patient consent procedures are typically presented so as to carry
out the requirement of informing the patient, while denying the patient an
opportunity for making meaningful choices. The procedure minimizes patient
questions and input, precluding serious patient consideration of alternatives, and
thereby preserves the effective control of physicians over treatment decisions.
Patient background expectations. Physician dominance in the clinical
context also rests upon the general frame of such encounters. As reviewed
earlier, the traditional doctor-patient relationship is based on a model of
paternalism, analogous to the emotional dependency which a child experiences
in relation to a parent, who is caring, knowledgeable, and in charge.
New models of the doctor-patient relationship have been proposed as
more appropriate. Freidson (l970a) has suggested a conflict-negotiation model,
based on the assumption that physicians and patients in some measure always
have different interests at stake in the medical encounter. Health care reformers
have suggested a collaborative model, especially for the management of chronic
illnesses, where the physician and patient develop a joint strategy for managing
disease (Szaz and Hollender, 1956; Shain, 1980).
The courts have adopted the role of consumer advocate to view patients
as engaging in a contractual relationship with physicians where a potential
conflict of interest exists between buyers and sellers (Betz and O'Connell, 1983;
Reeder, 1972). This consumer model, however, rests on the assumptions that
health is a commodity which can be sold in a market and health care consists of
atomistic units provided by a seller of services. Such a mechanistic view of
healing is fallacious and ignores the significance of the intrinsic emotional quality
of the doctor-patient relationship (Aring, 1974; Carlson, 1975; IIlich, 1976).
Research shows that the typical clinical situation remains closest to the
traditional paternalistic model. Most patients enter the medical context highly
anxious and desiring reassurance and comfort. They also hold background
expectations that physicians have the exclusive expertise to make medical
judgments and that a patient has a duty to passively cooperate. Patients expect
the physician to make decisions, and they refrain from asking questions or
challenging judgments. Only a small proportion of patients, typically those who
are better educated, younger, and those with certain chronic conditions, actively
question physicians and expect to participate in medical decisions (Haug and
Lavin, 1981; Fisher, 1984; Lorber 1975) Furthermore, the emotional quality
of the doctor-patient relationship is the principal basis on which patients evaluate
their care (Ben-Sira, 1980).
In Honolulu, efforts to increase patient control in the medical context is
likely to be especially difficult. Non-Haole ethnic groups generally have a
traditional respect for authority figures and a desire to avoid face-to-face
confrontations (Robillard, et aI., 1983; Howard,1974). It may also be the case
that non-Haole physicians perceive patients who ask questions and actively seek
information to be aggressive. A more democratic and participatory model of
doctor-patient encounters imposed by legal mandate is likely to fail in a context
which violates cultural orientations deeply held by both patients and physicians.
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mSOJSSliON AND CONCLUSJION
Formal patient consent procedures are now routinely implemented in
medical settings. Physicians embrace patient consent procedures in so far as
providing information to patients increases their trust in the physician.
However, steps to increase patient participation in decision-making are perceived
as threatening the medical responsibility of the physician and are vigorously
opposed by the medical profession.
In fact, the widespread acceptance of patient consent procedures does not
rest on an extension of patient control but on a rationale of physician
legitimation (Betz and O'Connell, 1983). Medical malpractice suits and
malpractice insurance constitute major costs to medical institutions and individual
physicians. Patients are less likely to be able to mount credible malpractice suits
if there is documentation that the patient was informed of the possible risks
attending medical treatment and yet provided consent. Thus obtaining consent
constitutes an act of patient submission to the authority and medical care of the
physician.
In contrast, recent court decisions and legislation have attempted to
formalize and extend patient rights. Legal requirements for patient consent have
been intended to increase the control of patients as consumers over medical
decisions which affect their lives. They constitute an extension of the general
tendency towards greater formalization of social relationships in modern societies
by rationalizing medical encounters into a contract between physicians and
patients.
These developments are a reaction to recent changes in medical care
which have undermined traditional social bonds based on diffuse obligations.
The bureaucratization of medical contexts, the commodification of health care
and patients, and the "proletarianization" of physicians have introduced many
considerations into medical decision-making apart from the well-being of the
patient. Developments in medical technology, furthermore, call into question the
assumption that medical decisions are solely a matter of expertise and scientific
neutrality. Alternative modes of treatment exist for many conditions, each
associated with certain risks and drawbacks, and successful medical outcomes
may have unacceptable results from the standpoint of non-medical values held
by the patient.
Nevertheless, the evidence seems clear that legal efforts to increase
patient control of medical decisions have had little actual effect on physician-
patient transactions. Physicians are indoctrinated to assume the legal and moral
responsibility to make the best medical decisions on behalf of their patients. In
addition, the clinical situation preserves the dominance of the physician. Due
to their esoteric knowledge, physicians are able to control their transactions with
patients and believe it is proper for them to do so in order that the most
appropriate decisions be made. Their advantage in controlling the situation
enables physicians to implement consent procedures in a manner consistent with
their own interests and perspective.
The attempt to rationalize doctor-patient transactions, however, has also
failed for a more fundamental reason. Doctor-patient relationships do not
conform to an impersonal contractual relationship, where the consumer is in
charge. Patients enter medical encounters in a state of high anxiety, seeking
relief from someone whom they believe has special expertise and capabilities.
While individual patients differ in their circumstances, desires and expectations,
many feel a deep emotional dependency on their physician. Healing is not a
mechanistic exercise, but entails important processes embedded in the
relationship between healers and sufferers (Frank, 1961). Thus, legal
requirements based on a contractual, consumer model of client-professional
relationships, try to formalize and standardize what is inherently highly personal.
Viable Approaches to Protecting the Patient
This paper has presented a skeptical view of the ability for legal
measures requiring informed consent to regulate doctor-patient encounters in a
manner acceptable to the perspectives of physicians or suitable to the needs of
patients. Nevertheless, the intention has not been to suggest patients should not
have a more active role in decisions which affect them. Indeed, the conditions
of modern medical practice offer great risk to biasing medical decisions against
the well-being of patients.
As an alternative to patient consent procedures, efforts to more directly
change the structure of doctor-patient encounters may offer more promise in
protecting the rights of patients to quality care and to a voice in the decisions
which affect them.
Two well-known procedures provide some control over the quality of
medical care. First, second opinions should be required from disinterested
medical professionals prior to invasive medical procedures. Second, a fair
amount of experience suggests that monitoring the quality of care by external
bodies through the review of medical records, prescription records, lab samples,
and so forth, does affect medical decision-making in favor of better patient care.
Two less widely implemented procedures have the potential to increase
the participation of patients in decision-making by moving ~octor-patient
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transa~tions in the direction of greater collaboration. First, new nursing roles
as patle~t educator~ and. patient advocates can serve as a help to patients in
formulatmg and artIculatmg their values and concerns. Second formal models
of ?ecision ana~y.sis can serve as a medium for physician-patie~t collaboration
whIch would utIhze both the medical expertise of the physician and the values
and psychological concerns of the patients as input for making medical decisions.
Steps along these lines, may be more successful than patient consent
pro.cedures to build greater communication and trust between physicians and
patIents, because they do not try to impose an impersonal contractual model of
physici~n-patientrelationships which is contrary to the desires of both physicians
and patIents.
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This paper attempts to open up a way of considering the crisis in nursing,
a problem of shortage of registered nurses, as the effect of the way nursing is
defined in society. It is argued that nursing is a degraded commodity in a mass
circulation of career commodity values, where the prestige values in a hierarchy
of cultural capital are autonomy, sovereignty over the conditions of work and the
ability to appropriate the capital generated by one's efforts. After considering
the manner in which the nursing crisis is expressed, the redundancy of the
problem of professional status and staffing in the history of nursing, we address
the homology between the language of nursing career research and the
reproduction of the problem by comparing this research to the feminist critique
of sociology. We continue with a description of the types of nursing, focusing
on inpatient hospital-based nursing as the locus of high turnover and constant
nursing recruitment. We conclude that nurses are recruited from symbolically
disprivileged sectors of the hierarchy of cultural capital and the same symbolic
system that disprivileges these sectors also degrades nursing careers in the face
of alternative prestige careers.
The approach of the paper differs markedly from most nursing personnel
or career research. What is proposed is a social semiotics! of the way nursing
is reproduced in a system of cultural capital.
THE EXPRESSION OF A CR.ISIS
It is said that there is a crisis in the ability to adequately staff inpatient
and outpatient direct health care services in Hawai'i and across North America.
Patient care units, even whole wings, have been reportedly closed due to the
shortage of R.N.s. Surgery and other procedures are delayed because of
inadequate nursing coverage. Many institutions in the United States and Canada
report vacancy rates from 13.6 % to 25 %.
Nursing agencies abound in the U. S. , operating nationally and
internationally, recruiting nurses for six month tours of duty. The recruitment
of "flying" nurses is very common in intensive care. Up to seventy percent of
nurses working in intensive care in Hawaii are flying nurses from out of state.
Most of these nurses stay for only one contract period, three to six months,
accelerating the circulation of nurses and the business of the recruitment
agencies. Many nurse working on regular floors in Hawaii are flyers, as well.
When the story is projected out into the future it becomes even more
frightening. North America has an aging population. The need for registered
nurses will explode as the number of elderly people grows. Related, in part, to
the graying of the population is the increase in acuity of inpatient care. ~o~e
registered nurses will be required to deliver this type of hightech care. ThIS IS
the care involving complex life support equipment. In survey after survey of
future employment needs, registered nurses are among the fields expected to
grow the most. It is pointed out that the number of students studying nursing are
not enough to fill the anticipated short- or long- term need for nurses.
The nursing personnel problem has become a national problem in the
United States and Canada. The governments have commissioned national studies
and have formulated national strategies to meet the problem. In the U.S. the
master text of nursing personnel assessment and planning is the Secretary's
Commission on Nursing (1988), a two volume report from the United States
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.
Regionally, state and provincial departments of health have initia~ed
similar studies and have sought ways to attract and retain nurses. Hospital
associations in Hawai'i and across the nation and Canada have examined the
problem (Healthcare Association of Hawai'i 1987). Consortia of ~l~iversity
nursing departments, nursing associations, state and county heal~h a~mmlst~ators
and planners, hospital management, legislative committees, legislatIve auditors,
and others have systematically investigated the problem (Hawai'i Task Force on
Nursing Education and Service 1987). In Ontario, Canada's most popula~ed
province, there has been a spate of studies on the nursing situation: The Nu:szng
Shortage in Ontario (Goldfarb 1988); Report on Nursing Manpower (AdVIsory
Committee 1988); What Do Nurses Want? A Review ojJob Sati~taction and Job
Turnover Literature (Frisina, Murray, and Aird 1988); Agency Nurses In
Toronto: Who Works For Supplementary Nursing Services, And Why? (Murray
1988); Nursing Morale In Toronto: An Analysis OJ Career, Job, And Hospital
SatisJaction Among Hospital Staff Nurses (Murray and Smith 1988); Nurses
Resigning Their Hospital Jobs In Toronto: Who Are They, Wh~. Are They
Resigning, And What Are They Going To Do? (Murray and Fnsma 1988);
Morale Among Registered Nursing Assistants In Toronto's Long-Term Care
Hospitals (Murray 1988); arid Report of the HCMT Nursing Manpower Task
Force (Hospital Council of Metropolitan Toronto 1988)
Added to this technical report literature is a further expression of concern
about the problem in academic nursing and social science research publications
(e.g. Barker, 1987; Curry, Wakefield, Price, Mueller, a~d McCloskey 19~5;
Kosmoski and Calkin 1986; Lowery and Jacobsen 1984), m the glossy nursmg
literature or those periodicals read by most R.N.s (e.g. Ackerman 1986; Aiken
, ~
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1987) and in the nursing management literature (e.g. Barhyte, Counte, and
Christman 1987; Calhoun, Williams, and McCready 1988). These three streams
of writing, though different, all focus, in large part, on how to assess the nursing
shortage, how to plan for future nursing needs, and how to retain current nurses.
One important feature of this literature, taken as a whole, is the generation and
maintenance of a historical record of the problem. The present nursing shortage
is not novel (Aiken 1987). It is a cyclical and chronic problem. It may be
argued that the problem has existed since the beginning of the recruitment of
young women to work as nurses.
A public or mass expression of the crisis can be found in the feature
stories in the newspapers. Locally, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Honolulu
Advertiser have run many stories about the nursing shortage. The problem is
also represented in the paid public service spots on television, advertisements
designed to show appreciation for nurses' work and attract nurses to the
sponsoring agency. In Hawai' i the Department of Health has run appreciation
spots. Kuakini Medical Center has run frank solicitations for new nurses. The
Department of Health has used TV advertisements for recruitment for the
neighbor island hospitals. Queen's Medical Center has used elaborate panels of
oncamera interviews of nurses testifying to how much they enjoy nursing at
Queen's. St. Francis Hospital has broadcast spots showing nurses at work.
Now the State of Hawai'i has new recruitment campaigns, including T.V. spots,
for professionals, nurses, social workers, and engineers. The T.V. ad
campaigns for nursing recruitment have been episodic and reciprocal among
institutions, when one employer advertises the rest tend to follow suit.
Responding to the information circulated in the mass media and to
initiatives from hospitals and other agencies to use public capital or tax revenues
to train more nurses, the state legislature has appropriated additional funds for
schools of nursing. In Hawai'i, the legislature has increased support for the
University of Hawai'i, Manoa B.S.N. program and for the two-year R.N. or
A.D.N. program at Kapiolani Community College and at Maui Community
College. The intent of additional support is to graduate more nurses for local
institutions. In the context of the crisis proportion of demand for nurses,
Hawai'i Loa College, a private institution, has a burgeoning R.N. training
program.
The Queen's Foundation, associated with Queen's Medical Center, is
supporting nursing education on Oahu at the University of Hawai'i and at
Kapiolani Community College. The Foundation, set up by Queen Emma
Kaleleonalani, has extensive commercial real estate holdings, primarily in
Waikiki.
The problem of the nursing shortage reticulates through many social
institutions. It is of concern to hospitals, physicians, professional nursing
organizations, nursing training programs, licensing bureaus, university
researchers, health services regulators and planners, the press, government and
even advertising agencies. This concern is a practical activity, topically
structuring and maintaining small, albeit significant, amounts of the substance
of these institutions. By structuring we mean, in accordance with Anthony
Giddens' notion of structuration (1981;1984), that this concern, topic of the
nursing shortage, is knowledge at hand, a practice of symbolic exchange, used
for building and reproducing interaction. In this manner, it structures
institutional life, at least parts of institutions. This preliminary positioning of the
nursing shortage crisis in an ontology of social structure is not equivalent to the
position that the crisis is not real or that the crisis is relative to a specific
configuration of social structure. That the nursing shortage is real, independent
and objective is not at issue. How it is independent and objective is the target
of a desconstructional analytic.
REC.BUJHMENT
There are other expressions of the nursing shortage crisis. One is the
effort to recruit nursing labor. Recruitment takes multiple forms.
The first recruitment strategy is directed at the "active supply" of
licensed registered nurses. There is a large pool of licensed registered nurses,
about two million in the United States. Most of them are not working in
nursing. There are 11 ,129 nurses licensed to practice in Hawai'i (Sakoda
1989). Among these nurses 8,487 reside in Hawai'i. The remaining 2,642
nurses live on the mainland and in foreign countries. Because of the large
military population in Hawai'i, many nurses come into the state, work for the
duration of a husband's tour of duty, and then move on in the next assignment.
One estimate of the number of R.N.s working as nurses in Hawai'i is 3,501
(Hawai'i Task Force 1987, p. i). This means that less than half those licensed
and living in Hawai'i are working in nursing. 2
One recruitment initiative has been to attract licensed nurses who are not
currently working in the field. This has included advertising in the newspapers
and on television. The Office of the Legislative Auditor in Hawai'i has sought
to learn if more people can be employed from this pool if job sharing were
offered in nursing positions (Robillard, Johnson, and Robillard, 1989). While
most surveyed R.N.s in Hawai'i are in favor of job sharing, less than 10 % of
4,849 mail survey respondents plan to take a shared position in the next two
years if such a position were offered. The attraction of nurse~ to shared
positions, as a labor recruitment strategy, is less than anticipated.
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Operation Nightingale is a project funded by the State of Hawai'i
designed to provide additional training to foreign-trained nurses. The trainin~
is both clinical and didactic. It has the objective of recruiting foreign-trained
nurses who are already resident in Hawai'i, providing the extra experience to
enable them to pass the State licensure examination. The program has been
successful in having 90% of its graduates obtain licensure as R.N.s. The
program has about thirty students in each cycle of training. Most of the students
are Philippine trained nurses. Many of the Philippine trained nurses have been
working in health care as L.P.N.s or as nursing assistants. Previous to State
funding, the program was supported by the community hospitals, providing a
channel of upward career mobility for nurses employed by local institutions.
Another. ~ec~uitment strategy has been looking overseas, primarily in
Irela~d, the PhIhppmes and more recently in Taiwan and Korea. One large
hospI~al on Oahu has recruited from Ireland. The Hawai'i hospitals have not
re~ruIt~d from the Philippines. There is a substantial family reunification
mIgratIOn, also known as chain migration, to Hawai'i from the Philippines.
Most of t~e F~lipi~o n
3
urses working in Hawai'i have come through family
spons~red Immigratl?~. However, the Manila Bulletin is full of large display
advertIsements for chmcal nurses from metropolitan hospital systems on the U. S.
mainland, principally from the east coast cities. Up to over 90% of some ofthe
graduating classes from the University of the Philippines College of Nursing are
working in the United States or Canada.
A new source of nurses is New Zealand. The Board of Nursing in
Hawai'i has taken special measures to give temporary licenses to these nurses.
However, the New Zealand government is not too happy about losing nurses to
Hawai'i, or anywhere else. Most of them have been trained at public expense,
from. tax. revenue-supported institutions. New Zealand has experienced an
outmigratIOn problem, exacerbated by an economic recession and a low
population. New Zealand is arguably not a peripheral country in the world
economy but the shift of trained nurses to Hawai'i and North America is a shift
in capital re~ources. The United States is meeting its need for nurses, in part,
by transfernng the fruits of capital intensive training from other countries.
There is little cost to the United States in recruiting nurses that other countries
have paid to train.
In the Philippines the overseas nursing market in the United States
Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Europe has distorted the number of
student~ .in ~ursing schools and the numbers of licensed nurses in the country.
The PhIhppmes has a surplus of nurses. This is a concentration of public and
private .capital wh~ch could be used for alternative ends. The Philippines, India,
AfghanIstan, PakIstan, South and Central America, and now Ireland, New
Zealand, and Canada have been free resources of trained medical personnel, at
no cost to the United States.
THE JREDUNDANCY OlF THE PROBLEM
The shortage of nurses is not a new phenomenon. Nor is it new to
research. It has concerned professional nursing associations since the turn of the
century. Problems in nursing, like the shortage, have the status of unsolved
social problems. 4 An unsolved social problem is chronic. It does not get solved
because its problematic character structures not so much a solution as it
maintains a set of social institutions. 5 We will return to this discussion below.
In 1901 the New York Nursing Association surveyed its members about
a number of issues. Amcng them were: (1) educational requirements for
practice; (2) title for nurses; (3) job design; (4) recruitment; (5) career
development; and (6) turnover. At the turn of the century, nursing or what was
considered the work of females in health services was in a transitional state.
Like medicine, it was being increasingly articulated as an independent way of
making a living, a full-time occupation (Starr 1982). Nurses were maneuvering
for some degree of control over their work in the emerging and rapidly
expanding institutional structure of a health care system. The work of nurses
was rapidly changing from the informal and independent curing ministrations of
women, in a largely agrarian economy, to a cash compensated job in the context
of a complex division of labor. The role of women in the delivery of health care
services was transformed from a life long-avocation, handed down within
families, to a proletarian vocation, subordinated to the physician and to those
who bought their labor time.
In 1903 North Carolina became the first state to license nurses.
Previously, nurses had established registries, with minimum requirements for
training. These registries were like membership in the Better Business Bureau.
Membership was not required to practice. With licensure by the states, entry
into nursing practice became legally regulated and integrated into a system of
accredited schools of nursing. Soon licensure examinations were established.
These examinations evolved into the standardized national examination currently
used by all states and territories in the United States. In Hawai'i, the Board of
Nursing, a division of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs,
administers the examination.
Many of the early schools were free-standing hospital schools of nursing.
These schools were not affiliated with a college or university. However, as
health care became more and more technologically complex, particularly after
World War II, the training of nurses was shifted to publiCA and private
j £. U G.!
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universities, with substantial basic and science educational requirements. It
should be remembered that the shift to university-based training was not so much
a technological imperative as the rationalization and ascendancy of capital
bourgeoisie, their philanthropic foundations, and the increasing vertical national
integration in mass production and distribution and in penetration of government
in everyday affairs (Brown 1979).
Even schools of nursing in a private university received public funding
from the U.S. and state governments. The costs of nursing education have been
incrementally transferred to the public. The same can be said of the training of
physicians. Federal research grant overhead (an additional outlay often 65 % of
direct costs), construction and capitation grants underwrite over half of the cost
of medical education at some institutions. State financing also plays a substantial
role. Tuition plays a minor role.
With licensure and accreditation of schools of nursing, in the late 1960s,·
the American Nursing Association and the National League for Nursing began
advocating, a further increase in standards. The two organizations have
proposed that the professional registered nurse should have a bachelor of nursing
degree (B. S. N.), a four or five year curriculum. The product of the two-year
training program (A.D.N.), usually located in community colleges, would be
downgraded to an associate nurse. At present in Hawai'i the two-year nursing
program is offered at Kapiolani, Maui, and Hilo Community Colleges. The
University of Hawai'i at Manoa used to offer the A.D.N. program but it was
transferred to Kapiolani Community College.
This proposal had the manifest objective of creating a professional
identity, better pay, and increased autonomy for nursing. The proposal was to
increase the quality of health care and stabilize the career paths of nurses. The
proposal has not been adopted in most states, including Hawai'i. While the
nursing organizations argued that this would attract and maintain a pool of
working nurses to meet national needs, the primary employers of nurses--
hospitals and governments--have effectively resisted the proposal. The
employers argue the two-year nurse or A.A. nurse programs provide the
"troops" in the nursing corps in any institution. They say that the B.S.N.
prepared nurse is often dissatisfied with the field because of unrealistic high
expectations and too frequently enrolls in a master of nursing program, thereby
limiting availability to clinical work. Supervisors of nursing recruitment and
personnel management say they already have too many master's nurses. 6
The interests of the employers of nurses apparently have not been the
same as the interests of nurses in professionalization. While the nurses have
sought autonomy and sovereignty over their own affairs (the sine qua non of a
I
L_
orofession, as in medicine, law, and theology), the employers have sought to
~aximize their access to a stream of newly trained nurses. We emphasize the
interest is in new graduates, young, unmarried individuals at the bottom of the
pay scale, who are professionally unsure of themselves, and who are relatively
complaint.? The employers feel that if the B.S.N. is the threshold to nursing
practice, they will be denied access to the community college trained nurse in an
~ccupational field with a reputation (a reputation which may be more rhetorical
than real) of high turnover and a short active work life span. The employers
expect nurses to leave the field after four or five years. 8 The vision the
employers have of the increase in the standards of licensure is that it would cut
off an important source of nurses.
Throughout the long quest for sovereignty in the United States, a state
that continues to elude it, nursing has been researched on an annual basis. There
have been studies and revisions of nursing curricula. There have been studies
of the nursing labor market, compensation, career development, work
satisfaction, clinical skills and performance, record keeping, foreign nurses, and
even research on nursing research. This is to mention only a few of the nursing
research categories. The point here is to demonstrate that nursing is a well-
researched field. The research has been conducted by nursing school faculty,
nursing associations, hospital associations, and the government. The financial
support for the research has been from the hospital associations and government,
the primary employers of nurses.
When we were asked to research nurses in Hawai'i by the Department
of Health and the Board of Nursing, Department of Commerce and Consumer
Affairs, we were struck by the recurring nature of the issues of high turnover,
recruitment, job dissatisfaction, and requirements for entry into practice. These
issues have been on the table since the late 1880s. In reviewing the literature for
our research on nurse retention in the services operated by the Hawai'i
Department of Health and for our research on the entry into practice issue for
the Board of Nursing, one of us began to think of Friedrich Nietzsche.
Nietzsche postulated the law of eternal return, the same things keep being
reproduced through time, thereby maintaining the sensibility and order of
experience. We began to wonder if the research questions about nursing
preparation, recruitment, and retention have remained the same for a long time--
at least at a level of abstract equivalence--what this constancy represented. We
began to conceptualize the problem of nursing as a recurring conversation, being
used to reproduce a social order in the same way Anthony Giddens talks about
knowledge-at-hand being used interactively to structure a social order. We
began to think that if the issues were recurring, without solutions, maybe the
approach or posture--including the assumptions--of the research and the problem
it sought to solve were not "supposed" to change. Perhaps the research and its
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political application (including recurrent calls for more research on the same
topic) serve to mystify and maintain the structure of the problem, a chronically
unsolved social problem.
FEMINIST SOCIAL TJHfJEORY
The fleeting reference to Nietzsche and the law of eternal return of
history made us start to think we might survey and interview nurses, counting
and associating responses to variables of interest, forever without learning why
nurses work for a few years, become alienated, leave the field, and cannot be
enticed back to the field. Counting is not useless but we recognized--maybe
from the volatile phone calls and letters we received from nurses in connection
with our survey research--that the semantic categories which defined our measure
variables are from a vision of a social order. Their use reproduces this vision.
Many of our respondents were not happy with this Giddens-like structuration.
Our interview and survey schedules were deductive extensions of preceding
research and were developed in collaboration with nursing management in the
Hawai'i Department of Health and the Board of Nursing. What our respondents
said to us in the calls and letters (including three threats of lawsuits) was that
they felt subordinated by the language of the survey schedule. They said the
language of our questionnaire carried fotward the problems of nursing
employment and as such are incapable of detecting the organization of the
problems, no less offering solutions.
We did not know what to do with the reorientation of our attitude about
nursing shortage research until the February 1990 issue of the American
Sociological Association's Footnotes arrived. Footnotes is the Association
newspaper. In this issue there is a shockingly naive attack on feminist theory,
"The Trouble With Feminist Theory," by Michael A. Faia (1990). Until the
Faia article we did not know much about feminist theory. It had been
sequestered beyond the pale of funded research. We still do not know enough
about feminist critical theory. 9
Faia, like someone from the European Enlightenment, argues that
positivistic sociology is value neutral and as such it can only serve the interests
of feminists in righting injustices. He cites the work of legendary female
sociologists as examples of the proper utilization of positivistic methods. He is
arguing against the thrust of the assertion, exampled by Stacey and Thorne
(1985), that the methods and theoretical orientations of sociology assume, albeit
unconsciously, a social order, one repressive of women and subordinate classes.
The feminist critique of sociology has gone right by Faia. Obviously, it takes
some knowledge of the constitutive role of language to understand the feminist
critique.
Now we have moved to the tentative position that the research on nursing
and the shortage has been informed by the same language that constitutes,
institutionalizes the problem. This is biting off a lot. To begin to explicate this
position, we will discuss a number of issues: (1) The unconscious reification of
~apitalistpower and proletarianiZation of women in nursing personnel research;
(2) The subordination of nurses to science; and (3) The attempt to set-up an
independent science of nursing based on the phenomenology of the person.
The research on nursing personnel, such as that cited above, can be
characterized as highly focused. The research zeros in on nursing, framing it
closely as an occupation, neglecting the wider phenomena of why people are
compelled to seek full-time employment, to undergo training to make their labor
saleable in the capitalist division of labor and commodified exchange. Without
becoming a pataphysist, or one who adores romanticized versions of traditional
cultures, we can say there are other ways to spend your life than as a fulltime
proletarian. 1O The usual approach of nursing research assumes a background of
~vage employment and treats entry into nursing education and practice as
individual choices, rather than the channeling effects, the limitation of horizons,
by class position. Because of the unquestioned assumption of proletarianized
society, already divided up into occupations, how one could come to view this
kind of social order as the natural reality is undescribed. Further, because of an
essentialized individualism, how this kind of naturalized proletarian social order
differentially recruits segments (like upper-lower and lower-middle class women
for nursing (Muff 1988, Reverby 1987) of the population to the occupational
structure is uninteresting. The entire circuitry of a system which prepares
individuals, mostly females, for nursing employment and who become, because
they are individuals, dissatisfied and alienated with nursing is literally a priori
to where nursing research begins.
Weare suggesting a political economy investigation of nursing education,
entry into practice, and the shortage. That it seems beside the point, that
nursing appears as a fully formed employment field meriting our complete
attention, is a noncritical posture toward the social institutions which reproduce
the unsolved and chronic problem of a nursing shortage. We concede that the
vocabulary of proletarianization, division of labor, capital, naturalization, class,
and the method of studying nursing vis-a-vis a political economy of the entire
society may sound strange and far out. They are items from a Marxist lexicon,
even though no attempt is made here to represent a Marxist or neo-Marxist
perspective. But as in the feminist critique of sociology, the use of a vocabulary
representing what is apparent about the vocational order and about nursing
simply reifies the existing society. This is not analysis but, rather, acting on
behalf of the values, ideologies, opinions, vocabularies, and deep assumptions
II
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which naturalize or make normal, over the life of professional nursing in the
United States, the short-term working career of women in nursing.
Moreover, the absence of a political economy of nursing in nursing
research leaves unavailable or at least marginal the values that draw women into
nursing, values which may not be easily commodifiable, as a sustaining basis of
the structure of nursing. The value of political economy will have to stand here
as an assertion. There is insufficient space to demonstrate a political economy
of nursing here. We will explore it further below in the discussions of science
in nursing and in the attempt to found a science of nursing in the phenomenology
of caring.
Many nursing leaders subscribe to the idea that nursing has to become
more scientific if it is to gain the autonomy of a profession. Will the study and
practice of science really make nurses sovereign over their own affairs? What
is the status of laboratory technicians or radiological technicians or inhalation
therapists, people who work within a relatively more confined scientific
circumspection than nurses? Nurses are not only responsible to science but to
the practice of "caring," or the skills of face-to-face communication with the
patient, giving emotional support and patient education, among other tasks
(Benner and Wrubel, 1989).
It is apparent that science is not the tail that wags the dog in health care
career status. For example, a physician who earns a Ph.D. in a science, as in
computer science or rehabilitation engineering, and elects to pursue the practice
of the science in the context of health care has a lower status than the clinically
active physician who does not have a Ph.D. More is involved than the practice
of science in professional sovereignty.
Recently, Benner and Wrubel, in The Primacy of Caring, have sought
to formalize the process of caring, thereby giving nurses an independent role.
This effort seems to recognize the fact that most nurses are not scientists, in the
sense of creating new scientific knowledge for health care. The average floor
nurse, the clinic nurse, and the state public health nurse are not basic research
or clinical scientists in the sense of publishing their work in The New England
Journal of Medicine, Lancet, Nature, Nursing Research, or any of the basic
science disciplinary journals. The science in clinical nursing is derivative, as it
is in the everyday practice of medicine. It is learned and practiced by nurses but
rarely created by clinical nurses. Nursing school curricula are not geared to
producing hypothetico-deductive scientists in physics, the life sciences, computer
science, engineering, or any other applied science. The training in nursing in
mathematics, chemistry, logic, physics and other sciences is not enough to be
prepared to enter the sciences as a practitioner of basic research. Except for the
first two years of nursing· study, when a liberal arts experience takes place,
students are relatively isolated from bench science or the hands-on practice of
any scientific discipline. Furthermore, nursing students are recruited from social
classes unlikely to become scientists and go mostly to colleges and universities
which supply few research scientists. These are "teaching schools," the state
colleges and universities and the community colleges, largely without Ph.D.
programs in the sciences and the federally funded research infrastructures.
There are nursing schools at elite universities but the number of nurses graduated
from them is small, compared to the number produced by non-research
universities and colleges.
Even the nursing faculty who have Ph.D.s have them mostly in
disciplines other than nursing, usually in the social sciences or in education
(Ed.D.). There is now a doctorate in nursing and it is receiving vigorous
support from nursing leaders. The degree is a Doctorate in Nursing Science, or
the D. N. S. 11 Some universities offer the Ph.D. in nursing. But nursing faculty
who have Ph.D.s in the social sciences, education and even the "hard sciences"
are not mainstream practitioners of their graduate training disciplines. They
teach, research and write about nursing, a multidisciplinary applied field.
Benner and Wrubel (1989) have tried to distill what nurses do best or should do
best and have prescribed the role of nurses as providing "caring." They have
tried to create a new science of nursing built upon a Heideggerian
phenomenology of the person (Heidegger 1962).
If everyday nursing is not doing disciplinary science, if nursing education
does not prepare scientists and if nursing faculty do not practice disciplinary
science, will the scientificizing of nursing really bring the hoped for autonomy
of nursing? We think not. It is clear from the other sciences in health care that
science in itself is not the path to high status and professional autonomy. A
more serious question is if nurses do not do disciplinary research, researching
instead the applied field of nursing, and if nursing is creating its own doctoral
programs and if the likes of Benner and Wrubel are attempting to provide an
independent theoretical basis for nursing, maybe nursing has a free-standing core
of knowledge and practice different from disciplinary science. We will argue,
in part, that nursing has little power over its own affairs because the core of
nursing, caring, is institutionalized at the margins of the commodified exchange
system. In fact, nursing, as primarily the work of females, is institutionalized on
the margins of commodified exchange. As women who are housekeepers for
their families, raising their children, cooking and maintaining shelter, thereby
reproducing the force of laborers and consumers without compensation, nurses
provide relatively underpaid work for a system that depends on labor intensive
and diffuse" caring" to function financially. Capitalism depends on
uncompensated and underpaid sources of production, domestic household work
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carri~d out by females and publicly financed infrastructure (schools, roads,
hospitals, police, courts, harbors and airports, to mention but a few) to, in part,
create a surplus for private appropriation. The tremendous differential returns
on capital in health care depend on the undercompensated labor of nurses, as
well as the low paid work of others in health care.
The notion that nurses do caring as the centerpiece of their work and its
proper execution is based on a Heideggerian definition of the person does set out
a horizon of nursing sovereignty as a profession. However, is this formalization
of nursing knowledge nothing more than a retreat into a rhetorical position? We
are struck, however popular phenomenology is in nursing, at how much things
would have to change if the kind of nursing Benner and Wrubel advocate were
put into general practice. The assignment of nursing contacts with the patient
and the number of nursing hours per patient would dramatically increase. The
program of Benner and Wrubel and others like them ignores the locus of control
of health ~are units: the rational calculation of treatment against outcome by the
rate of reimbursement from insurers and government programs, like Medicare
and Medicaid. If the phenomenology movement in nursing does not fit the
acuity of nursing care systems figured out by Big Eight accounting firms such
as Peat Marwick, designed to calculate simultaneously with the Diag~ostic
Related Groups (DRGs),the program is merely a pipe dream of academic
nursing. 12
. The phenom~n~logy of caring, as the unique science of nursing, is highly
~ttr.a~tlve .an humamstlc grounds. Perhaps the attention on the subject, the
mdlVldualist grounds of its European humanism, and the exclusion of the social
ar~ really indic.ations of a socially structured ignorance of power (certainly not
~mque to .nursmg). The structured avoidance of discussing the problems of
I~plementmg a program of phenomenology of caring, depending on the
nghtness of the idea to win the day, mystifies members of this discourse,
reproducing the conditions of the subordination of nurses as well as the
impersonal character of health care. The nurses who practice this discourse--and
all of us are partial members of this classical Enlightenment vocabulary--cannot
find or formulate the structure of subordination of nurses.
There are other problems with the phenomenology of caring. Among
them are. th~ ~uroc~ntric basis of the person, the structure of the subject.
Ano~e~ IS m Igno.nng the social it becomes an elitist ideology, iteratively
mystlfymg the nursmg faculty who produce it.
']['HE WOJRK OF NUJRSES
We have to back up for a short digression on the range and nature of
nursing labor. There are many kinds of work under the label of nursing. There
are nurses working in the traditional hospital roles in acute care: medical-
surgical, critical care, OB/GYN, pediatrics and inpatient mental health. In
Hawai'i, our survey of all licensed registered nurses generated data to indicate
that 64.78 percent of RNs work in acute care settings in hospitals (Robillard,
Robillard, and Johnson, 1989a). This figure may be higher (70.31 %) if we add
the nurses working in geriatrics (5.53 %), often in long-term skilled nursing
facilities. Other nurses work in nursing training, patient education, ambulatory
care, administration, home care, community health, school health, community
mental health, maternal and child health, health planning and for insurance
companies. However, the numbers and percentage of nurses in each of the non-
acute care categories is low.
In a separate interview study of a sample of 300 nurses employed by the
State of Hawai'i Department of Health the distribution of nursing assignments
were the following: medical-surgical 12.3%; critical care 7.35%; OB/GYN
6.0%; emergency room 5.3%; operating room 3.0%; inpatient pediatrics 2.7%;
inpatient psychiatry 7.0%; long-term skilled nursing facility/intermediate care
facility 12.7 %; long-term facilities for the mentally retarded 4.3 %; long-term
psychiatric care 3 %; community and home care 25.3 %; administrator 3.3 %;
supervisor 2.7%; alcohol abuse 1.3%; other 3.3%; don't know/refused .3%
(Robillard, Robillard and Johnson 1989). Among nurses employed by the State
of Hawai'i 43.65% work in acute care. Add to this the percentage working in
long-term care facilities and the institution-based nurses are increased to 63.65 %,
beginning to approximate the distribution of nurses at large in the State, both in
the public and private sectors. In Hawai'i the State operates hospitals on Maui,
Hawai'i, Lanai, and the TB and Hansen's Disease hospitals on Oahu (Leahi) and
on Molokai (Kalaupapa), Hawai'i State Hospital in Kaneohe, several facilities
for the mentally retarded and multiple long-term care facilities. The point is
Hawai'i, unlike most other states, operates general community acute care
hospitals and may have a higher ratio of RNs in the State Department of Health
in acute care than other states.
The focus on ratios of RNs working in acute care settings and other
institutional circumstances has a rationale. First, nursing is very heterogeneous,
with many dissimilar skills and different levels of technological sophistication.
Nurses are not functionally interchangeable. Second, our research on nurses in
Hawai'i found a greater career satisfaction and relatively low turnover among
public health nurses and free-standing State-operated outpatient clinics than in
hospital acute care settings, both private and public. The nursing shortage is
A
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concentrated in the acute care services of hospitals, where most nurses work
and where the public imagination places most nurses, uniformed, moving from
bed to bed twenty-four hours a day.
Acute care nursing is labor intensive. It requires twenty-four hour
staffing, divided into three shifts. One dimension of labor intensity is that a shift
is rationalized into a schedule of cycles of repeated procedures, like vital signs
or changing IV fluid bags, and single time events, as in a patient shower or a
stool sample. This rationalization is tight as the discrete continuum of the shift
is composed--for the nurse and supervisor, alike--of these cycles of repeated and
single events. There is no time out in nursing coverage of patients, except for
scheduled breaks and even then coverage arrangements are made for absent
nurses. The intensity of the labor in the entire shift is subjectively and
objectively claimed by a sequence of duties. Floor nursing requires stamina and
able-bodied people. It is an on your feet and lifting kind of work.
Except for medical residents, where they have them, RNs are the top tier
of in-house medical staff, carrying out treatment plans ordered by physicians and
supervising LPNs, nurses' aides and ward clerks. They interact, also, with the
technical staff, e.g. respiratory, radiology, laboratory and others. RNs and
residents are in direct communication with the patient's physician, both during
rounds and by telephone. RNs are the implementors and managers of most
bedside care in most hospitals.
This work is routinized, with a procedure for every contingency, and
often performed under the stress of having to deal with extremely ill patients.
Actually, there are two issues here. One is routinization and the subordination
to regimes of treatment decided collectively or by third parties, like physicians
or, even, accountants (see above). While the hospital department of nursing
administration will plan--within national standards--nursing procedures, the
individual floor nurse will have little freedom in carrying them out. There is an
overriding notion of effective medical procedure and responsibility, requiring
equivalence between the sequential implementation of the same procedure across
multiple implementations. The idea of step-wise equivalence in effecting the
same procedure, with little tolerance for deviation, produces its own kind of
stress. Not everyone can perform in an environment where actions have a
constant and an equivalent identity, especially as health care becomes more and
more technological, embedded in unforgiving computer digitalization. This may
be responsible for some of the high turnover in acute care, people without proper
educational backgrounds or without the necessary cognitive orientation are
filtered out or transfer to less demanding nursing environments.
The second issue is the reaction to dealing with acutely ill and terminal
patients, people who are often disfigured by wasting, surgery or accident trauma.
Most people die in the United States in acute care hospital services, like
oncology, cardiac care, intensive care, and medical-surgical, and nurses are the
first contact with death. On busy services death is an everyday phenomenon,
made increasingly so by a rapidly aging population and a rising level of patient
acuity.
Death, disfigurement and any form of physical decline are the sine qua
non of failure and debasement in American youth-oriented culture. Death is
sequestered in hospitals in a proletarianized society of full-time wage
employment. No one has time to care for the dying. It is not that death,
disfigurement and decline are inherently undesirable, no less unexpected, but that
American social and economic structure and the cultural knowledge used to
construct and maintain it systematically disvalues death and illness, to the extent
that mere presence to dying, death and disfigurement may reflexively erode
one's sense of competence. It is as if there is no future with the presence of
death or physical decline in a secularized America, where gods and an after-life
have long since departed (Baudrillard 1976). Death work and dealing with
patients with irreversible illnesses are warrantable reasons (expressed in
conversations heard everyday throughout the society) for leaving hospital nursing
and for leaving the care of the sick, generally (Sontag 1988).
One last factor deserves attention, albeit all too brief. We have already
mentioned the dependence on relatively low wage labor of nurses for the
generation of capital and we have talked about the labor intensity of nursing.
However, we have not directly addressed the issue of the appropriation of the
generated capital and what may happen to the consciousness of nurses in the face
of this appropriation. The greatest percentage of the total annual national health
care bill is spent on hospital care in the last six months of the patient's life,
usually on life-extending treatment requiring intensive nursing. Hospital
suppliers, manufacturers, administrators, physicians--indeed the entire medical
economic sector--relies on hospital-based care for maximum capital growth. The
capital growth generated by nurses is not appropriated by nurses and to even
consider a claim by nurses to the capital produced by their work--above the
prevailing wage for nurses--can be said to be confused about the ownership of
productive capital, including the labor of nurses. Nevertheless, nurses are
acutely aware they benefit differently from their labor than do physicians,
hospital management, and the owners of medical investment capital, even at
$19.00 per hour.
Nurses are hourly employees, not withstanding the rhetoric about nursing
being a profession. Nurses sell their labor and the time and fruits of their work
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are owned by the institutions that employ them and are appropriated by
physicians and investment capital suppliers of the health care industry. The
maintenance of the hourly labor contract belies any comparison with physicians
and management. The authorizing symbolism of greater professional freedom,
of charging fees or being in charge of capital (physical plant or admitting
patients), is not available to nurses.
It is an irony of social structure that the proletarianization of women into
nurses, and the general society-wide division of labor, are the conditions of a
calculative and accelerating individualism, the basis of discontent. Nurses are
leaving nursing to take other employment because of dissatisfaction with the
relative rewards of payor because of a feeling of no personal future in the field,
often feeling taken advantage of or being uneasy with strict subordination to
routines of care, physicians and management. More nurses are working outside
of nursing than in nursing. Moreover, as we will argue below, nurses are
leaving nursing because nursing is symbolically presented in society as a
transitory female occupation.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that the nursing shortage and related problems of
standards of entry into practice and licensing are not new. They have been
chronic problems since the rationalization of nursing into full-time wage
employment. In part, the history of nursing since the late 1800s has been the
unrealized struggle for professional autonomy and sovereignty. We suggested
that the redundancy of the problem, even after decades of research, may lie in
the unexamined premises of the language used to formulate the problem, what
is assumed and what remains silent, not even capable of formulation. To
illustrate this point, we used the analogy of the feminist critique of sociology.
An ethnographic observation was entered on the resistance by nursing
employers to raising the preparation of nurses to the bachelor's degree, the BSN.
Employers say they must maintain access to the two-year-curriculum trained
nurse, mostly from community colleges, to meet staffing needs. Access to a
stream of newly-trained nurses is considered critical. In fact, there is a stated
preference, by some employers, for nursing graduates of two-year programs.
Some reluctance was expressed about "over-educated" nurses, meaning they
wanted "troops" and not nursing leaders, of whom they had an ample supply.
The personnel officer's problem is conceived as continual replacement of floor
staff nurses who work for a comparatively short number of years. Observations
were also made on the recruitment of nurses, both as an indicator of the shortage
and as an example of uneven exchange between the United States and Third
World suppliers of nurses. Hawai'i has only recently entered into direct
recruitment of foreign nurses, having relied on Filipino nurses who migrated. to
Hawai'i in family reunification immigration. Philippine trained nurses compnse
a substantial number of the active clinical nurses in Hawai'i.
The desire to maintain recruitment from two-year training programs and
the expansion into overseas recruitment reveal the implicit inscription of gender
and class subordination of nursing. The maintenance of the "fiction" or the
rhetoric of nursing being a short-term career of females permits the structure of
nursing jobs, possible changes in terms of employment, and the exploitation of
women made possible by such rhetoric, to remain hidden. Furthermore, the
class o;igin of most American nurses and the attraction of foreign-trained nurses-
-amplified by structured rapid turnover--maintains the class hegemony of
physicians and hospital management. Such nurses are well ordered a~d
orderable in a relatively integrated hierarchical system of values and symbolIc
codes, where the differential access and performance of cultural capital is one
of the class sorting mechanisms.
In Hawai'i it is no mistake that the health careers program financed by
the private hospitals and the State is focused on Farrington High School in
Kalihi. One might ask why the health careers program (nursing and allied
health) are not focused on Kalani High School in Kahala or at Kaiser High
School in Hawai'i Kai. These high schools and neighborhoods are far different
from Farrington High School and Kalihi, an area that has traditionally been the
home of recent immigrants, native Hawaiians, and the working poor. Kalihi has
been through successive waves of migrants but today may be characterized as
having a large Filipino and Samoan population. Good intentions aside, the
concentration of health careers recruitment in Farrington in Kalihi is a statement
and class channeling device of where these careers fit in the structural hierarchy
of Hawai'i, what cultural skills are needed and not needed and, moreover, the
differential access that children from various neighborhoods have to the cultural
capital of controlling their own employment and career devel.opm~nt. Women
in high school in Kahala and Hawai'i Kai, if they are not 111 pnvate scho.ol,
where the occupational orientation is even more pronounced, are plannll1g
careers in the professions, finance, university professorships and commerce.
Nursing is literally below them.
Nursing is a broad field of employment, with many different specialties
and career development paths. However, it is in hospital, inpatient care where
most nurses are employed and where the turnover is the highest, and the
shortage is concentrated. We have characterized this work as routinized. and
increasingly tied to technology. The work is composed of repeated and sll1gle
sequence tasks for the entirety of a shift, hence the labor intensity of nursing.
fJ
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The work is tied to the symbolism of the labor contract, hourly wages.
Nurses are the front line of acute care but have, because of the labor contract,
no claim to the enormous capital growth their labor in large part generates.
Nurses implement the orders of physicians, who are largely absent from the
service floor, except for rounds and in emergencies. Capital growth is
appropriated by physicians, hospital management, suppliers and equipment
manufacturers, among others, and, yet, it is the labor of nurses which in large
part is responsible for the implementation of care and the consumption of
equipment and supplies.
Routinization, labor intensity and the expropriation of the fruits of labor
are not new and not intrinsically sources of complaint. Traditional and class
divided or feudal societies certainly were composed of agrarian routines and
rituals and the chiefly elite and the lords of the manor expropriated their measure
of production (Giddens 1981). This is still happening in agricultural societies,
where the under classes have been socialized to think of themselves as lesser
beings than the elites, to whom they willingly give a large measure of their
production. In modern societies this is decidedly not the case.
In modern capitalist societies13 upper class values of self-determination
are circulated throughout the social structure, almost as if a commodity for sale
and upper class status emulation. This context permits the realization of relative
deprivation of those employed in routinized and subordinated jobs. As we
progress into a postmodern social structure, where signs are the main product,
the desire for a self-determined career with professional autonomy and access
and control of the capital generated becomes a prestige commodity. The free
circulation and consumption of signs in society opens up unlimited possibilities
and unhappy comparisons among those subjects formed, socialized within an
"information" society. Upper and middle-class women in American society are
already within the self-hermeneutic circle of autonomous careers and increasingly
regard nursing as a low status job. 14 Lower-middle and upper-lower class and
foreign women are not as firmly embedded in the same milieu (the information
society of infinite possibility) and more readily accept, at least rhetorically, and
are targeted for nursing recruitment. Once in nursing, however, and as the
circulation of prestige signs penetrates more and more of society these recruits
have the same structural grounds for unhappiness with hospital nursing.
The structure of the problem of contemporary nursing, and perhaps over
a longer term, is that it is lodged in a social system that recruits females from
the literate lower middle and upper lower classes and at the same time
commodifies all prestige values, presenting and diffusing throughout mass
society alternative autonomous careers and the foundations for comparative
discontent. The rhetoric of the hierarchy of cultural capital, the vertical array
of values and signs, increasingly subject to com-modification, defines the
dimensions of society: who knows the dimensions; who does not know the
comprehensive dimensions; who has the right to inform who about what it means
to be "informed" 15; who has the duty to learn from the "informed"; who should
be restricted or unrestricted to acquiring what job skills; and even how long a
nursino- career should last before it becomes a degraded commodity. Nursing
emplo;ers, nurses themselves, and nursing training programs, albeit implicitly,
inhabit a structure of commodified symbolic exchange wherein all become
mutually reinforcing poles of formulating nursing as an unrewarding career,
requiring a constant stream of new recruits, like the enlisted ranks of the armed
services.
NOTES
This is to thank Divina Telan Robillard for timely assistance in writing and completing this
paper.
I. We are using semiotics as a theory of signs bnt with the following qualifications. First, the
world is not rednced to a positivistic reality of signs or some linguistic construction, as the
world as constructed by language. Second, we are not using the theory of signs as a
metaphor, as the world as if it were constructed by language. We are using semiotics or
signs as a topic, a referent of modern social organization. In capitalist social organization
signs are both what is produced and the means of production, especially in late capitalism.
For a political economy of signs see Baudrillard's For a Critique ofthe Political Economy
of the Sign. This paper draws on the work of Baudrillard and contemporary French social
theory, but makes no attempt to be a faithful representation of any single author or style.
2. The number of nurses licensed in Hawai'i is derived from the Board of Nursing, the
licensing agency. The number is from 1989 license renewals. The number of nurses
estimated to be working in Hawaii is from a 1987 survey of health care agencies in Hawaii
by the Hawaii Task Force on Nursing Education and Service. We recognize the problem
of comparing 1989 license renewals and 1987 survey data but only enter the comparison
to make a rough indication of the gap between the number licensed and those working in
nursing.
3. Mention should be made of the large number of Filipino nurses who fail to qnalify for
Hawaii licensure by reason of low scores in the State R.N. licensure examination. Many
are working as L.P.N.s or as nursing assistants.
4. The idea of an unsolved social problem in the context of the nursing shortage was
suggested by Deane Neubauer.
5. We are aware that sounds like simple functionalism, a position we hope to elude.
6. This information was gathered in field work in Hawaii. The identity of the sources must
be protected.
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7. We are thankful to an unidentified member of the audience at the Hawaii Sociological
Association meeting on March 24, 1990 for this observation. This observation is confirmed
by nursing personnel officers at major Hawaii health care institutions. This ideological
belief about young nurses contrasts markedly to the actual age structure of working nurses
and probably points to the culture of gender bias more than to the empirical distribution of
nurses.
8. Some in nursing report that nursing administrators actually desire high turnover of nurses
after a few years of employment.
9. Recently we discovered a feminist series of papers in Images ofNurses: Perspectives from
History, Art, and Literature, edited by Anne Hudson Jones (1988).
10. See Baudrillard's discussion of gift and sumptuary cultures in The Mirror of Production
(1975) and Ferrarotti's, The End of Conversation (1988), use of non-European cultures to
get an idea of non-proletarianized social orders. For a criticism of fetishization of non-
European cultures see Kellner's Jean Baudrillard (1989).
11. We are thankful to Pat McKnight for materials on graduate training in nursing.
12. There is a process of ever and ever tightening control over health care by the rationalities
of financial management. The Peat Marwick acuity system is the latest phase in Max
Weber's tightening cage of rationality.
13. Including the socialist countries.
14. Men are subject to the same phenomenon.
15. Those of us who read The New York Times, Nation, T7Je New Republic, The Wall Street
Journal, and T71e New Review ofBooks think we are better informed than those who do not
read these publications and we feel this knowledge gives us the power to make decisions
on behalf of the "uninformed."
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Ironically, though the Native Hawaiian population had been reduced
dramatically by the Western diseases, the first hospitals in the islands were
created by and for foreigners (Nebelung and Schmitt, 1948; Schmitt, 1949;
Blaisdell, 1983). The British, the French, and the Americans all established
hospitals for their marines as part of their respective programs to dominate the
Pacific region (see Doyal, 1979). The so-called "Seamen's Hospitals" were built
near the major ports of Hawaii (i.e., Hilo, Lahaina, and Honolulu) where the
roads of commerce were being paved. The mission of these facilities was quite
specific: they offered palliative care to reticent mariners (Schmitt, 1949).
diseases from the outside world to the Native Hawaiian population. Within a
brief period of time, imported diseases were wreaking havoc on the Native
Hawaiian population (Schmitt, 1977; Stannard, 1989; Handy and Pukui, 1972).
This "invasion" of foreign microbes resulted in cultural genocide: i.e., a
situation in which the cluster of intergenerationally transmitted survival practices
became insufficient in bringing about the satisfactory outcomes (see Sartre, 1968;
Handy and Pukui, 1972). The initial government response to this situation was
the development of quarantine practices at the ports, beginning with a
proclamation at Honolulu in 1836 and major quarantine laws passed in 1839 and
1842.
6 Hospiitals 2KIld Social Control DlUlring




There has been little discussion of the hospitals established during
Hawaii's Kingdom era. This, no doubt, is partly due to the paucity of data
concerning these health institutions coupled with the difficulty in handling this
tumultutous period of Hawaiian history.
The studies that have been done dealing with kingdom hospitals have
been quite interesting and varied. This literature may be said to falI into the
following categories: inventories of hospital facilities (Bolles, 1947; Nebelung
and Schmitt, 1948; Weinerman, 1952); histories of single institutions or unique
institutional events (Greer, 1969; Yardley and Rogers, 1984; Talmadge, 1989;
Kamakahi, 1989c); general chronologies (Blaisdell, 1983; Kamakahi, 1989a,c);
or brief accounts of hospitals as they relate to medical biographies (Halford,
1959).
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The purpose of this paper is to present a discussion of kingdom hospitals
from a social control perspective. Specifically, the question that will be
addressed is: were there differences in terms of social control between Hawaii's
kingdom hospitals? In order to accomplish this task, a number of related issues
will have to be handled. How did hospitals fit into the fabric of Kingdom
history? What is meant by social control? What information is available
concerning Kingdom hospitals? How can the data be employed within a single
analysis?
BACKGROUND OF HAWAU'S KJINGJIJlOM HOSJ?JI1'ALS
Hospitals both reflected and helped instigate the changes that took place
during 19th century Hawaii. Therefore, before speaking to the issue of hospitals
and social control, it would be appropriate to include a brief history of hospitals
during Hawaii's kingdom era.
The Kingdom of Hawaii came into existence when Kamehameha I was
successful in establishing a political alliance between what had previously been
separate island provinces (Kuykendall, 1938). It was during the turn of the 19th
century when foreigners, who were arriving by ships, were beginning to make
an impact on Hawaiian history. This contact fostered the transmission of
The first hospital of note to serve non-mariners personnel was opened in
1853. City Hospital was a proprietary enterprise that offered medical care on
a fee-for-service basis. Although located within the heart of populous Honolulu,
the fee-for-service criterion virtually eliminated the vast majority of Native
Hawaiians from availing themselves to the facility. This was because a money
economy had not yet been operating extensively throughout the population. In
essence, limiting care on a fee-for-service basis was paramount to saying that the
facility was designed to care for foreigners and Native Hawaiians of substantial
means (see Kamakahi, 1989b).
The State began concerted involvement in the hospital sector with its
sponsorship of Queen's Hospital. The fledgling constitutional monarchy enacted
legislation to create and maintain quasi-public hospitals on all major islands.
The Queen's Hospital, however, was the only institution to achieve actual
existence. Immediately it became the center of Western medical care in the
islands, serving as an ideological foci for various island factions (see Kamakahi,
1989c). What was unique about Queen's Hospital was that it was designed to
serve Native Hawaiians free of charge while others would be cared for on a fee-
for-service basis (Kamakahi, 1989c). In essence, the Queen's Hospital of the
kingdom era (and even until the early 1900s) was an example of successful
socialized medicine.
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The influx of foreign contract laborers to man the plantation economy
brought a second wave of epidemics to the island archipelago (Schmitt, 1977).
Ma'i Pake, known more commonly as leprosy, became a major health concern
for the kingdom (Gugelyck and Bloombaum, 1979). Quarantine and civilian
surveillance of others was intensified, and new laws were put into action as this
affliction circulated among the population. In 1865 the State created the Kalihi
Settlement Hospital as a receiving station for lepers and designated the isolated
peninsula of Kalaupapa as a permanent settlement for those designated as
incurable. The Board of Health, which had been established in 1850, was placed
in administrative charge of these facilities. After this, generalized concern with
controlling the importation and spread of infectious diseases became paramount.
The State continued its efforts to legitimize Western medical practices
with the creation of a facility to deal with those diagnosed as mentally ill. The
Oahu Insane Asylum was an institution created in the image of those created in
the eastern United States (see Rothman, 1971). The Asylum's evolution and
management were closely monitored (Talmadge, 1989).
Various other non-governmental specialty hospitals were created during
the 1880s and 1890s: the Kingdom's waning years. Not much information is
available regarding two short-lived, specialty institutions: Brewer's Leprosy
Hospital and the Smallpox Hospital. Brewer's existed between 1881 through
1895 apparently as a private venture. The Smallpox Hospital survived for a
brief period, 1881 through 1882, during the height of one of the epidemics that
visited the islands (Schmitt, 1949). These facilities apparently were viable
during periods when their respective foci were volatile and subsequently
discontinued service.
Kapiolani Home was one facet of the Hoola a me Hooulu Lahui
associated with the reign of King David Kalakaua. The Lahui was concerned
with the dwindling numbers of Native Hawaiians in the Kingdom's population:
not only had diseases taken their toll, but the imported contract laborers now
constituted a substantial proportion of the whole. The Lahui adopted a number
of measures to circumvent this trend, the most notable being the creation of the
Kapiolani Home established for the maternity care of Native Hawaiian women
(Yardley and Rogers, 1984; Kamakahi, 1989b).
The sugar plantations had became more and more central to Hawaii's
political-economy and interaction within the world-system. By the 1880s and
1890s, the plantations were the life-blood of the Kingdom's economy. By the
end of the kingdom era, there arose the plantation hospital. This last "type" of
hospital was nested within the plantation corporation, becoming an ancillary
service of the larger conceptual rubric. In essence, these were the only facilities
of Western medicine available in the isolated, rural communities of the (non-
citizen) contract laborers (see Takaki, 1983; Char, 1975). Later many of these
facilities would be adopted by the State in their rural infrastructure building
periods.
In 1893 a group calling themselves the Committee of Public Safety (with
the illegal complicity of U.S. Marines), overthrew the government of Queen
Liliuokalani. This brought an end to the Kingdom period which had begun
roughly a century earlier under Kamehameha I (Blount, 1893; Kuykendall,
1967). During the Kingdom era Hawaii had changed from an isolated
collectivity of islands into a Westernized country within the world-system. The
transformations which occurred were both instigated and reflected in the
kingdom's hospital sector.
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The concept of social control has been one of the core ideas in the field
of sociology (Cohen and Scull, 1983; Gibbs, 1989). Although the notion of
social control has been applied most conspicuously to the study of deviance and
the concomitant levying of sanctions (see Goffman, 1961; Zola, 1972; Parsons,
1951), it has also been used to refer to a broader notion involving the manner
in which practices of social control agents is "maintained" by social networks
(Foucault, 1973). In this presentation, the duality of the concept of social
control will be preserved. On the one hand, certain aspects of the social
organization of hospitals allow them to sanction their "clientele": social control
within hospitals. On the other hand, hospitals themselves are subject to
sanctions by external bodies such as legal agencies, private corporations,
community groups, and so on: social control of hospitals.
It is important to preserve this duality in the concept of social control if
an understanding of Kingdom hospitals is to be successful. For only then can
we link the practices of these health institutions to macro and micro processes.
SociaU Control Within JHIospitals
The notion that health institutions are agents of social control has been
forwarded by a number of social scientists (Foucault, 1973; Goffman, 1961;
Strauss, 1985; Parsons, 1951). From this perspective, health facilities are
hierarchical networks which dispense sanctions: restrictions on the activities of
members and clientele, restrictions on contact beyond institutional boundaries,
monitoring of care and attention, and the like. Clients are immersed into an
environment structured by institutional efficiency rather than the care of the
client per se.
98 SOCJIAJL PROCESS JIN HAWAU Kamakahi HOSPJITAJLS AND SOCJIAJL CONTROJL 99
Foucault (1973) theorized that the clinic was a manifestation of a
particular mode of discourse, that discourse being the conception of the body as
an object of interventionist analysis (see Turner, 1987). The so-called "clinical
gaze" as a legitimized view of health practitioners served to buttress and
propagate interventionist measures on those diagnosed as ill. This clinical view
of the body worked in consonance with the practices of social control of the ill
by health personnel.
Goffman's (1961) idea of the "total institution" was of seminal
importance in reference to the realization that health institutions were agents of
social control. Goffman begins by illustrating the ramifications of clinical
discourse and practices upon the personal lives of patients within mental
institutions. It is important to note that Goffman furthers Foucault's position by
demonstrating the importance of recognizing the distinction between health
practitioners and staff from inmates. Thus, it is not just health practitioners per
se that are involved in this situation but also their interlocutory assistants, they
formed an asymmetrical power situation through a complex network of relations.
The distinction between this triad of actors (Le., health practitioners,
staff, and inmates) was developed further by Anselm Strauss (1985). Strauss has
shown in his various writings that the interactions at the level of care are
complex and asymmetrical. While outcomes are not determinate, Strauss has
continually demonstrated that the practices of staff serve to manipulate the
dispensing of care as a way of managing patients.
Parsons (1939, 1947, 1951) dealt with the idea of social control within
professional bureaucracies in an entirely different light. His focus was upon the
problems of administrators in controlling professionals (Le., those with expertise
in technical applications) within an institution: the dual-lines of authority
dilemma. In these instances, the notion of a pure meritocracy is violated.
Parsons realized that complex organizations, such as hospitals, require people
with a range of skills in which certain role occupants possess high status from
both internal sanction and external agencies (e.g., professional guilds and
associations). The control of administrators over professionals is especially
tenuous in the realm of the latter's sphere of expert knowledge. Parsons, then,
presented an exposition of the limits of social control when expert knowledge
and external networks are involved.
It becomes quite clear that there is conflict inherent in institutions in
general and health institutions in particular. This conflict can be manifested in
the care of patients. Where else does one submit oneself to bodily examination
by strangers, inconvenience oneself to diagnosis, accept the opinions of others
in regard to one's well-being, and submit oneself to being treated as an object?
At each juncture, health practitioners are engaging in social co~trol pra~tices.
But nowhere is social control more conspicuous and encompassmg than m the
hospital.
Social Control Within Kingdom Hospitals
The historical transformations that took place during Hawaii's Kingdom
period are tremendous. And this complexity is manifest ,:it?in the sph~re ~f
kingdom hospitals. How to handle this complexity when limited data eXists IS
a major challenge.
Little data exists for hospitals that were established prior to 1860. This
is mainly because there was no centralized surveillance of them: such agen~ies
were either nonexistent or in their infancy. Furthermore, some hospitals
established after 1860 were short-lived. Much of the data that is available
outlines only rudimentary aspects of these facilities.
Another difficulty is the diversity which existed between these health
institutions. The Seamen's hospitals, for example, were small, mobile, and
offered palliative, acute care to a specific clientele by means ?f co~trast
physicians. They were monitored only by the consul of the respective natl?n~.
The Queen's Hospital, on the other hand, offered treatment to everyone wlth~n
the kingdom's boundaries and was under constant government and public
scrutiny. Kalihi Hospital was a dreaded respite for those suspected. of
contracting a specific condition: leprosy. Size, clientele, and level of medical
sophistication represent a few of the characteristics in which differences were
marked.
These circumstances make it difficult to ascertain similar information on
all facilities. As a consequence, a way must be found to synthesize the available
information in order to provide a comparative assessment of these health
institutions. Employing social control as a sensitizing concept does provide us
a means of assessing kingdom hospitals within a single rubric.
The question that needs to be asked is: what characteristics of hospitals
would necessitate the employment of different levels of social control measures
within these facilities? Given the available data, four characteristics are of
substantive import.
First how non-discretionary was admission to the hospital on the part
of the pati~nt? What is of interest here is whether patients were willingly
subjecting themselves to such treatment. In some cases, such as the
leprosariums, patients were vehemently attempting to avoid admis4lion. Even
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Queen's hospital had to lobby extensively to initially gain legitimacy among the
populous even though there were virtually no barriers to entry. It is being
assumed here that greater levels of social control exist within organizations in
which non-voluntary patients are being serviced.
Second, how interventionist was the care? As Foucault (1973) had
pointed out, the "clinical gaze" required a re-orientation of the view of the body.
Such an orientation served to legitimize an interventionist model of care: where
diagnosis was specific, treatment was intrusive and medical discourse was
privileged. Interventionist practices usurp some control from the patient and
place wider discretion in the hands of the health practitioners. Such an
arrangement translates into the legitimized subjugation of the patient or at least
the potential for it.
Third, from an institutional perspective, how desirable were the
patients that were receiving care? This aspect of social control addresses the
latent aspects of care within hospitals. One manner of circumventing the
admission of "undesirables" is to restrict entry into the facility by means of
seemingly "objective" institutional policies. On the other hand, restriction of
admission is also a mechanism for isolating "undesirables" from others. The
treatment of low status actors (e.g., contract laborers, the destitute, and so on)
is not as desirable, from the facility's standpoint, as the treatment of high status
actors in terms of status and management. The assumption here is that those
considered undesirable require more resources involving monitoring and
surveillance by the staff.
Fourth, and lastly, how sociaHly isolated was the facility? Another way
of phrasing this is: how independent was the facility with regard to surrounding
social groups? The presumption being explicated is that the more socially
isolated the institution, the greater its social control capacity. This is because
the institution must maintain and employ mechanisms of social control that would
otherwise be delegated to other institutions.
These four dimensions of social control within hospitals can be
extrapolated from the available data on Hawaii's Kingdom hospitals. Of course,
what occurs within the hospital is influenced by its social environment and
cultural milieu. Hospitals are also subject to social control by external sources.
Social Control of Hospitals
The political-economic aspects of medical practice are well established
in the medical sociological literature (Navarro, 1976; Doyal, 1979; McKinlay,
1984). Kingdom hospitals were not just agents of social control, but were
subjected to social control as well. The influence of surveillance by
governmental organs (like the Board of Health), professional organizations (the
Hawaii Medical Association), the community (e.g., Hawaiian language
newspapers such as Kuakoa) helped to parameterize the control of hospital
practice.
The manner in which hospitals are controlled by external agencies is
varied. Navarro (1976) has demonstrated that the nascent aspects of politics
structures the environment within which health institutions exists. This
"environment" does exert some influence on the proliferation of certain types of
facilities and services (see Robillard and Marsella, 1987).
This political environment includes not only what is directed to hospitals
per se, but at the health sector as a whole: the legitimacy of professions (Starr,
1982; Friedson, 1970), the form of established medicine (e.g., socialized, fee-
for-service, etc.) (Doyal, 1979; Mechanic, 1976), and the level and influence of
technology (Brown, 1977; Mechanic, 1977).
In what ways are hospitals controlled from without? There are various
mechanisms. Legislation can be enacted delimiting the parameters of medical
practice, communities can demand the omission or inclusion of certain practices,
guilds may outline the duties and privileges of professions, and so on.
Social Control of Kingdom Hospitals
The history of Kingdom hospitals is indicative of the marked changes that
transpired during 19th century Hawaii. Prior to the establishment of the
government's infrastructure, hospitals operated according to the discretion of
their physician/managers. Thereafter, periods of very close scrutiny occurred,
especially conspicuous in times of epidemics. A few facts concerning kingdom
hospitals must be remembered.
First of all, the conception of what constituted a hospital changed over
time. This prompted Kamakahi (1989a) to adopt a nominalist view of the term.
Kamakahi argued that a nominalist perspective offered the advantage of
employing the relevant verstehen of the period rather than imposing an
historically static definition. After all, it must be acknowledged that longitudinal
inventories of hospitals employ this perspective.
Second, the creation of hospitals for the kingdom population was a part
of the general movement toward infrastructure building which became manifest
in the 1850s. At this time, the government had solidified to such an extent that
it could concern itself with the addressing of health problems in an active
!:J
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fashion. This movement involved the creation of specific institutions to monitor
evaluate and intervene with respect to identified issues/exigencies. '
Third, the medical profession itself had enjoyed high status at the
beginning of the kingdom era. This status manifested itself in the form of
political clout rather than in medical feats. By the 1860s, however, physicians
themselves were wielding powerful political influence as both political figures
of stature and as able lobbyists for their profession.
Once the medical profession had become sufficiently legitimated by the
State, the health sector became quite complicated. Much of what transpired
thereafter was a melange of conflicts of interests between the State, the medical
profession, the royal families, the plantation owners, and the various health
problems facing the kingdom's population.
Given the information that is available, some aspects relating to the social
control ~f kingdom hospitals can be gleaned. Although there may be some
overlappmg of these dimensions, it is believed that they are conceptually distinct.
. First, to what extent was the sociaB isolation of the facility enforced?
~urv~Illance and enforcement was quite varied among kingdom hospitals. The
Isolatlon of the facilities housing those with highly infectious diseases, like
leprosy, is one extreme of this dimension where isolation was vehemently
enforced. Also, the separation of contract laborers on the plantations was
conspicuously policed especially after the passage of the Master's and Servant's
Act. O~ the other extreme, Queen's Hospital served the population at large and
often did so on an outpatient basis: in essence, it was integrated into the
population at large.
Second, to what extent was the facility Illested within multiple BeveBs
of smrveiBIance? This dimension assesses the degree to which the hospital was
answerable to different, hierarchically arranged external agencies. The seamen's
hospit~ls were under very loose and distant monitoring, to the point that there
was bnbery of at least one consul for the contract. Kalaupapa hospital, however
was closely watched by the Board of Health, the legislature, the medical
profe.ssion, and the community at large. Generally, the assumption employed
here IS that the greater the levels of manifest surveillance, the greater the social
control of hospitals.
Third, under what types of payment aJrJrangements did the facilities
operate? In other words, how were facilities reimbursed for services rendered?
Proprietary. hospitals were run on a fee-for-service basis; State facilities were
operated Via the tax base; and plantation hospitals were paid within the
corporation itself. The working assumption of this paper is that closed systems
(such as State and plantation hospitals) were subjected to more social control
than open systems (Le., proprietary hospitals) are subjected to.
Fourth, how extensively surveillant was the political-economic climate?
As mentioned earlier, there was no substantial regulative governmental bodies
for hospitals prior to the 1860s. And it was not until such time that sufficient
headway had been made by the kingdom to actively control the spread of
diseases in an organized fashion. Even within the latter period, there were
fluctuations in organized political monitoring of hospitals. This dimension taps
the general "elan" of the period and types of facilities with regard to their social
control.
The Duality of SociaB ControB
In this paper, a duality in the concept of social control is being
employed. In essence, this duality recognizes that agents of social control do not
exist within vacuums. Agents are subjects of social control as well. As
independent and important aspects of social control, it is suggested that kingdom
hospitals can be located within the cross-section of these dimensions.
METJHIODOLOGY
Two dimensions of social control as they relate to kingdom hospitals
have been discussed: social control within kingdom hospitals and social control
of kingdom hospitals. In this section, the sources of the data used to investigate
these two notions will be discussed and coding procedures will be explained.
A variety of informational sources were employed for this analysis. Data
on hospital name, type (general, specialty), ownership (government,
independent, plantation), and area were garnered from Nebelung and Schmitt
(1948). Nebelung and Schmitt's survey of facilities is still the most extensive
that covers the kingdom period.
Other information required specific sources for different facilities:
Seamen's hospitals and City Hospital (Schmitt, 1949); Queen's Hospital (Greer,
1969; Kamakahi, 1989c); Oahu Insane Asylum (Talmadge, 1989); Kalihi and
Kalaupapa Hospitals (Gugelyck and Bloombaum; 1979); and plantation hospitals
(Weinerman, 1952).
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R.anking of Social Control Within K.ingdom Hospitals.General information regarding Hawaiian history and political economy
were also used to round-out the assessments. Works such as those by
Kuykendall (1938; 1953; 1967), Daws (1974), and Beechert (1985) were used.
Coding of Data
The data obtained for this study was mostly of the narrative and
descriptive variety. While these sources were rich in description, information
was not always available in the same fidelity and completeness for all kingdom
hospitals. The data that was available had to be assessed with regard to the
various aspects of social control.
It was decided that values would be assigned to each aspect of the two
social control dimensions. These assigned values were dichotomous: scored one
(" 1") for extensive presence of that facet in reference to that facility or zero
("0") for non-extensive presence of that facet. The values were assigned
employing assessments of all the information that was available. Hospitals, then,
could score a minimum of zero for each dimension of social control and a
maximum of four for each dimension. Scoring on one dimension of social
control, however, was independent of scoring on the other dimension. Those
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Data were coded for each of the twenty kingdom hospitals. Scores were
calculated separately for social control within hospitals and social control of
hospitals.
Table 1 shows the ranking of kingdom hospitals for social control within
hospitals with the name of the facility and their scores respectively.
As can be seen by an inspection of Table 1, the hospitals fall into certain
clusters. The State and private hospitals controlling infectious diseases and
mental illness, two of the most stigmatized categories of afflictions, were rated
high in social control within hospitals; and plantation hospitals, which served
another stigmatized population - contract laborers, were also in this cluster.
Those situated low in social control within hospitals were the proprietary
facilities and the seaman's hospitals.
Table 2 lists kingdom hospitals in terms social control of hos~i~a~s along
with facility name and their respective scores. The same kind of divIsion that
existed in Table 1 is manifest in Table 2. There has been, tho~gh, some
rearrangement in the list. Much of the similarity is due to the clustenng of both
the plantation and seaman's hospitals respectively.
Figure 1 graphically displays kingdom hospitals within an inters~ction ~f
the two dimensions of social control discussed in this paper. On the vertical aXIs
is the dimension of social control within hospitals by score (Le.: 0 - .4). 1?e
horizontal axis displays the scores for the social control of hospital dlmensl?n
(Le., 0 - 4). Higher values for both dimensions indicate a higher level of social
control.
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Figure 1 Kingdom hospitals by social control within and of Dimensions.
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Although this "sample" is too small for meaningful statistical analysis,
there does seem to be a general association between both dimensions of social
control. It seems to be the case that both dimensions of social control vary in
the .same direction: that is, high social control of hospitals is associated with high
SOCial control within hospitals and vice versa. This association is quite marked
because of the clustering together of many like-situated institutions: namely, the
plantation and seamen's hospitals.
Even with this trend, the graphical depiction of these facilities in Figure
1 illustrates the diversity even in this small number of hospitals. And it provides
a way in which such a heterogeneous array of institutions can be handled on
conceptually equal footing.
We should be cautioned upon extrapolating too far beyond this analysis.
It must be remembered that this is an analytical framework placed upon health
institutions existing within very diverse circumstances. Unlike historically
inclined analyses in which the milieu is integral in the analysis, here the milieu
is selectively incorporated into pre-selected dimensions. Thus, some information
is ignored for sake of focllsed inquiry.
mSCUSSliON
The duality in the concept of social control has been preserved in this
presention. In this way two separate but complementary traditions employing
the notion of social control have been incorporated: that conce{lning the
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institution as an agent of social control (Within) and that considering the
institutions as subjects of social control (Of).
Because the comparative data on hospitals for the kingdom period were
sparse, information was supplemented by other relevant literature. Also, the
focus of this paper meant that information was incorporated selectively and were
sometimes organized in terms of various working assumptions when being
coded.
. There is always the danger that the use of such working assumptions may
have mfluenced the data rather than vice versa. This might account for some of
the homogene.ity displayed within plantation and seamen's hospitals. Granted,
~ese ass~mptlOns do focus upon certain types of information and interpret them
m prescnbed ways, but by the same token certain hospitals shared characteristics
because they existed within similar milieu. But, there does not seem to be an
ass?ciation betw~en the social control assessment of hospitals and the year within
which the hospItal was established as would be suggested if one focused
exclusively upon the government infrastructure and political-economic aspects.
Being an analytical framework, this study does not claim to be more than
a way of interpreting certain information from a perspective of social control.
Obviously, there is room for improvement.
First of all, we could hope that more complete and comparable data were
avail~ble for ki~gdom hospitals. For some of these facilities, this may be
plaUSIble, especIally those facilities established during or after the 1860s when
the sur:eillant government structures were operative. This analysis included
those kmgdom hospitals existing previous to this time with the most complete
data publically available.
Secondly, the working assumptions used in this analysis may be treated
as research propositions or hypotheses in their own right. Since the coded data
we~e tex~red ~y the assumptions employed, different results may be yielded by
theIr ~odIficatlOn...The working assumptions were employed in this study to
establIsh comparabIlIty between hospitals.
Thirdly, only a few aspects of social control were explicated. If different
dimensions of social control were used or different aspects of the two dimensions
explicated, the results might be modified. After all, what we find is dependent
on what we look at, both what is included and what is omitted are of
fundamental import. In this study, the exposition of social control dimensions
was an attempt to match this concept with available data.
Finally, it must be admitted that such a "timeless" analytical framework
handles history by ignoring it somewhat. Each hospital was treated as an
ephemeral unit extracted from its milieu. Although certain contextual aspects of
facilities were incorporated into the dimensions themselves, history is lost. The
"background" section was included specifically to give the reader a glimpse of
how these facilities fit into the history of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
CONCLUSION
What utility does this analytical framework have in regard to the study
of social control regarding Kingdom hospitalS?
First, it sensitizes us to the existence of mechanisms of social control
within health institutions in general and kingdom hospitals in particular.
Hospitals were not always legitimized, voluntarily sought after, and universalistic
enterprises. Instead, many were places to separate and isolate certain groups
from others.
Second, it demonstrates the heterogeneity that existed between kingdom
hospitals. In this vein, such a scheme facilitates the inquiry into various
tendencies and anomalies in regard to social control mechanisms and processes.
Third, it offered a means by which diverse institutions existing during
different contexts can be compared within a single analysis. In this case,
similarities and differences were graphically depicted.
Future research involving Hawaii's kingdom hospitals will hopefully be
facilitated by this analysis. Some directions that might be followed include:
incorporating hospitals after the Kingdom era into the scheme; including non-
health institutions in the analysis for the 19th century; or refining the analysis of
certain clusters of facilities, most notably, the plantation and seamen's hospitals.
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JINTRODUcnON
One of the critical issues that every social group must address concerns
the mode by which disputes are to be processed and by which formal social
control is to be exercised upon its members. If at least minimal stability is to
be achieved, a social group must contain conflict and provide for the exercise of
authority over its members. All authority systems attempt to endow these
functions with legitimacy -- the feeling on the part of the group members that
they ought to comply with authoritative decisions because of their source or the
process by which they were reached (Weber, 1954:3-5).
One major institution that has developed in Western society to give
authoritative decisions is the jury. This institution, developed in England as a
constraint on arbitrary centralized power, and passed on to countries adopting
the English legal model, promotes legitimacy by delegating legal decision-
making power to a body of the peers of the disputants or the accused. Such a
body is thought to be able to issue a reliable judgment likely to be accepted by
the community.
However, through time the issues of when to use a jury, what role the
jury should play and who are the "peers" have been major political questions
(Green, 1985; Thompson, 1986; Langum, 1987). As Van Dyke (1977:7-19)
observes, problems arise with jury legitimacy when a social group is
characterized by class, ethnic, political, or other serious social divisions. In
these situations the determination of a jury of "peers" is problematic and
definitions of what a peer is have varied. Van Dyke (1977: 10-11) notes that the
Magna Charta provided that English knights were to be tried by juries of other
knights. Juries of cooks have been assembled to try persons accused of selling
bad food. Until recently in England, merchants were impanelled to try
commercial cases. In thirteenth century England equal numbers of Christians
and Jews sat on disputes between members of the two religions. In Plymouth
Colony, colonists sat with "Indians" on cases of crime or other dispute between
colonists and the natives. Until the nineteenth century, mixed juries of aliens
and citizens sat on criminal cases involving aliens in both England and America.
While we have been unable as yet to trace any direct connection to Hawaii, we
should note that Cesare Beccaria, the founder of the classical school of
criminology, first published An Essay on Crimes and Punishments in Italian in
1764 and it quickly became widely available in both French and Engli~h editions.
He wrote (Beccaria, 1819: 54-55):
4k.Q..t sa
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It is an admirable law which ordains that every man shall be
tried by his peers; for, when life, liberty and fortune, are in
question, the sentiments which a difference in rank and fortune
inspires should be silent; that superiority with which the fortunate
look upon the unfortunate, and that envy with which the inferior
regard their superiors, should have no influence. But when the
crime is an offense against a fellow-subject, one half of the
judges should be peers of the accused, and the other peers to the
person offended: so that all private interest, which, in spite of
ourselves, modifies the appearance of objects, even in the eyes
of the most equitable, is counteracted, and nothing remains to
turn aside the direction of truth and the laws ....
In contemporary America the general rule is that one's peers are all
citizens of adult status (Van Dyke, 1977:9). However, demands have arisen in
some quarters to change certain practices to assure that juries do not exclude
members from the particular social groupings of those involved in a case. These
demands arose in part because of the widespread practice of prosecutors to use
their peremptory challenges to exclude from a jury all persons of the same
ethnicity as the defendant in criminal cases, but the inviolability of a prosecutor's
right to use his peremptory challenges in an unrestricted manner appeared to
have been settled by the United States Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama (380
U. S. 202) in 1965.
However, in 1986 the Supreme Court of the United States in Batson v.
Kentucky (476 U. S. 79) returned to the problem of "racial" exclusion from
juries or "racial" inclusion on juries and did restrict the right of prosecutors to
use peremptory challenges to exclude all persons of a defendant's ethnicity from
a criminal trial jury. In 1990 the Supreme Court of Hawaii extended this
restriction to gender (State v. Levinson and Carvalho, Respondents, 71 Haw.
492, 795 P. 2d 845), and in 1991 the U. S. Supreme Court extended its
restriction on racial exclusion to civil cases also (Edmundson v. Leesville
C?ncrete Co., 500 U.S. _, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660). Recent years have also
w~tnessed many Native American Indian tribes gain the right to try offenders in
tnbal courts with Indian juries.
These events have created new interest in the ethnic jury system of 19th
century Hawaii. Hawaii in the nineteenth century clearly represented a
problematic situation and jury questions became a focus of intergroup conflict.
Indeed, representatives of foreign governments and other resident foreigners
intentionally used the jury issue to create conflict for the purpose of pursuing
their own national and personal interests.
This article is a work in historical sociology. Following Peter Manicas
(1981), we believe that the job of historical sociologists is to explain the
development of social institutions, that is, their creation, modification and
extinction, and to set forth the critical events which account for these
developments.
In this article we will briefly describe the indigenous Hawaiian authority
structure and its decision making processes and then describe the major events
associated with the development of the institution of European and American
type juries with special ethnic characteristics. Considerable attention is paid to
the "consul jury," whose members were nominated by foreign consuls, because
it was the most prominent real and symbolic jury issue. Although this institution
was used in only a handful of cases, it was a serious symbolic encroachment on
the Kingdom's sovereignty and remained a constant irritant to the Hawaiian
government until it was eliminated.
TJHIE INIllXGENOUS AUTJHIORUY STRUCTURE
A complete treatment of social control and legal decision-making in
Hawaii before the arrival of Westerners is beyond the scope of this paper, but
some of the principal elements of Hawaiian social organization must be
described. These generally pertain to the high level of stratification that existed,
the religious-cosmological system, and the nature of the economy (Barratt, 1987;
Tyerman and Bennett, 1832; Campbell, 1967; Cox, 1957; Earle, 1978;
Franchere, 1969; Frear, 1894; Goldman, 1970; Holt, 1979; Hommond, 1976;
Ii, 1963; Kamakau, 1961; Loomis, 1820-1823; Malo, 1951; Pukui, et aI, 1972;
Ross, 1849; Sahlins, 1958, 1981, 1985; Valeri, 1985; Vancouver, 1798).
With respect to stratification, the principal division was between the
chiefs (ali'i) and the commoners (maka'ainana, attendants of the land). The ali'i
were in turn ranked according to genealogical proximity to the gods and
achievement. Power and authority devolved downward from the highest ali'i,
the ali'i nui or king, to the lowest, with each rank having considerable power
over those below. The commoners as a group were controlled by the ali'i.
This social control was expressed in both the land tenure system and the
religious-cosmological system, commonly called the "kapu system." Authority
over land use resided with the king. He divided the land and delegated authority
over it to his immediate subordinates, who did likewise, until actual occupation
for productive use devolved upon the commoners. Surplus product in the form
of ritualized tribute was passed back up the hierarchy. Bad behavior or lack of
productivity could result in removal from one's land or position of 'Authority.
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The kapu system was a complex, religiously based set of prescriptions
and proscriptions that defined the relationships of the commoners to the ali'i and
the ali'i among themselves. It also included specific rules of behavior
established by the chiefs applying to such matters as the conservation of fish or
the use of water (kanawai). Violation of a kapu could result in immediate
punishment, even death, at the hands of a chief or priest (kahuna).
The nature of the Hawaiian economy, the fact that the commoners, the
great mass of the people, did not or were not allowed to accumulate great
surplus value in the form of property greatly reduced potential for interpersonal
conflict and disputes. There was little for them to fight over and disputes over
such things as water use would be settled by the chiefs' managers (konohiki).
THE PJlUNCliPLES OF THE INDIGENOUS JUSTICE SYSTEM
If we think of a jury system as consisting of at least two separated roles,
that of a judge to conduct the trial and a body of jurors to render a verdict in the
case, there was no formal jury system in Hawaii when Captain Cook arrived in
1778.
At a risk of great oversimplification, there appear to have been several
principles operative in authoritative responses to violations of rules (kapu,
kanawai or chiefs' orders) or to other disputes between Hawaiian individuals into
the 1830's. First, there tended to be (1) summary justice if superordinate-
subordinate relations were involved and (2) more compensatory or conciliatory
processes if the parties were roughly equal in the social and political hierarchy.
Second, collective decision-making and sanctioning were often imbedded both
in practices which sought to restore harmony (ho 'oponopono) and practices
which imposed punishments. This last was related to the third principle, that of
collective responsibility. Fourth, certain persons of high rank had the power to
pardon offenders (pu'uhonua) either in person or by designating places where
a violator could not be harmed until relations with the offended could be
restored.
In general the chiefs did not concern themselves with interpersonal
wrongs among the commoners, unless the conflict reached such proportions that
it disturbed the community. In most cases the burden fell on the victim and his
or her kin group to move against the wrongdoer. Immediate retaliation was
likely if the offender was caught in the act. In other cases, particularly if the
wrongdoer was able to make his way to a person or place of refuge, a process
of mediation between the kin groups, resulting in compensation or restitution to
the victim, could be used to restore the social fabric. Success in righting
personal wrongs was always dependent on the relative statuses of the victim and
the wrongdoer and the ability of the victim to mobilize community sentiment in
his or her behalf. In some cases trial by ordeal was employed. Suspected
offenders could be given the "test of the shaking water" to determine
truthfulness. Where the wrongdoer was unknown, he could be encouraged to
come forth by the threat of being "prayed to death" (ana 'ana) by a priest, acting
on behalf of the victim.
lFliRST FOREIGNERS (HAOLE) AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The first handful of foreigners (haole) who were forced or given
permission by a high chief to reside in Hawaii were perceived by the chiefs to
be subservient to them, that is, they were designated as "belonging to a chief."
In return for rendering service as interpreters, skilled workers, or soldiers skilled
in the use of guns and cannons, they were allotted land and the services of the
commoners on the land. If they offended their chief they could lose land
holdings, be banished, or even be assassinated. As transient or seasonal ships
arrived more often, the captains of the ships were expected to maintain discipline
and to punish their seamen if altercations broke out involving only foreigners.
On the other hand, if the altercation involved a foreigner and a native, King
Kamehameha I did not hesitate to assert his judicial jurisdiction. Three such
cases in 1811 and 1812 have been documented (Franchere, 1969:67-8; Marin,
1973:202; Cox, 1957:8).
THE ABOUTION OF THE JKAlPU
This situation began to change in 1819 with the death of Kamehameha
I, the designation of one of his Queens, Kaahumanu, as the Kuhina Nui (co-
authority with the King) and the ascension of Kamehameha II (Liholiho) to the
kingship. These events were followed shortly by the "abolition of the Kapu,"
with the attendant reduction of the enforcement roles of the priests and the
destruction of the temples and the images of the gods, and a much greater
dispersal of authority among the high chiefs (Davenport, 1969).
THE "RESmENCE RIGHTS" OF FOREIGNERS
NOT "BELONGING TO A CHIEF"
The pace of change was increased beginning in 1820 by intensification
of the sandalwood trade and the arrivals of American missionaries and the first
whalers basing in Honolulu to hunt off the coasts of Japan (Bradley, 1942).
These events increased the number of resident foreigners and seasonal seamen,
and there was a corresponding increase in public disorders in Honolulu,
especially among foreigners. In September, 1820, the King ordered all
foreigners that "had not lands" to leave the islands (Marin, 1974.i270). The
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order was brought from the island of Hawaii by John Rives, a French Catholic
then serving as a clerk of the King. Governor Boki assembled alt the foreigners
in Honolulu and announced the order. Hiram Bingham, the leader of the
mission, argued with Rives that the missionaries did not "belong to any Chief,"
but that as American citizens they were entitled to remain in the islands under
the protection of both the United States and the "civil power of Hawaii" so long
as they were "conforming to the laws of the country" (Bingham, 1847:112-113).
This was the beginning of many disputes concerning the rights of the government
of Hawaii to control immigration to the islands and to establish jurisdiction over
the foreigners.
In March 1822 the King and his Chiefs in Council, immediately
following a riot involving the crews of two foreign ships, published the first
printed law in Hawaii, an enactment prohibiting riotous disturbances by
foreigners and placing such offenders within the jurisdiction of the governors'
summary courts (Kuykendall, 1926: 129).
TIm ADV][CE OF LORD BYRON
The next major development was the arrival of Lord Byron in June 1825
with the bodies of King Liholiho and Queen Kamamalu, who had died in
London. Among other things he advised new King Kamehameha III
(Kauikeaouli) and his Chiefs in Council that "no man's life shall be forfeited but
by the consent of the King in Council with twelve Chiefs or the Regent
[Kaahumanu] in time being for the King," still reserving to the King the right
to pardon (Bingham, 1847:270). Although this advice applied only to capital
punishment, it did apply to all persons, chief or commoner, Hawaiian or
foreigner.
A CHALLENGE TO nm GOVERNOR'S
.WRlfSmCnON OVER FOREIGNERS
Almost at this same time Poalinui, the Hawaiian wife of Joseph Navarro,
a Honolulu hotel keeper, deserted her husband in favor of Captain Sistaire, a
rather renegade whaler. Navarro retaliated by shooting and wounding Sistaire,
and both Navarro and Sistaire were brought before KaJanimoku, the Kalaimoku
(Prime Minister) for trial. Kalanimoku now shared his task and invited the
foreign residents to help decide the case. Some of the foreigners denied
Kalanimoku's jurisdiction over a case involving only foreigners, but Kalanimoku
replied that if such were the case he would just let the "crews and the mates
fight it out" in the future. The foreigners then conceded that he should enforce
the law of 1822 and in August 1825 both Navarro and Sistaire were ordered
banished from the Kingdom (E. Loomis, Aug. 22 & 24, 1845; Chamberlain,
Aug. 22 & 24, 1825).
THE FIRST IMPLEMENTATllON OF BYRON'S ADVICE
A year later in September, 1826, a homicide case occurred which
appears to represent the initial implementation of Lord Byron's advice. Two
Hawaiians, Kamakea and Kamumuku, robbed and killed a Spanish laborer of
longtime resident Don Francisco de Paula Marin. Kamakea was probably drun~
at the time of the incident, to which there were many witnesses. Governor Boh
and Kalanimoku conducted an investigation. British Consul Richard Charlton
demanded that they be hung immediately. Governor Boki agree?, .but
Kalanimoku refused to permit their execution until the chiefs of all the pr111Clpal
islands had met, considered the matter and given their approbation. Kamumuku
escaped the Fort and was subsequently pardoned. Kamakea refused to escape
and was hung, after it was widely proclaimed by Kalanimoku and t~e King that
this was the fate of those who "break the laws of God" (E. Loomis, Sept. 17,
1826; Kamakau, 1961:278).
THE UNll'fED STATES MADE A "MOST FAVORED NAnON"
Shortly thereafter (December 23, 1826) the Hawaiian rUl~.rs and U .. S.
Navy Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones, who had come to Haw~H to negotla~e
the payment of the debts which the Chiefs had amassed to Amencan traders 111
the course of the sandalwood trade, sign~d certain "Articles of Agreement."
Included was a provision that American citizens in Hawaii should be protected
in their lawful pursuits and be permitted to sue in the Kingdom's courts; others
which read in part that "the citizens of the United States [shall be] permitted to
trade freely with the people of the Sandwich Islands" and "the citizens or
subjects of the Sandwich Islands shall be allowed to trade with the United States,
and her territories, upon principles of equal advantage with t~e most fav?ured
nation." Jones apparently did not believe that he had authonty to negotiate a
treaty and the articles were never ratified by the U. S. Senate. Nevertheless, the
government of the Kingdom would continue to adhere to its terms and U. S.
consuls would demand that its "most favored nation" clause be enforced
(Stauffer, 1980; Kuykendall, 1938:98-99).
THE PRINTED LAWS OF 1827
On December 8, 1827, the King and his Chiefs in Council had printed
a brief set of laws (He Olelo No Ke Kanawai) prohibiting certain acts and
establishing penalties for them: murder (death by hanging), theft (irons), adultery
(irons), selling rum (irons), prostitution (fine) and gambling (irons) (~rchives of
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Hawaii, hereafter AH). It appears that the first three took effect immediately
and the latter three were to take effect after the people had been properly
forewarned.
U.S. COMMERC][AL AGENT ][NS][STS THE GOVERNOR TRY A
JFOJRE][GNER JFOR ASSAULUNG ANOTHER JFORIE][GNER
Two weeks later John Lawler assaulted Captain Gardner, the master of
an American whaler, over a business disagreement. Gardner went to Governor
Boki and asked for redress. Boki refused until U.S. Commercial Agent
("consul") John C. Jones insisted that he assert his jurisdiction. Boki relented,
tried Lawler and fined him two hundred dollars. A missionary commented that
the case was the first in which the governor convened "a court" in a dispute
solely involving foreigners (Chamberlain, Dec. 20, 1827), but it is significant
that the governor did so only at the insistence of a representative of a foreign
government.
THE CASE OJF THE SANDALWOOD CUTTER
Two months later in February, 1828, a Hawaiian sandalwood cutter
killed another Hawaiian. Kuhina Nui Kaahumanu and other chiefs conducted an
investigation and sentenced the cutter to death. When the chiefs inquired of the
American missionaries about the proper method of hanging, they were advised
that the real issue was the procedure for establishing the defendant's guilt. The
execution was postponed three weeks, during which time twelve Hawaiians,
presumably all chiefs, held a new trial, found the cutter guilty and sentenced him
to be hung (Chamberlain, Feb. 27-29 & March 18, 1828).
THE "COW CASE:" LAWS APPLY TO NAUVES
AND JFORE][GNERS ALIKE
A highly significant dispute took place in October, 1829. It began when
a Hawaiian shot a cow belonging to British Consul Charlton which was
trespassing in his garden. Charlton and U.S. Commissioner Jones roped the
native round the neck and dragged him behind a horse, inflicting serious injuries.
Subsequently the King issued "The Cow Case Proclamation," which among other
things declared: "If any man shall transgress any ... laws, he is liable to the
penalty, the same for every foreigner and for the people of these islands,
whoever shall violate these laws shall be punished" (Bingham, 1847:351). In
Hawaii the laws of the Kingdom were to apply to all.
~'---------~---~-----
TWO GRADES OJF HOM][CmE mSUNGUIISJI-JlED
By 1832 the King and chiefs had begun amending the 1827 laws,
although the new laws would not be printed until 1834 (Reynolds, June 19,
1833). Among other changes they now distinguished between "willful killing"
and "killing in anger" or "provoked killing" (manslaughter). The consequences
were immediate.
THE TRXAL OJFJI-JlENRY COLEMAN
In November, 1832, Henry Coleman, a half-Hawaiian boy fourteen or
fifteen years old, defending against an invasion of his family's residence, struck
and killed a drunk foreign sailor, Benjamin Whittier. King Kamehameha III,
Kllhina Nui Kinau, and Gov. Kuakini investigated the case. Coleman was found
guilty of "manslaughter" (provoked killing) and sentenced to banishment to
Kaahoolawe for a limited time (Reynolds, Nov. 6, 1832; Bingham, 1847:443).
None of the descriptions of this case mention a convening of twelve chiefs, but
such would not have been necessary since the adjudicators had convicted
Coleman of a non-capital offense.
A M][XED JURY JFOR AN ALL JFOREJIGNER CASE
The next month (December, 1832) Irish seaman Robert F. Bell, stabbed and
killed Irish seaman Wilson in a saloon fight. A meeting of the chiefs was held
to consider the matter and two days later Bell was tried before a jury composed
of twelve foreigners and twelve Hawaiians. He was found guilty of "wilful
murder" (Chamberlain, Dec. 3 & 14, 1832; Reynolds, Dec. 2, 3, 11, 13 & 14,
1832). Since neither the offender nor the victim was Hawaiian, it can be
surmised that we now find a principle emerging that twelve foreign jurors were
necessary to legitimate the conviction of a foreigner for a capital offense, while
twelve Hawaiian jurors (presumably chiefs) were needed to concur for the King
to consent to the forfeiture of a person's life. Lord Byron had recommended
that the King's decision be made "in Council with twelve Chiefs," but with the
institution of a jury in capital cases the twelve chiefs had now moved into the
courtroom.
AN EXCLUS][VELY HAWAHAN JURY JFOR A HAWAHAN CASE
Two years later (1834) a Hawaiian man was hung for murdering his
Hawaiian wife (Chamberlain, Dec. 30, 1834, & March 18, 1835; Reynolds,
March 19, 1835). No mention can be found of a jury in the scant references to
this case, but the fact that no foreign residents mentioned it most probably means
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that there was only an all Hawaiian jury. Here a single Hawaiian jury could
both judge and consent to the execution.
A M][XED JURY FOR A HALF-HAWA][][AN AND FORE][GNER CASE
The next year (September, 1835) another mixed jury of twelve each was
employed in a case involving two half-Hawaiian defendants and a foreigner
victim. John and Isaac Lewis had been hired by a ship's officer to beat up one
of his crewmen. A longtime resident foreigner, Henry Palmer, had attempted
to intercede and been struck and killed by John Lewis. Levi Chamberlain wrote,
I understand that the jury was. composed of twelve
foreigners & twelve natives - or rather two juries of equal
numbers. Both, after hearing the witnesses, agreed in the verdict
of Man Slaughter; which crime is by law punishable by four
years imprisonment, but may be commuted by paying two
hundred dollars in money. (Chamberlain, Sept. 15 & 21, 1835,
underline in original; Reynolds Sept. 15, 1835)
THE LORD RUSSELL TREATY AND THE
PEnT-THOUARS CONVENnON
In 1836 Lord Edward Russell arrived at Honolulu in H.B.M.S. "Acteon"
and involved himself in a number of complaints which British Consul Charlton
had made against the Hawaiian government. On November 16 the King agreed
to a form of treaty, article one of which read:
The English subjects shall be permitted to come with their
vessels, and property of whatever kind, to the Sandwich Islands;
they shall also be permitted to reside therein, so long as they
conform to the laws of these Islands, and to build houses, and
warehouses for their merchandise, with the consent of the King,
and good friendship shall continue between the subjects of both
countries.... (Sandwich Island Gazette, Nov. 11, 1836;
Kuykendall, 1938: 148)
Future problems would arise over the interpretation of the phrase "with the
consent of the king," with the British insisting that such consent must be given
so long as the British subject is law-abiding.
The next year French Captain Du Petit-Thouars and British Captain
Edward Belcher arrived in the midst of disputes about the pending expulsion of
two Catholic priests, one French and one British, and compensation for the
detention of a ship of British registry, owned by a Frenchman who was a British
subject, Jules Dudoit. Petit-Thouars begrudgingly conceded that the King was
within his rights to exclude the priests if he so wished. Although he had no
authority to make a treaty, Petit-Thouars then proposed and the King accepted
a convention on July 24, 1837, with a clause that
.... the French may go and come freely in all the states which
compose the Government of the Sandwich Islands; they will be
there received and protected, and they will enjoy the same
advantages as the subjects of the most favored nation. (Bingham,
1847:511; Kuykendall, 1938:150)
Petit-Thouars also appointed Dudoit to be provisional French consular agent.
Missionary Bingham, seeking to be consistent with his 1820 position that
the King must consent to the residence of persons so long as they conform to the
laws of the Kingdom, now led the King and his Chiefs in Council in December
1837 to issue "An Ordinance Rejecting the Catholic Religion" which prohibited
its being taught, its ceremonies being exhibited or any vessel bringing a Catholic
teacher to the Kingdom (Kuykendall, 1938:151). Such conduct was now clearly
a violation of the law. This enactment was followed by an intensification of the
prosecution of native Catholics (Sandwich Island Gazette & Journal of
Commerce, June 29, 1839), which had gone on sporadically since 1827 and
which continued until the King ordered its halt on June 17, 1839.
THE FRENCH CONSUL JURY TREATY PROV][S][ON OF 1839
However, by 1838 the government of France had interpreted such actions
by the chiefs of Tahiti and Hawaii to be efforts by British and American
Protestant missionaries to monopolize the commerce of these islands "under .the
pretext ofa religious quarrel." Accordingly Captain LaPlace of the ." Artimise"
was ordered to touch on these islands
.... to rectify the erroneous opinion which has been created as to
the power of France [and to] exact, if necessary with all the
force that is yours to use, complete reparation for the wrongs
which have been committed, and you will not quit those places
until you have left in all minds a solid and lasting impression.
(Quoted and cited in Kuykendall, 1938: 152)
LaPlace arrived at Honolulu in July, 1839, and he and French Consul
Jules Dudoit immediately presented King Kamehameha III with a set of demands
and a threat to begin hostilities if they were not met. Although it was not
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included in the original demands, Article IV of the LaPlace Treaty, signed July
17,1839, said:
No Frenchman accused of any crime whatever [crime ou
delict] shall be judged otherwise than by a jury composed of
foreign residents, proposed by the Consul of France and accepted
by the government of the Sandwich Islands. (Bingham,
1847:547)
There were at the time at most four hundred American, two hundred British and
seven French residents, along with at least 100,000 Hawaiians.
The LaPlace Treaty was the first extension of the right to trial by jury
to "any crime whatever," the first requirement that any class of foreigners be
tried by a jury exclusively of foreigners even if the victim were a native
Hawaiian, and the first requirement that the jury must be selected from a list
nominated by a foreign consul.
One might inquire why Dudoit did not also demand that the French
Consul be given a clear role in the selection of juries in civil suits involving a
Frenchman? The most probable answer is that whenever a foreigner sued a
foreigner the case typically went to arbiters. Thus, the month after LaPlace left
Honolulu Dudoit sued James J. Jarves for "libel" because of an article he had
written in the Hawaiian Spectator about LaPlace's visit. The dispute was given
to five arbiters, described by one of them as being "a jury" (Reynolds, Aug. 5,
1839).
THE EXTENSION OF CONSUL JURIES TO OTHER NAnONALS
Immediately British Consul Charlton and United States Commercial
Agent Peter A. Brinsmade demanded similar rights under the "most favored
nations" provisions of their nations' agreements with the Hawaiian government.
The King gave verbal assurances of this, but he subsequently refused to put it
in writing. Nevertheless, it did become the practice. Thus in March, 1840,
Governor Kekuanaoa asked Brinsmade to propose twelve names of foreigners for
the trial of Henry, an American, presumably for killing another foreigner.
Brinsmade, adopting a more conciliatory posture, submitted twenty-four names
in two groups of twelve: "I am telling you of these persons because you asked,
but not because I believe that I have any say in matters of trials in your land.
And because of your word that I too could interrogate the witnesses" (Brinsmade
to Kekuanaoa, March 24, 1840, AH).
A JURY OF CHIEFS TO TRY A CHIEF
Six months later Kamanawa, a close friend of the King, and Lono, a
captain of one of the Kingdom's ships, were tried on a charge of poisoning
Kamanawa's wife and were convicted by ajury of "twelve of the most intelligent
Hawaiians, all of high rank" (Polynesian, Oct. 3, 1840; Chamberlain, Sept. 28
& 30, 1840). Much pressure was put on the King by some foreigners, including
U. S. Navy Capt. Wilkes of the Exploring Squadron, not to grant a pardon to
Kamanawa on the ground that it was a basic test of whether or not the law
applied equally to all persons (Morgan, et aI, 1978:499). The King left
Honolulu and went to Maui to avoid Wilkes (Reynolds, Oct. 10, 1840).
Kamanawa and Lono were hung.
THE CONSnTUnON OF 1840
The first printed Constitution, adopted November 8, 1840, was silent on
the right to trial by jury, although it did address the issue of impartiality:
No man or chief shall be permitted to sit as judge or act on
a jury to try his particular friend [or enemy], or one who is
especially connected with him. Whereupon if any man be
condemned or acquitted, and it shall afterwards be made to
appear, that some one who tried him acted with partiality for the
purpose of favoring his friend or injuring his enemy, or for the
purpose of enriching himself, then there shall be a new trial
allowed before those who are impartial (Kingdom, 1842:1-2).
A FOREIGN JURY FOR A CliVIL sun BETWEEN FOREIGNERS
However, a week after the promulgation of the constitution Gov.
Kekuanaoa assembled a jury of twelve foreigners, "mostly Men-of-War folk,"
for a suit between Henry Paty and Capt. Curtis Clapp to establish the ownership
of some tallow which Clapp had just brought from San Pedro. After the jury
was assembled, the case was taken out of court and settled by three "referees"
(Reynolds, Nov. 7, 13, 14 & 16, 1840; Kekuanaoa to Jurymen, FO & Ex Doc.
No. 133, AH). This is the first instance found of an actual convening of a jury
for a civil trial, and it introduced the principle that a foreign jury should hear
cases involving only foreigners.
CONSUL JURIES IN C:n:VIL TRIALS?
However, the next year British Consul Charlton raised the Consul Jury
issue in the context of a civil suit between two foreigners, one of the first such
2
126 SOCliAL JPROCESS JIN HAWAU Nelligan and Ball E1'HNJIC JURJIES 127
suits not sent to arbitration. In October, 1841, Henry Skinner, a British subject,
brought a suit in the Governor's Court against John Dominis, a U.S. citizen, in
a contract and money dispute. Charlton now insisted that under an agreement
between Governor Kekuanaoa and himself, reached in consultation with Captain
Jenkins Jones of the British warship "Curracoa," he would name six jurors and
consider the names of six submitted by the U. S. Consul. Brinsmade refused to
accept all of Charlton's list. The Governor then stated that his understanding of
the agreement was that he would accept any twelve jurors agreed upon by the
two consuls and that in the absence of such agreement he would appoint a jury.
Brinsmade submitted twelve names for Charlton to consider, but Charlton
insisted upon his right to name his six, subject only to a challenge for cause.
The Governor then appointed a jury, which did include every British subject in
the room except Charlton and Skinner, and announced that the court was
organized. Skinner protested and left; the Governor declared a non-suit.
The next day, October 14, Charlton and Capt. Jones visited the King and
the King and Capt. Jones signed an agreement that the King would "summons
a jury consisting of equal numbers of Respectable British Subjects, and citizens
of the United States, residing on this Island to try the case between Mr. Skinner
and Capt. Dominis, but that if such a jury will not meet on my Summons, or if
Mr. Skinner & Capt. Dominis will not plead their case before the said jury, I
will have nothing more to do with the case" (Copy in Reynolds, March 6, 1843).
Brinsmade protested, insisting that the case had ended with the Governor's
declaration of a non-suit, and Capt. Dominis refused to appear. The British
warship sailed, an American warship arrived and the matter lay dormant until
March, 1842, when Sir George Simpson of the Hudson Bay Company was in
Honolulu and acted as intermediary (Reynolds, Oct. 8, 12, 14, 18 & 23, 1841,
& March 15, 1842; Kekuanaoa, Oct. 13, 1841, Fa & ex, AH; Brinsmade to
Kamehameha III, Oct. 14 & 19, 1841, U. S.Consular Correspondence).
However, as will be shown, Charlton would continue his efforts to ·gain the right
to select half the jurors in any case in which a British subject was a party.
"A1'1'ORNEYS" AGREEU1?ON A JURY OlF TEN
Two months later Skinner and George Pelly, also British, brought suit
in the Governor's Court against William French, an American, over the
ownership of the Warren Hotel. Stephen Reynolds, an American, represented
French and Mr. Robson represented Skinner and Pelly. The day before the trial
the two representatives met and agreed to let the case go to a jury of ten
persons, who presumably were then assembled by the Governor. The case was
argued in the court after which the jurors brought in a unanimous verdict for
French (Reynolds, Dec. 9, 10,28 & 29, 1841; Chamberlain, Dec. 29, 1841).
THE DENJIAL OlF JURY 1'RiALS lFOR NON-CAJPJITAL OlFFENSES
Criminal offenses which were not capital offenses and did not involve a
Frenchman continued to be tried by the governors without a jury, even when
Captain Charles Wilkes of the U.S. Explorer Squadron demanded a jury trial
"under the treaty" for a sailor convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Wilkes
to Kekuanaoa, Nov. 23, 1841, AH; Kekuanaoa to Wilkes, Nov. 24,1841, AH;
Reynolds, Nov. 23 & 26, 1841) and French Consul Dudoit requested a jury trial
for Henry Zupplien, convicted of selling rum to a native (Reynolds, Dec. 7,
1841). When an American, Palmer, was tried for striking a constable, Acting
U. S. Consul Hooper was present in court but "allowed" the Governor to fine
him ten dollars (Reynolds, Dec. 31, 1841).
1'HE EXTENSJION OlF 1'HE JlUGH1' 1'0 1'RKAL BY
JURY lFOR SOME NON-CAPJITAL OlFlFENSES
However, on May 5, 1842, the first jury statute was enacted and it
extended the right to trial by jury and provided an ethnic structure (Kingdom,
1842:Ch. 47). Juries were to be impanelled in all cases of crimes or civil suits
in which the amount disputed or the penalty of the crime exceeded $100, and no
person was to be subject to "death, banishment or similar severe penalty"
without a jury trial. Juries were to be twelve in number and "three fourths of
the jury shall be sufficient to decide the case," except for capital offenses when
all had to be "perfectly agreed." A jury trial could be had on appeal for a minor
criminal offense upon payment of twenty-five dollars, which would be forfeited
if the person was convicted.
AN ETHNIC STRUCTURE JPROVWED FOR JURJIES
The last section read as follows:
If the accuser and the accused be both foreigners (haole),
then the jury (iure) shall be made up of foreigners only. If there
be no foreigner on either side, then there shall be no foreigner on
the jury. If there be a foreigner on one side and a native
(kanaka maoli) on the other, then in forming the jury, half shall
be foreigners and half natives. But if the foreigner accused be
a Frenchman,. then this law respecting the formation of the jury
shall not be applicable. See French Treaty.
No consul was provided any role in the selection of a civil jury.
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When British Consul Charlton was absent from the islands a few months
later he designated Alexander Simpson as acting consul and Simpson proceeded
to post a proclamation on the gate of the Fort protesting against the government
trying any British subject unless he was present to see that the defendant had a
"fair trial." However, the King resolved this matter quickly by refusing to
accept Simpson as the British consul (Reynolds, Oct. 10 & 11, 1842).
But the same month a more significant question was raised when George
Pelly, representing two Londoners, Sewall and Patrickson, brought suit against
the absent Charlton for a debt of $9,000. According to Stephen Reynolds,
"[Mrs.] Betsy Charlton sent in a Protest against the jurisdiction of the Govt.
Court, & competency of the jurors on ac/t of not being Merchants, that it should
have been tried in Valpariso or England!!! & much more like trash... "
(Reynolds, Oct. 18, 1842). The foreign jury found against Charlton.
However, only weeks later, in December, 1842, the same Reynolds
reported without comment that a jury composed of "Ship Masters" was called
in the Governor's Court to decide whether the captain or the owner should bear
the loss when the ship "Honolulu" had lost its flying jib boom. The verdict
favored the captain (Reynolds, Dec. 1, 1842). Apparently the foreign
community believed that many of them were competent peers to judge matters
of debt, but that when technical questions about ships and sailing were at issue
then occupational expertise was a consideration in determining one's peers.
TIHIE 1'HOMAS "1'REA1'Y:" CONSUL JURKES IN OVlIL CASES
However, British Consul Charlton had not forgotten his failure to obtain
a half British consul jury when Skinner had sued Dominis in 1841 and when
British Lord Paulet imposed the provisional ceding of the Kingdom to Great
Britain in February, 1843, one of his demands was for" a new and fair trial" of
this suit (Kuykendall, 1938:214). Thus it was no surprise when one of the
"Articles of Agreement" forced upon the Kingdom by Admiral Thomas as a
condition for the "return of its sovereignty" on July 31, 1843, provided that
when a British subject or his property was at issue in a jury trial one half of the
jurors "shall be British Subjects approved by the Consul, and all of whom before
proceeding to trial shall declare upon oath that they have not prejudged the
case ... " (Friend:Extra, Feb. 20, 1844). What Consul Charlton had demanded
in Skinner's suit against Dominis was now to be had.
Accordingly the King and his Legislature, on August 11, 1843, passed
the appropriate legislation while extending it for any foreigner represented in
Hawaii by a consul. The second section read:
...hereafter in cases where the person or property of any
foreigner is brought to trial by jury, one half of the jurors must
be his own countrymen, and it is expected that the Foreign
Consuls will furnish a list of such persons belonging to their
respective countries, as they will approve as Jurymen, and their
names are to be kept in a separate ballot-box, out of which one
will be drawn alternately with one of those who are to form the
other half of the Jury .... (AH).
Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, immediately followed up
for the government. For example, he requested U. S. Commercial Agent
Hooper to submit a list of "such respectable Amn. residents as in your opinion
are capable to sit as jurors in cases which may hereafter arise in which the
interests of Am. residents here are involved," and Hooper submitted twenty-nine
names (Judd to Hooper, Sept. 21, 1843, AH; Hooper to Judd, Sept. 26, 1843,
AH).
NEW lBRnISH 1'REA1'Y OF 1844 LiMnS CONSUL
JURKES 1'0 CRiMINAL CASES
However, this situation changed most unexpectedly on February 12,
1844, when General William Miller arrived as the new British consul with a
proposed treaty which had already been approved by the British government and
which presumably superceded the agreement with Admiral Thomas. It basically
followed the French LaPlace Treaty of 1839:
Art III. No British Subject accused of any crime whatever,
shall be judged otherwise than by a jury composed of foreign
residents, proposed by the British Consul, and accepted by the
Government of the Sandwich Islands" (Friend:Extra, Feb. 20,
1844).
U. S. Commissioner George Brown, who had previously taken the position that
the LaPlace treaty was not binding on the government of Hawaii because it had
been coerced, now viewed the jury provision of this British Treaty in a different
light, since it had been voluntarily accepted by the government (Brown to Mrs.
Brown, Oct. 17, 1844, Haw. Hist. Soc). He immediately protested the article
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unless the privilege was also extended to U. S. citizens and Dr. Judd replied that
Americans would be placed on the same footings as Englishmen (Brown to Judd,
Feb. 14, 1844, FO & Ex, AH).
WJH[AT.lIS A "CR.lIMJE" UNDER TJH[E CONSUL JURY TREATJIES?
The next day the King and Kuhina Nui issued a proclamation repealing
the second section of the laws of August, 1843 (Friend:Extra, Feb. 20, 1844).
Five days later, February 17, 1844, Dr. Judd wrote to Lord Aberdeen, the
British Foreign Minister, to seek clarification of the consul jury provision:
It is not believed that it was or ever could be the meaning
of Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the third article to
stipulate under the words "any crime whatever" that crimes of a
trivial nature or petty offenses and misdemeanors should
necessarily be tried by a jury, but that the operations of that
article will be restricted to cases of crimes usually submitted to
juries by our laws (FO & Ex, AH).
Judd argued that such an interpretation would be a serious violation of the
Kingdom's independence and sovereignty which had been guaranteed in the Joint
British and French Declaration of September 12, 1843. He also sought
assurance that the 1844 treaty superseded the Thomas Articles of Agreement of
1843. Judd would receive no answer until October 29.
CONSUL JURY lFOR AMER.lICANS CJH[ARGED WJITJH[ MURJI)ER
On March 9, 1844, John Ricord, an American lawyer who had arrived
a short time earlier, was appointed Attorney General of the Kingdom. He would
soon be challenged by Brown whether or not the consul jury privilege extended
to Americans and whether the privilege applied to "any crime whatever." On
March 27, 1844, Walter S. Pike and Robert McCarty, white U. S. citizens,
along with Jared Von Clief, a Black from New Jersey, deserted the ship
"Ontario" at Lahaina, stealing a boat in the process. Their boat was overturned
in a storm in the channel and they landed on Lanai at the foot of a cliff.
According to Pike and McCarty, they were too exhausted to scale the height, so
they drew straws to see who should give his life so the other two could
cannibalize him and thus gain enough strength to survive. Von Clief lost. Since
the killing took place on shore they were tried for murder at Lahaina.
Commissioner Brown was on Maui at the time and he nominated twelve
foreigners, six residents of Lahaina and six ship captains, who were accepted by
the Governor of MauL The Governor and one of the judges of the Native
Supreme Court conducted the trial. The jury found ~hem not guilty , commenting
that if the Kingdom had had a "manslaughter" statute they would have convicted
(U. S. Embassy Dispatches, May 4, 1844).
COUNSEL JURY lFOR SAME AMER.lICANS CJH[ARGED WJITJH[ TJH[ElFT
Now Pike and McCarty were brought to trial for the theft of the boat.
The value of the boat is not stated in any of the remaining documents, but it is
of much significance. If the value were "more than two dollars but less than a
hundred" the authorized sentence was a fine "four times the amount of the
property'" (halfto the government and halfto the property owner) and "hard labor
for a term of from four to eight months, as the judges shall determine from the
character of the theft" (Kingdom, 1842: Ch. 36, Sec. 2). However, if the value
of the stolen property was "more than a hundred dollars," the prescribed
sentence provided, first, that the thief "shall pay all the loss sustained by the
owner of the property" and, second, that "the thief shall be transported to
another land, there to remain for a term of from five to ten years, according to
the aggravation of the theft, as decided by the judges (Kingdom, 1842: Ch. 36,
Sec. 3). Under the law of Hawaii at that time the first offense would be triable
by a district magistrate without a jury, but the second, since it involved
banishment, would require a trial by jury (Kingdom, 1842: Ch. 47).
They were tried in the court of the Governor of Maui by a foreign jury
proposed by the American Commercial Agent at Maui and accepted by the
Governor. They were convicted. If we assume that the value of the boat was
more than one hundred dollars, then clearly the consul jury provisions applied
because, as specified in Judd's letter to Lord Aberdeen, it fell within that class
of "cases of crimes usuaHy submitted to juries by our laws," and the action of
the governor in granting a consul jury was quite correct.
However, George Brown does not appear to have taken this possible
distinction into account, for without mentioning the value of the boat, he
believed that this action meant that "this Government had fully acknowledged the
claims of Americans" -- that Americans had a right to a consul jury when
charged with "any crime whatever" (Brown to Mrs. Brown, Oct. 17, 1844,
Haw. Hist. Soc.).
RAPE .lIS NOT A CR.lIME DESERV.lING A CONSUL JURY
It was during this time of confusion and uncertainty that a case arose
which would become an international incident. John Wiley, a carpenter who
was a U.S. citizen, was charged with raping a young Hawaiian girl in August,
1844. He was tried by a native magistrate, convicted and given the prescribed
sentence, a fifty dollar fine, to which the girl's father had a claim to one half.
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Wiley then stated that he wished to appeal for a jury trial and offered to make
bail until the final verdict was in. The magistrate insisted that he pay the fine
immediately. Wiley then went to U. S. Consul Hooper. As later recounted by
Brown:
....Mr. Hooper told him he could have a Jury trial, and
asked him what Jury he wanted, whether a Jury of half
foreigners & half natives, or all foreigners, to the latter of which
he had a right ifhe demanded it. Wiley replied he wished a Jury
of all foreigners. Mr. Hooper then called upon the Governor
and explained to him the facts, and offered to propose a Jury; the
Governor however, did not appear to understand the matter, and
referred Mr. H to Dr. Judd, upon whom Mr. H called, and the
two nominated a Jury which was acceptable to both parties, and
the affair appeared to be arranged. The next day, however, Dr.
Judd and a man by the name of Ricord, whom no one knows
here, & who had been appointed Attorney General. .. called upon
Mr. Hooper and told him, that as there was no treaty with the U.
States, he would not be allowed to propose a Jury. Mr. H was
astonished at this, and argued the case with them, alluding to the
King's speech, but all to no purpose, when they left. Mr. H
then officially addressed the Governor, who is the Judge,
demanding a foreign Jury, but he being entirely under the
influence & control of Judd & Ricord declined granting it, and
told Mr. H he had better refer the case to me to be settled
between me & Dr. Judd. Mr. H then applied to ~e verbally and
I requested him again to see Dr. Judd and if possible induce him
to alter his determination, as I did not wish to come in collision
with him on this subject, and to urge upon him that it would be
an insult to the U. States, should [illegible] Jury be refused
(George Brown to Mrs. Brown, Oct. 17, 1844, Haw. Hist.
SOC.).2
The government's position was that Wiley could have a trial by a regular mixed
jury, since there was a native "party," but had no right to a foreign jury, much
less a consul jury, first because there was no such treaty with the U. S. and then
that Wiley had not been charged with a "crime" but only with an "offense."
Finally Judd argued that the jury provisions of the British Treaty of 1844, to
which the U. S. consul most often referred, did not exist under "the Law of
Nations," but he stopped short of declaring the section of the treaty null and
void. This case dragged through diplomatic channels for some months
(Kingdom, 1844b).
r;--------------------- _
TlHIE SPOUSJE MAY DJETJERMINE WlHIJETlHIJER ADUlLTJERY IS
A "ClRKMJE" DJESJERVING A CONSUL JURY
Shortly thereafter, on October 1, 1844, Anthony Jenkins, a U.S. citizen
married to a native "woman of good character," was convicted of adultery by a
native magistrate and fined $30. Jenkins' wife did not exercise her right to a
divorce in which case the sentence could have been "banishment to another
land" f~r four years, and Jenkins' accomplice was not married so that no native
husband had claim to half the fine. Acting U.S. Consul Hooper demanded a
retrial by a consul jury composed only of foreigners. Governor Kekuanaoa,
assisted by Ricord, denied a consul jury on the ground that Jenkins' wife's
refusal to claim a divorce, thus removing the possibility of banishment, had
eliminated "the criminal part" of the penalty, but he did grant a retrial by a
regular foreign jury because no native was claiming part ofthe fine (Polynesian,
Oct. 5, 1844). However, Hooper misunderstood this reasoning and jubilantly
reported to the U.S. Secretary of State that, since Jenkins' offense was less than
Wiley's, "I have reason to believe that in all cases which may hereafter arise the
privilege of [an exclusive] Foreign Jury will be allowed," even if it were not a
consul jury (U.S. Embassy Dispatches, Sept. 25, 1844).
A HAOLE JURY IS A "WlHIITE" JURY
But the Jenkins' case would have a special significance. It is the first
jury case in which the word haole is translated as white instead of foreign in the
government's official report of the case:
....An entirely white jury was drawn from the jury box by
the Governor according to the statute. The reason of having an
entirely white jury was that no native had a beneficiary interest
in the result of the prosecution -the entire fine, if any, accrued
to the government; -in other words this was not a quitam action,
as in the recent case of John Wiley, where a mixed jury was
required by law. There are three kinds of juries provided for by
the law "FOR THE REGULATION OF COURTS," chap 47: in
one set of cases entirely white jurors -- in another mixed juries
composed of an equal number of each; and lastly entirely native.
The statute was strictly adhered to in this instance. Jenkins paid
his fine and deposited $25 for his jury of appeal (Polynesian,
Oct. 5, (1844).
A foreign jury was now a white jury.
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When Lord Aberdeen's response to Judd's query of February 17, 1844,
did arrive on October 29, 1844, it was a decided disappointment to the Hawaiian
government. Addressed to British Consul Miller, it said in part:
....With regard to the modifications which are desired in
certain Articles of the Convention concluded between you and the
Sandwich Island Government, and especially those relative to the
importation of Wines and Spirits, and to the mode ofselection of
the juries for the trial of British Subjects, Her Majesty's
Government propose to concert with France for admitting such
modifications of those provisions as may be mutually satisfactory
to all parties (Fa & Ex, AH).
"NATURAUZED" HAOLE ARIE S'fILL FOREnGNERS
FOR A CU:VIL JURY
Now the process which had begun in 1840 of permitting or requiring in
some cases foreigners to take an oath of allegiance to the King and become
"naturalized subjects" became an issue in the jury selection process (Jones, n.d.).
Though not raised formally until November, 1844, the question had been
evolving for some time and Stephen Reynolds was a central figure in this
evolution. When Commodore Lawrence Kearney, commander of the U. S. East
India Squadron, was in Honolulu during the Paulet seizure, it was reported to
Reynolds that he had told the King that" ... all American citizens, who hold his
Commission, were his subjects and must fight for him if need be. They were
no longer American citizens" (Reynolds, Aug. 25, 1843). Reynolds would
remember this. In June, 1844, George Pelly sued ex-Consul Charlton for
slander after Charlton, angry at Pelly for his having been the attorney for Sewall
and Patrickson, called him a "sodomist." The foreign jury found in favor of
Pelly (Kingdom, 1844a), but Reynolds then recommended to Charlton that he
appeal on the ground that the jury was illegally constituted because it included
two "naturalized foreigners" while he believed it must be "all foreigners"
(Reynolds, June 20, 1844; underline in original). Charlton did not appeal and
Pelly ,after paying his lawyer, gave the remainder of his award to Mrs.
Charlton.
The question was formally raised when a suit was brought by Attorney
General Ricord in the name of the Estate of French and Greenway against
Charlton and Skinner, a part of the extended and complicated legal proceedings
connected to the purported bankruptcy of the partnership of French and
Greenway which had begun in 1842. The jury included at least two naturalized
foreigners, although Reynolds, its foreman, identified nine as "allegiance men"
(Reynolds, Nov. 9, 1844). Charlton argued that "naturalized foreigners" should
be considered "native" under the jury statute and not permitted to serve on the
jury in this case. The Court denied this interpretation and ruled that "naturalized
foreigners" were still "foreigners" so far as the Jury Statute was concerned. The
verdict was nine to three in favor of Charlton (Polynesian, Nov. 16, 1844) .
"NATURAUZED" HAOLE ARE S'fILL FOREnGNERS
IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL
U.S. Commissioner Brown continued his assault on the judicial system,
using a February, 1845, case to question again whether "naturalized ~or~igner.s"
who were now "subjects of the King" were still "foreigners" for a crlmmal tnal
jury. James Gray, American, had been convicted in a magistrates court of
assaulting another foreigner and appealed for a jury trial in the Governor's
Court. The jury drawn consisted of two "naturalized" and ten other foreigners.
Brown, serving as Gray's attorney, challenged this composition, but the
Governor again ruled that a haole who had taken the oath of allegiance to the
King was still a "foreigner" for the purpose of the jury statute, citing Estate of
French and Greenway v. Charlton and Skinner (Kingdom, 1845). Brown argued
that such a ruling had been appropriate in that particular case but that a criminal
trial was a different matter, but he was again denied (Kingdom, 1845).
AN AGENCY OF THE HAWAHAN GOVIERNMENT
IS NA'fIVE FOR JUR.nES
The question was raised again when The Hawaiian Treasury Board sued
Ladd & Company in August, 1845, for recovery on a promissory note. The jury
seated consisted of six natives and six foreigners, one of whom was naturalized.
LaM contended that the jury violated the law of August, 1843, and the Court
ruled that law had been repealed by the proclamation of Feb. 13, 1844. Having'
lost that, the defendant argued that a juror who had taken the oath of allegiance
was not a foreigner for jury purposes, but again he was overruled. The BOaJ:d
then agreed to arbitration and the jury was discharged (Polynesian, August 23,
1845). However, the case did establish that agencies of the Hawaiian
Government were a "native party" under the jury statute.
At the request of the government of Hawaii, Brown was removed as
Commissioner in August, 1845. He was replaced by Anthony Ten Eyck and at
the same time Alexander G.. Abell was appointed U. S. Consul.
nm COURT OF OAHU: A FOJREIGN JUDGE FOR FORIEIGNIERS
The next month Governor Kekuanaoa, in an effort to placate foreigners,
"delegated" his judicial authority and powers to try cases involving them to
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Lorrin Andrews, a former missionary fluent in Hawaiian, who would sit as
Judge of the Court of Oahu (Polynesian, Sept. 27, 1845).
U. S. CONSUL TRmS TO PACK. A CONSUL JURY
But this did not stop efforts to use the consul jury process to attack the
judicial system. In December, 1845, Joseph Holland, a U.S. citizen, was
committed for trial on a charge of grand larceny and U.S. Consul Abell was
asked to submit a list of prospective jurors. Abell submitted a list of only twelve
names, later described by one person as consisting of "seven Americans, two
Germans (Clerks to Americans, understood to be opposed to the Government)
and three British Subjects, of whom two are reputed to be in the same
predicament," and also "contended that no naturalized foreigner could be
nominated according to [the Third] Article of the English Treaty" (R.C. Wyllie
to Jules Dudoit, April 22, 1846, No. 16, F.O. & Ex, AH). After many days of
argument, the question was not settled because Judge Andrews refused to
approve Ricord's indictment "because of insufficient evidence" and the case was
dismissed (Polynesian, Dec. 20, 1845).
The government fought back through a long editorial in The Polynesian
(Dec. 20, 1845), which said in part:
... this Am. Consular jury system is a wicked farce throughout,
dangerous to society at large, for it is incompetent to punish.... It
is also a violation of American and Hawaiian law. It is a
contempt of natural right. It is in opposition to the mandates of
the divine which say, "He that justifieth the wicked and he that
condemeth the just, even they both are an abomination to the
Lord. "
NATURAUZED FORE][GNERS GRANTED ONLY
NATURAUZED FORE][GNER JURORS
A short time later Judge Andrews made a decision which seemed
inconsistent with the government's prior position regarding the consequences of
naturalization. In January, 1846, Linton Torbert and Benjamin Forbush, two
naturalized foreigners, shot and killed a Native, Aki, on Maui. They thought
Aki had harmed some of their cattle, which had been causing trouble by
invading the fields of the Natives, and had sought to perform a citizen's arrest
of Aki after a constable had told them that Aki would soon turn himself in. Aki
resisted their "arrest;" he was shot and died; and Torbert and Furbush were
brought to Honolulu to be tried for murder in February. To the surprise of
many, "the court in interlocutory debate, decided that they were entitled to a
jury of half naturalized subjects and half native, and to be allowed twelve
peremptory challenges" (Polynesian, Feb. 14, 1846). Three of the six
naturalized jurors were former Britons and three former Americans. The
defense argued self-defense and provocation. The jury convicted them of
manslaughter and they were sentenced to four years imprisonment, commutable
for two hundred dollars. The Polynesian (Feb. 28, 1846) praised "the good
sense and just discrimination, particularly of the native portion of the jury,
whose national sympathies were certainly liable to be strongly excited," and
added, "It ought to convince foreigners that natives are capable of coming to
intelligent decisions even on juries, and that the stigma that has been cast upon
them in matters appertaining to juries is totally unfounded in experience." It
ended the editorial by calling for the enactment of some new penalty for the
offense of manslaughter. Now the principle was established that a naturalized
foreigner charged with a serious crime was entitled to a jury on which all the
foreigners called would be naturalized.
FRENCH AND BRllHSH TREA'fliES OF 1846:
CONSUL JURmS MAY BE M][XED JURmS
The next month, on March 26, 1846, new treaties with Great Britain and
France embodied the changes in the consul jury article which these governments
had agreed to "in concert." The new provisions broadened those eligible for
nomination to include both "native or foreign residents" (residens indigenes, ou
restrangers), but made no other changes (Kuykendall, 1938: 368-373).
ONLY THE JUDGE DETERMiNES iF A STATEMENT][S UBELLOUS
At this point Attorney General Ricord aroused many of the foreign
residents by insisting upon the division of labor between the judge and the jury
provided by the common law in a libel suit. In April, 1846, Brinsmade sued
James J. Jarvis, editor of The Polynesian, for publishing "libellous and
slanderous Publications" against him in November, 1845, in connection with the
failure of Ladd and Co. He asked for fifty thousand dollars in damages. Judge
Andrews assembled a foreign jury, at which point Ricord interceded that this
was a mistake as it was solely the decision of the judge to determine whether or
not a remark was a libel, after which, if the judge decided in the affirmative, the
question of damages would go to the jury. Brinsmade then sought to make the
government also a "deep pockets" defendant in the case. The case involve~ a
huge exchange of correspondence between the Kingdom's Minister of ForeIgn
Relations, Robert C. Wyllie, and the British and American consuls. In the end
it was declared a nonsuit (Kingdom, 1846). The anti-government foreigners saw
this as another effort of the government to deprive them of their jury rights.
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THE GOVERNMENT JRESIlSTS EXTENSION OlF
CONSUL JURIES 1'0 MINOR OlFlFENSES
Given the conduct of the U.S. consuls and commissioners, the inability
of the Hawaiian government to get the consul jury provision removed was most
upsetting to Minister Wyllie. On April 22, 1846, he wrote French Consul
Dudoit:
I fear the 3rd Article of the Treaty lately made will only
increase this evil, which is one obstructive of all good
Government. This opinion frankly stated cannot offend you, for
in seven years you have never had occasion to act under the 4th
Article of the LaPlace Treaty, so free have French Residents
been from any infraction of law that could come under it. I
consider that your letter of the 18th September 1844 to my
Predecessor gave a correct view of the sense in which that article
was to be understood, & also of the sense in which the 3d article
of the late treaty should be acted upon. Upon that point Mr.
Perrin [the new incoming French Consul] will take the opinion
of the French Government, but, as great abuses will certainly be
attempted under the 3d Article, I particularly request of you also,
in the name of the King, to solicit of the Government of France,
with the least possible delay, to state clearly their views upon
what is to be the exact interpretation of the 3d Article (FO &
Ex., AH).
But some relief would soon come to the Hawaiian government. In May,
1846, the government lodged a formal complaint against Abell with the U.S.
Secretary of State and on July 1, 1846, Joel Turrill replaced him as consul and
adopted a most friendly posture toward the government, much to the chagrin of
Commissioner Ten Eyck, who intensified his anti-government activities.
Minister Wyllie, in his August, 1846, report to the legislature proclaimed that
the government would continue to resist efforts "to make foreign jurors,
nominated by foreign Consuls, the arbiters of the fate of the King's native
subjects, where they accuse foreigners of offences that do not amount according
to Hawaiian law, to what is considered crime in England or the United States"
(Polynesian, Aug. 22, 1846; underline in original).
OPPOSrfKON SUPPORT lFOR "JURV NULUlFllCA1'llON," ATTACKS
ON THE NA1'llONALrfV COMPOSrflON OlF lFOJREIGN JlJRIES
AND A DEMAND lFOR EXTEJRJRrfORIlAUl'V
Before the end of 1846 William L. Lee, an American lawyer who had
studied some law at Harvard, had arrived and been appointed a Judge of the
Court of Oahu coordinate with Lorrin Andrews. However, assaults on the jury
process continued, led by Reynolds and his supporters through their paper, The
Sandwich Island News. In May, 1847, they reported that jurors were confused
whether they were to judge only the facts or the facts and the law and supported
the latter position with many British "authorities" (SIN, May 12, 1847). The
next month they published the foreign jury lists for April, May and June, and
analyzed them according to nationality and naturalization status, claiming those
on the lists to be disproportionately naturalized and American (SIN, June 30,
1847). The next week they editorialized in favor of the United States demanding
"extraterritoriality" in Hawaii, drawing heavily upon U. S. Secretary of State
Buchanan's report to the U. S. Congress in December, 1846, which had asserted
the need for Americans to be tried by U. S. consuls when charged with offenses
in "uncivilized and heathen lands" (SIN, August 4, 1847).
THE ACT 1'0 ORGANIZE THE JUmCIARV: NATURAUZED
lFOREIGNERS S1'llLL 1'0 BE lFOREffGNERS FOR JURIES
The next month, September, 1847, the Hawaiian Legislature passed "The
Third Act to Organize the Government: An Act to Organize the Judiciary"
(Kingdom, 1847:1-65), which had been drafted by Ricord and reviewed by Lee.
It established a Honolulu Superior Court of Law and Equity with original and
appellate jurisdiction. Lee was elected Chief Judge, along with John (Jaone) Ii
and Andrews, to the three judge court. It also established four judicial districts.
The First District was Oahu; the Second, Maui, Molokai, Lanai and
Koohoolawe; the Third, Hawaii; the Fourth, Kauai and Niihau. Each district
had one or more Local Circuit Judges who could hear appeals in Chambers
(without juries) from District and Police Courts. In addition, at specified terms
the Local Circuit Judges were joined by a Judge of the Superior Court, at which
time they constituted the Circuit Court of the District and could hold jury trials.
Under the Third Act foreign jurors and juries were authorized only for the
Superior Court of Honolulu and the Circuit Court of the Second District (Maui),
a situation that would last until 1854 when foreign jurors and juries would also
be authorized for the Third and Fourth Judicial Districts (Kingdom, 1854: 17).
Chapter IV of The Third Act contained detailed procedures for jury
selection and trial by jury (jure). Article IV, Section VI, specified:
140 SOCIAL PROCESS IN lHIAWAU Nelligan and Ball ETHNIC JURIES 141
In all jury cases in which one party is a foreigner (haole)
and the other a native (kanaka maoli), the jury shall be composed
of an equal number of natives and foreigners (naturalized or
unnaturalized,) [sic] (he haole hoohiki a hoohiki ole paha) who
shall be drawn alternately from the boxes containing the names
of such foreigners and natives as have been summoned to attend
the court convened for the trial of such cases.
Section XI then extended the same principles to cases of native Hawaiians and
naturalized foreigners accused of a crime:
All native Hawaiians (kanaka maoli 0 Hawaii nui, kanaka
Hawaii) and naturalized foreigners (haole hoohiki) , when accused
of any crime, shall be tried by a jury drawn in the same manner
as for the trial of civil cases.
The ruling of Judge Andrews in the trial of Torbert and Furbush conferring a
special entitlement to naturalized foreigners to have only naturalized foreigners
as the foreigner component of their juries was taken away by the statute.
However, alien foreigners could still have a consul jury, which under the
French and British Treaties of 1846 could include both foreigners and natives.
Article IV, Sections VII through X covered the consul jury. They ordered the
.clerk of the Superior Court to send a letter to the appropriate consul asking for
thirty-six names whenever "any accused party is an alien foreigner," but
specified:
.... In the case of the refusal or neglect of such consul or
consular agent to propose said jurors within ten days after the
reception of such request, such refusal or neglect shall be
considered as a proposal on the part of said consul or consular
agent that the jury for the trial of such accused person or persons
shall be drawn from the array of jurors for the trial of civil cases
in which any foreigner is a party.
Article IV, Section XXI provided: "No jury for the trial of any civil or
criminal case shall be less than twelve in number; but when any nine of such
jury shall agree upon a verdict, they may render the same, and such verdict shall
be valid and binding upon the parties as if rendered by all twelve. "
The chief justice of the Superior Court was authorized to establish a
"special jury of inquiry of lunacy, or de ventre inspiciendo," and under certain
circumstances a special jury could be had "in any case of complication or
involving artistical or professional knowledge or skill" (Article III, Section
XXIII, and Article IV, Section XIV).
With respect to the role of the jury, Chapter I, Section VIII, declared:
In all civil cases triable by jury, the jury shall be solely
judges of the facts proven before them. They shall not in such
cases have power to determine the law applicable to those facts,
or the legal construction to be given of any law, or to any
contract or agreement, or the legal points arising therein, nor of
the jurisdiction of the court over the matter submitted to them,
nor of the constitutionality and force of any law; but such
constructions, interpretations and questions shall be solely
determined by the judge, judges, or other judicial officers before
whom the matter is depending; who shall instruct the jury as to
the law upon which such facts are to be applied by them in their
verdict.
This was reasserted again in Chapter IV, Section XIX.
No similar limitation is spelled out anywhere in the act with respect to
a criminal case; the act was simply silent on the "jury nullification" issue in
criminal trials. Presumably such a jury could refuse to convict in spite of the
evidence if they disapproved of the law or its application to a particular
defendant.
U. S. CONSUL DECLJINES TO NOMlINATE CONSUL
JURORS BU'f BRlI'flISH CONSUL DOES
These new provisions were quickly tested. In October, 1847, four men,
Americans George Morgan and Anthony Jenkins and Britishers Duncan McLean
and Joseph Esquith, were arrested for burglarizing James Campbell's residence
and taking seven hundred dollars. During the Police Court committal hearing
Jenkins testified against the other three and was not indicted. U.S. Consul
Turrill did not nominate a consul jury, but British Consul Miller did, so separate
trials had to be held by nationality. On November 9 Morgan was tried and
convicted by a regular foreign jury (Supreme Court Criminal Case No. 499, AH
[hereafter S.C Crim. No. 499]). McLean and Esquith were tried the next day
by a British consul jury. Their attorney sought to challenge four of the jurors
because they had also served the day before on Morgan's jury, but this was
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denied by Judge Lee. McLean was convicted and Esquith acquitted (S.c. Crim.
No. 1024, AH).
Now Jenkins, who had testified in the Police Court but then refused to
testify in the Superior Court, was indicted. On November 20 Judge Lee
requested a list of twenty-four jurors from Consul Turrill. Turrill declined,
though he said he would attend the trial:
.. ..Believing as I do, that any interference in the
organization of the Judicial tribunals of the country, by official
Agents of foreign Governments, is, to say the lest [sic] of it, of
doubtful policy, I have, in the absence of treaty stipulations
conferring that power, come to the determination, not to exercise
it in this case, notwithstanding your liberal request for me to do
so. In taking this course, so clearly marked out by duty, it
affords me great pleasure to know, that the rights of the prisoner
cannot in the slightest degree, be prejudiced thereby. During the
last year I have examined the printed panels of Jurors .. .in your
Honorable Court. These panels afford a sure guarantee, that by
taking the usual course of trials, this issue will be passed upon
by upright and intelligent Jurors, who, under the direction of an
erudite Judge, cannot fail to come to a decision clearly warranted
by the law and the facts of the case (U. S. Consular Corr., Dec.
1, 1847).
Lee immediately thanked Turrill "for the just and praiseworthy course you have
adopted. It is one that cannot fail to reflect great credit upon you, and high
honor upon the Nation you represent" (U.S. Consular Corr., Dec. 1, 1847).
Jenkins was convicted by a regular foreign jury (S.C. Crim. No 260, AH).
Turrill continued this policy, although with the passage of time he
apparently did realize that under the Third Act he did have a right to nominate
consul juries with or without a treaty. In April 1849 when Prince Jackson, a
Black American, was charged with assault and battery with intent to kill a fellow
sailor on board their ship in the harbor, Turrill formally declined to exercise his
"right" to nominate a consul jury. Jackson was convicted by a regular foreign
jury, who rejected his defense of insanity in spite of a great deal of evidence in
support of it (S.c. Crim. No. 1025, AH).
TWO MDffiJ[) BR][T][SH CONSUL JUR][ES
In July, 1850, George Bush, a British butcher, was charged with
manslaughter when one of his steers ran loose in the street and a sailor playing
around with it got gored. Consul Miller submitted a mixed list of prospective
jurors. When the names were drawn it turned out that eight of them were also
present in court for either the regular foreign or native jury. Four were added
from the "tales proposed by Consul." One of the first eight was objected to and
he was replaced by another from the consul's list. The twelve seated included
Judges Kauwahi and Kalama and half-Hawaiians Francis Manini and William
Sumner. The jury acquitted Bush (S.C. Crim. No. 107, AH) .
In October 1850 Consul Miller again nominated a mixed consul jury for
the trial of George Dillon for grand larceny from another foreigner. The trial
jury included half-Hawaiians John Sumner, William Sumner, David Adams and
Paul Manini. The jury acquitted Dillon (S.c. Crim. No. 161, AH). These two
juries were the only two mixed consul juries and they would be the last mixed
jury in a criminal trial.
NEW PJENAL CODJE OlF 1850: RlEGULAR CR][MINAL JURORS TO
BJE DJETJERMINJED SOLJELY BY THE JETHN][C][TY
OlF THE DJElFJENDANT
On September 2, 1850, a new Penal Code took effect in the Kingdom
(Kingdom, 1850:1-133). While it did not, in fact, add many new forms of
crimes, it made some important changes. It made a clear distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors and upgraded the seriousness of some offenses, the
most noteworthy of which was rape, which was now a felony. There would be
no more Wiley cases.
More importantly it assured that in the future no "party," that is, no
victim or relative of a victim, would have any claim on any part of the fine or
forfeiture which might be imposed as a sentence. Since the only compensation
of the police were fees in civil cases and a share of the fines in criminal cases,
it also provided that no person entitled to a reward could be admitted as a
witness unless he first relinquished his rights to a share of the fine (Kingdom,
1850:130-131).
From now on in a criminal trial the ethnicity of a regular jury would be
determined solely by the ethnicity of the defendant. Naturalized or unnaturalized
foreigners would have a jury composed only of foreigners, naturalized or
unnaturalized. Native defendants would have a jury composed solely of natives.
With the possible exception of a consul jury, such as was had in the Bush and
Dillon cases, there could be no more mixed juries in criminal cases.
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THE CHKEJF JlJSnCE AlPlF'OJINTS A CONSUL JURY
In July, 1851 two Americans, Joseph Marks and Dr. Henry Butler were
charged with conspiracy to defraud Apong, a prominent Chinese businessman.
of $9,000 in gold. They requested a consul jury, but the U. S. consul wa~
away. Their attorney, Charles C. Harris, then requested that the trial be
postponed or the charges dismissed. Chief Justice Lee solved the problem by
selecting a "consul jury" for them, to which Harris objected to no avail. This
special consul jury convicted Marks and Butler (S.c. Crim. No. 526, AH).
In October, 1851, and January, 1852, two Americans were charged with
serious felonies, but their right to a consul jury was waived, although it is not
clear whether they or the U. S. consul did so. Each was tried and acquitted by
a regular foreign jury (S.c. Crim. Nos. 1033 & 662).
NEW JBRlITliSH TREATV OJF 1852: NO CONSUL JURY
In May, 1852, a new British Treaty replaced the Treaty of 1846. It
relin~uished any claim to a British consul jury in express terms, but the right
remamed under the "most favored nation" clause so long as the French Treaty
of 1846 remained in effect. However, the Hawaiian government was optimistic,
for the same year the French government authorized negotiations for a new
treaty (Kuykendall, 1938:381-382).
A NEW SUlPREME COURT
Article 6 of the "Declaration of Rights" of the new Constitution 01
I!awaii of 1852 declared that: "The right of trial by jury, in all cases in which
It has been heretofore used in this Kingdom, shall remain inviolate forever"
(King~o~, .1852:3). It also established a clear separation of powers. At the top
?f~e.Ju?lclal branch was a three man Supreme Court with appellate and original
JunsdlctlOn. Lee was made Chief Justice with John Ii and LOlTin Andrews as
Associate Justices. Andrews would soon be replaced by George M. Robertson,
The prior system of Local Circuit Judges and Circuit Courts was retained but
the Supreme Court also became the Circuit Uury) Court for the First Di~trict
(Oahu). Thus the last time First District Circuit Judge Kapena was joined by
Lee or Andrews to hold native jury trials was August, 1852.
ANOTHER JBRHliSH CONSUL JURY
. Richard Fawcett, a British SUbject, waived his right to request a consul
Jury when tried for perjury in October, 1852, and was acquitted by a regular
foreign jury (S.c. Crim. No. 176, AH), but a British consul jury was selected
when Henry N. Greenwell, a British subject who had sat on Bush's consul jury,
was tried in January, 1853, for manslaughter after the death of Salai, one of his
Chinese contract laborers on Hawaii, who had been punished twice for running
away. The defense argued that Salai was weak and sickly and died from
exposure. The prosecutor contended that beating and leaving Salai exposed on
the lanai at night contributed to his death, even if it were not intended. Chief
Justice Lee's instructions to the jury appear to tell the jury that on the basis of
the evidence they must convict Greenwell of some degree of homicide even if
they knew Greenwell and believed him a "kind and humane man" (l Haw. 85).
The British consul jury unanimously acquitted Greenwell (S.C. Crim. No. 189,
AH), The Polynesian (Jan. 15, 1853) editorialized that Lee's instructions made
it abundantly clear to all that no master had a legal right to impose any corporal
punishment upon a servant under the Master and Servant Act of 1850 and that
a servant could apply to a magistrate to have his master punished in such an
instance.
U. S. CONSUL DECUNlES liN A NOTORliOUS MURDER CASE
In October, 1855, Andrew G. Francis, an American, was tried for the
murder of William Winters, who had been residing at the premises of Rev.
Samuel Damon and his wife. Francis, a recently arrived sailor, apparently
believed that the Damons were holding prisoner a French woman he had known
in California. According to U. S. Commissioner David Gregg, the woman,
Madame Roquette, was "suffering from some time past from nervous
derangement and hysteria, amounting almost to positive insanity," and was being
taken care of by the Damons (King, 1982:256-7). Late one night Francis set out
with a gun and knife to kill the Damons and free the woman. He killed Winters
thinking he was Damon. U. S. Consul Ogden was asked if he wished to
nominate a consul jury and Commissioner Gregg investigated the prior use of
such juries. Consul Ogden declined to nominate and restricted his role to seeing
that Francis had"good counsel and a fair trial" (Ogden to Marcy, U. S. Embassy
Dispatches, Oct. 17, 1855). Francis' counsels, John P, Griswold and Charles
C. Harris, presented an insanity defense, four physicians presented conflicting
"expert opinions" on the question and the foreign jury ended up hung (S.C,
Crim. No. 182, AH; Polynesian, Oct. 13, 1855). Before Francis was tried
again word came from San Francisco that Francis "had been a Lunatic there for
some time previous to his leaving for the Sandwich Islands." Francis was
discharged to the custody of Consul Ogden and was returned to San Francisco
(Polynesian, April 17, 1856).
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JBRJrTJrSH CONSUL JURY GRANTED JrN A MJrSDEMIEANOR CASE
In December, 1856, two hotel owners, Joseph Booth and Louis Franconi,
were convicted in the Police Court of the misdemeanor offense of common
nuisance for holding public dances which encouraged the mixing of "females that
are known to be public Strumpets and of doubtful character" with "males who
have heretofore maintained a good reputation," which "tends plainly and directly
to the corruption of the morals, honesty, and good habits of the people." Each
was fined one hundred dollars.
However, the situation quickly became complicated. Chief Justice Lee
was very ill of tuberculosis. His death was anticipated by everyone, and there
was a great deal of speculation about his possible successor. Acting Chief
Justice Robertson was known to covet the position. Alexander Campbell, a
recently arrived lawyer from the United States, also viewed as a likely candidate
in some quarters, was employed to represent Booth and Franconi. After the
conviction of the defendants in the Police Court Campbell filed appeals for trials
de novo with consul juries in the Supreme Court. His affidavits requested a
British consul jury for Booth and a French consul jury for Franconi. In the
latter affidavit he specified that Franconi was "born in Belgium of French
parents. "
Much to the surprise of many, Robertson granted the request to give
Booth a jury from a list nominated by the British consul, thus reversing the
position held by the government since 1844 that consul juries were not available
to foreigners charged only with a misdemeanor. In January, 1857, Booth was
found not guilty by his British consul jury (S.c. Crim. No. 110, AH) and the
Franconi case was continued to the April Term of Court.
ATTORNEY mSBARRED FOR "FALSELY" CLAJrMJrNG
A CONSUL JURY
However, in late March Justice Robertson charged Campbell with
deliberately misleading him in his request for a French consul jury, alleging that
Campbell knew that Franconi was not French. Campbell responded with an
"intemperate" letter in which he accused Robertson of ignorance about proper
procedure and demanded a hearing on the very question of whether or not
Franconi was French. Robertson denied the demand for a hearing, then
disbarred Campbell because of his "misconduct toward the court" (Advertiser,
April 2, 1857). The case against Franconi was then nolle prossed, after which
Robertson announced a new rule:
It is hereby ordered, that every foreigner charged with a
crime and claiming the right to be tried by a jury proposed by
the Consul of his nation, shall, either by himself or by his
counsel, file a written notice to that effect with the Clerk of the
Court, setting forth under oath, that such foreigner is a subject
or citizen of the nation whose consular intervention he claims
(Polynesian, April 11, 1857).
Chief Justice Lee, now literally on his death bed, refused to intervene.
Justice Robertson had eliminated a major competitor to be Lee's successor, but
in the process his reputation was so damaged that he had also eliminated himself.
Lee was succeeded as Chief Justice by Elisha Allen, formerly a U. S.
Commissioner and Minister of Finance of the Kingdom. In August Allen
reaffirmed Campbell's expulsion from the bar and in December Campbell
returned to the United States.
A IBRJrTJrSH SAILOR ON A U. S. SHU' JrS NOT AN AMIERICAN
FOR CONSUL JURY PURPOSES AND CONSUL JURORS
CAN lBE CHALLENGED lBY nIlE PROSECUTOR
The next consul jury occurred at Lahaina, Maui, in May, 1857. Three
sailors, William Tammas, Thomas Courtright and John Scott were charged with
assaulting a police officer, punishable by "a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars, and imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding three years" (Kingdom,
1850: 17). Tammas and Courtright were Americans and requested a consul jury.
Scott was by birth a British subject, but as no British consul was available he
claimed the right to a U. S. consul jury on the ground that he had arrived at
Lahaina as a seaman on aU. S. ship. Justice Robertson and Local Circuit Judge
John Richardson granted a U. S. consul jury for Tammas and Courtright, but
denied this to Scott. The consul at Lahaina, Anson Chandler, nominated the
jury list for Tammas and Courtright, and each of the defendants were granted
a separate trial. Tammas went first and his attorneys, Paul C. Ducorron and
Mr. Farwell, argued that the jurors nominated by the consul could not be
challenged by the prosecutor. The Court ruled that this contention was
"absurd." The trial proceeded and Tammas was found not guilty (2d Cir. Crim.
No. 2599, AH; Polynesian, May 23, 1857).
OP'f][MJ[SM AlBOUr A NEW FRENCH TREATY
On September 8, 1858, after years of contention, the King agreed to a
proposed new treaty with France which had no consul jury provision, but only
if the French government agreed to certain additional interpretations of some of
its provisions.
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A NATURAUZED HAOLE CANNOT HAVE A NATrrVE JURY
While awaiting this agreement the basic allocation of native/foreign
criminal juries was challenged from an unexpected direction. Charles F. Burns.
a foreigner variously described as "a quack" and "a well known amateur
practitioner of medicine and surgery," was tried at Lahaina for murder in the
second degree for causing the death of Maiho by maltreatment. Attorney
Farwell requested a native jury on the grounds that Burns could not get a fair
trial from a foreign jury and as a naturalized subject he was "entitled to a native
jury." Justice Robertson and Judge Richardson denied the request because a
foreign jury would be "ajury of his peers." Burns was convicted and sentenced
to five years imprisonment (2d Cir. Crim. No. 590, AH; Polynesian, Sept. 4 &
Nov. 20, 1858).
THE LAS'f CONSUL JURY
In May, 1859, it was learned that France had rejected the additional
article. On May 26, 1859 the King ratified the original 1858 version but now
had to await its final acceptance by France. The same month the new Civil Code
of 1859 was adopted without any changes in the jury provisions (Kingdom,
1859).
In mid-August, 1859, Joseph Watson, a sailor of the Australian barque
"Oreste" en route from San Francisco to Australia, told his captain, Thomas
Mason, that he wished to leave the ship at Honolulu. Mason then took Watson
and several other crewmen for a sail in his longboat. While outside the reef
Captain Mason was alleged to have taunted and beaten Watson with the tiller.
Watson jumped overboard and Mason returned to shore, having made no attempt
to rescue Watson. Second Mate Thomas Fitzgerald, who had been on the ride,
went to the authorities and filed a complaint, for which Captain Mason had
Fitzgerald placed in irons. Mason was charged with murder in the second
degree, a nonbailable offense, since it carried a possible penalty of
"imprisonment ... for a term of years, exceeding ten" (Kingdom, 1850: 121), and
was committed to the jail for trial at the October Term. The Court denied the
request by British Consul W. L. Green that Thomas be granted bail and Green
then demanded an expedited trial before a British consul jury. Chief Justice
Allen granted both requests and a special session of the Court was held on
September 19 to try Thomas. The trial was marked by the jury's request to visit
the longboat, by the aggressive questioning of Fitzgerald by one of the jurors,
by ~lIen's advice to the jury that the testimony of a ship captain is usually more
credIble than that of crewmen, and by an unusually long time for the jury to
reach a verdict (over four hours), while twice announcing during their
deliberations that they were "hung." Finally Captain Thomas was acquitted by
a vote of eleven to one (S. C. Crim. No. 507). Ten days later The Polynesian
(Oct. 1, 1859) celebrated that" at last" the "Oreste" was out of Hawaii's waters.
This is the last Consul Jury case we have found.
A NEW FRENCH TREATY AND THE CONSUL
JURY STATUTE REPEALED
On January 21, 1860, the Emperor of France promulgated the new
Hawaiian-French Treaty, known as the Treaty of September 8, 1858, and on
June 17,1862, the Legislature repealed Sections 1192 through 1195 of the Civil
Code (Kingdom, 1862:8). No longer would a consul jury be available to any
alien foreigner. They would be tried by a regular foreign jury.
A COMPARHSON OF 'fHE COMPOSll'fHON AND PERFORMANCE
OIF THE CRIlMHNAL JURIES OF THE 1850'S
With the appearance of the last consul jury, we can compare the
composition and performances of the three kinds of criminal juries on Oahu for
the ten years, 1850-1859. Rather detailed data on the progress of criminal cases
through the Superior Court and the Supreme Court are presented in Table 1.
Fifty-one different individuals composed the sixty sitting jurors for the
five British consul jury trials, which tried five British subjects. Using the base
of sixty, we find that 63.3 percent were nonnaturalized foreigners (nationality
unknown), 21.7 percent naturalized former British subjects, 10 percent haole-
Hawaiians, 3.3 percent Hawaiians and 1.7 percent naturalized former U. S.
citizens. As shown in Table 1, the five trials produced five verdicts of not
guilty.
The regular foreign jurors consisted of 280 individuals, 16.1 percent of
whom were naturalized former Americans, 8.9 naturalized former Britishers, 0.7
percent naturalized former Germans, and 74.3 percent nonnaturalized foreigners
(nationality unknown). All had Northern European surnames. Naturalized
foreigners were 31.1 percent and nonnaturalized foreigners 68.9 percent of the
972 sitting jurors in 81 regular foreign jury trials. They tried the cases of sixty-
one white and twenty-six Chinese defendants. The overall conviction rate was
55.2 percent, with a rate of 52.5 percent for the whites and 61.5 percent for the
Chinese. Foreign juries trying white defendants were far more likely to produce
a "hung" jury than any of the other categories, where hung juries were rather
unusual. Perhaps this was explained in part by the writer of a letter to the
Weekly Argus (Jan. 28, 1852) who complained that the backgrounds of the
foreign jurors were too disparate to "adjudicate laws of which they are
ignorant. "
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Cases could be filed either by the commitment of the defendant(s) for trial by an inferior
judge or by an appeal by the defendant(s) from a conviction by an inferior judge.
British --Foreign Jury--
Consul Chinese White Native
Jury Deft. Deft. Jury
CASES
Number Filed· 5 31 95 169
Number To Trial 5 29 72 118
Percent to Trial 100.0 93.5 75.8 69.8
DEFENDANTS
Number Charged 5 47 109 275
Percent Convicted 0.0 59.6 49.5 36.4
Number to Trial 5 39 82 179
Percent to Trial 100.0 83.0 75.2 65.1
Percent Convicted 0.0 71.8 65.9 55.9
DISPOSITIONS OF DEFENDANTS
Pleas of Guilty
Number of Cases 0 7 15 36
Number Defts. 0 11 19 36
Percent of Tried 0.0 28.2 23.2 20.1
Percent Convicted 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Trial w/o Jury
Number of Trials 0 1 2 2
Number Defts. 0 1 2 3
Percent of Tried 0.0 2.6 2.4 1.7
Percent Convicted 0.0 100.0 100.0 66.7
Tried by Jury
Number of Juries 5 22
59··· 86····
Number Defts. 5 26 61 140
Percent of Tried 100.0 66.7 74.4 78.2
Percent "Hung" 0.0 3.8 16.4 0.7
Percent Convicted 0.0 61.5 52.5 43.6
There were 1,032 sitting native jurors in 86 trials involving 140
defendants. We cannot as yet produce a solid estimate of the number of
individuals involved because of the variations in spelling which we find in the
records. A native juror without a Hawaiian surname was extremely rare, less
than one percent. The conviction rate of these juries was 43.6 percent.
These varying jury conviction rates were also consistent with the
likelihood that one would be convicted if indicted and convicted if brought to
trial. As shown in Table 1, the conviction rates for those indicted were 59.6
percent for Chinese defendants, 49.5 percent for white defendants, 36.4 percent
for Hawaiian defendants and 0.0 percent for the "British subjects." We should
note that the fact that these courts held a term of court only every three months
was particularly advantageous to Hawaiian defendants whose prosecutions were
especially likely to be handicapped by witnesses who had departed the Kingdom.
In contrast, almost half the Chinese defendants were tried in 1856, when there
was much talk of a "Chinese crime wave," their cases often involved burglary
and larceny charges after the defendants were caught in the act or found with the
stolen property, and there were permanent residents as the witnesses against
them (Lim-Chong and Ball, 1992). The same cluster of characteristics was most
likely to result in the conviction of a white.
HAOLE-HAWAIIANS ARE NAUVJES lFOR JURY PURPOSES
But some questions still remained. As the numbers of part-Hawaiians
increased, how would they be classified under the jury statute. In 1867 Mele
Kokai was brought to trial on Kauai charged with poisoning her husband with
arsenic. Through her attorney, C. Claude Jones, she requested a foreign jury
on the ground that she was "three-fourths foreign." Chief Justice Allen and
Local Circuit Judge Duncan McBryde denied the request and the native jury
found her not guilty (5th Cir. Crim. No. 457, AH) because the "[t]estimony of
the Chinese witnesses was so variable from what they had sworn on a former
occasion" (Advertiser, Nov. 1, 1867). Anyone with any native Hawaiian
ancestry would continue to be classed as native under the jury statute.
A NEW APPEALS COURT lFOR OAHU
Table 1 Numbers and! Percentages of Criminal Cases, Defendants and
Convictions in the Honolulu Superior Counrt and! Supreme Court
by Etilmidty of Defendants and Kind of Jury: 1850-1859
In 1874 the legislature eliminated the Local Circuit Judgeship for the
First District (Oahu) and established an Intermediary Court of Appeals to hear
appeals in chambers (no jury) from the District and Police Courts of Oahu. The
judges of the Intermediary Court were the individual justices of the Supreme
Court (Kingdom, 1874:9-11). This Court existed from 1874 through 1892.
-- There were two more juries than there were cases tried by juries, for in two cases an initial
hung jury resulted in a second jury trial.
•.• There were two more juries than there were cases tried by juries, for in one case an initial
hung jury resulted in a second jury trial and in another Chief Justice Lee misread the guilty
verdict of a native jury and acquitted the two defendants, but he corrected his error by giving
the two defendants a second jury trial the next day, at which they were duly convicted.
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A RAlRE. CASE OF A ClHmNESE ON A FO.RJEIGN JURY
As the numbers of Chinese, especially those who had become naturalized
subjects of the King, increased in the Kingdom, would a foreign, that is, haole,
jury continue to consist only of whites? Thus far only one Oahu case has been
discovered which represented an exception to this rule, In April, 1877, Apo,
Chinese, was brought to trial in the Supreme Court charged with selling opium.
His Foreign Jury consisted of eleven Whites and one Chinese, Ah See. Apo was
acquitted by a vote of nine to three, with Ah See voting with the majority (S.c.
Crim. No. 94, AH).
This absence of Chinese jurors as "peers" persisted even though tl1e
Chinese population grew substantially beginning in the 1850's, as did their
numbers as defendants in criminal cases and parties in civil cases. Rather, their
exclusion from juries demonstrates that community pluralism had its limits and
was closely related to the ability of an ethnic group to make credible demands
on the government, which in effect meant demands backed up by a foreign state.
Although there were always more Chinese than Frenchmen in Hawaii beginninfJ:
in 1789, the Chinese government had little interest in them. By the middle ot'
the century extraterritoriality had been imposed on China and it had lost any
ability to send a warship to protect the interests of overseas Chinese. No effort
was made to designate a Chinese consul until late in the century. Even the
general citizenship rights of the Chinese in Hawaii would decline after 1887.
Participation on juries by persons of Chinese ancestry would have to await tl1e
twentieth century.
THE IMPACT OF THE WIlLCOX lRE.BElLUON
In 1889 Robert Wilcox, a part-Hawaiian who had spent some years in
Italy and become an admirer of Garibaldi, led an armed rebellion against the
government. After he and his followers had been overcome by the private
foreign armies, they were brought to trial. One European, a Belgian named
Albert Loomens, was convicted by a foreign jury of treason and sentenced to
death, which was commuted to one year in prison and then banishment (S. C.
Crim.. No: 1367, AH),.and one Chinese, Ho Fon, a journalist, was convicted by
a foreign Jury of conspiracy and fined two hundred and fifty dollars (S. C. Crim.
No. 1370, AH).
As described by Daws (1968:257-8), "Wilcox himself was charged with
treason .... but it was obvious that no jury composed of native Hawaiians would
ever convict him of a capital offense. In the end he was tried for conspiracy.
The eViden~e against him was overwhelming ....Wilcox was found not guilty by
a vote of nme to three, and he emerged with a greater following among the
natives than he had had before" (S.c. Crim. Nos. 1372 & 1380, AH). All the
various charges of treason, conspiracy or mutiny were dismissed against most
of his other followers, including Kahuakai, Kaona, Jack Kuamoo, S. Pua, Robert
Boyd, H.P.K. Mulani, George Markham, Joseph M. Poepoe, Alexander Smith,
James Kauhane, Kamakea, Kanamu and Luhi (S.C. Crim. Nos. 1368, 1369,
1373 and 1376, AH).
CHIEF JUSnCE RECOMMENDS CHANGES IN THE JURY SYSTEM
An examination of the kinds of disputes brought as "actions at law" and
those brought as "equity" cases suggests that in many instances aggrieved parties
sought to mold their dispute into an equitable format in order to avoid a jury
trial and that this practice increased with the passage of time.
In 1892 the Legislature undertook to enact a major reorganization of the
judiciary. In his report to the legislature (Kingdom, 1892a:5-6), Chief Justice
Alfred F. Judd reported that the ethnic jury system "has given rise to many
perplexing questions which have been variously decided by different judges,"
especially when one party was a corporation. He gave several examples,
including:
....Where a domestic corporation composed of foreigners
and natives sues a native Hawaiian, what should the jury be
made of? Often all the parties on one side and all but one on the
other side are native Hawaiians. Should the fact that one
foreigner is a party entitle him to have six foreigners on the
jury?"
Judd recommended,
....Either a statute should be passed which will provide
particularly for all the cases which may arise, or the distinction
between Hawaiian, foreign and mixed juries be altogether
abolished. To provide that all cases, civil or criminal, should be
tried by juries drawn from all nationalities resident here, the
same being suitable persons, would remove all the questions
suggested above.
He believed, "Such a system would in the end tend to allay race prejudices and
would assist in educating the people in the duties of good citizenship."
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NEW COURT STRUCTURE JINCREASES OPPORTUNUJ[JES FOR
JURY TRJIALS FOR MJINOR OFFENSES
However, no mqjor changes were made in the jury statutes, but there was
a major revamping of the courts. The Supreme Court was made exclusively an
appellate court, the Circuit Courts became the general trial courts and the
District Courts were given parallel jurisdiction with the Police Courts. The
Intermediary Court of Appeals, that is, the justices of the former Supreme Court
hearing appeals from the District and Police Courts in Chambers was eliminated
and this had great significance for jury trials. Now appeals f;om these lower
courts went directly to the First Circuit Court where they could receive a trial
de novo with a jury (Kingdom, 1892b:90-125).
THE OVERTIHIROW OF THE MONARCHY
percentage of defendants convicted was 36.4, 62.5 and 23.6 respectively. It was
aimost impossible to get a native jury to convict the increased number of
Hawaiians charged with illegal liquor sales or possession of lottery tickets in
1893.
Everyone of the foreign jurors in 1883 and 1887 had Northern European
surnames, as did 96.7 percent in 1893. These juries convicted 20.0 percent of
the defendants in 1883, 46.6 percent in 1887 and 39.5 percent in 1893. The
percentages of the defendants tried by these jurors who were Chinese increased
1'rom 50.0 percent to 60.0 percent to 65.6 percent, but in 1887 and 1893 these
Chinese defendants generally were less likely to be convicted than were the
white defendants. On the other hand, the persons who were most likely to be
convicted by these juries were Chinese or Japanese charged with the illegal sale
of liquor, that is, encroaching upon a significant white monopoly.
------1883----- ------1887----- ------1893-----
Foreign Native Foreign Native Foreign Native
JURIES
No. Trials 7 17 13 7 33 44
No. Individ. 50 65 77 53 91 108
No. Sitting 108 204 156 84 396 528
SURNAMES
% No. Europ. 100.0 12.2 100.0 20.2 96.7 35.2
% So. Europ. 2.9 2.4 3.3 1.9
% Chinese 0.9
% Hawaiian 78.9 77.4 62.0
DEFENDANTS
Total Number 10 22 5 8 38 55
% Convicted 20.0 36.4 46.6 62.5 39.5 23.6
Chinese 5 9 25
% Convicted 40.0 33.3 32.0
Whites 5 6 11
% Convicted 0.0 66.7 45.5
Japanese 0 0 2
% Convicted 100.0
Haole-Hawaiian 1 1 9
% Convicted 100.0 .0 ILl
Hawaiian 21 7 46
% Convicted 33.3 71.4 26.1
In January, 1893, the Monarchy was overthrown with the assistance of
the minister and military forces of the United States (Blount, 1893). A
Provisional Government headed by President Sanford Dole was established, fLllly
expecting annexation by the United States. When this did not occur the
Provisional Government moved to establish its legitimacy by having a convention
in 1894 to adopt a constitution for the Republic of Hawaii. Editor H. N. Castle
of the Advertiser regretted that the proposed constitution still retained a right to
trial by jury, which he described as "an antiquated machinery" (June 26, 1894)
The Constitution of1894 did retain the right to trial by jury and the ethnic jury
system remained on the statute books (Republic, 1897:3 & 517-527).
JURY COMlPOSJI'f][ONS AND lPERFORMANCES JIN 1883, 1887 and 1893
However, everything was not the same. After the overthrow jurors had
to take an oath of loyalty to the new regimes (Provisional Government, 1894: 10;
Republic, 1897:46). Thus, comparisons of the compositions and performances
of criminal trial juries on Oahu for 1883, 1887 and 1893, presented in Table 2,
are illuminating (Moriyama, n.d.). 1883 was early in the administration of Prime
Minister Walter M. Gibson, 1887 was the year of political turbulence in which
the whites forced King Kalakaua to drop Gibson and accept the "Bayonet
Constitution," and the cases in 1893 are after the overthrow of the Monarchy.
The first point to note is the great increase in the number of jury trials in 1893
due to the changes in the structure of the courts enacted in 1892. In contrast to
1883 and 1887, the vast majority of these jury trials were for misdemeanor
offenses appealed from the District and Police Courts.
As shown in Table 2, almost 80 percent of the Hawaiian jurors in 1883
and 1887 had Hawaiian surnames, but this dropped to 62 percent in 1893. The
Table 2 Foreign and Native Jury Composition by Ethnic Surnames and
Conviction Rates by !EOmicity of Defendants: 1883, 1887, 1893
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The low conviction rates in 1893 for both kinds of juries reflect the
degree to which the juries were acquitting defendants of any ethnicity who were
appealing the increased number of convictions in the lower courts under the
liquor, organized gambling and opium possession laws. The results suggest that
being of Northern European ancestry or being haole-Hawaiian did not guarantee
agreement with the policies of the new government.
MiUTARY TRUmNALS iN 1895: NO HAWAHAN JURY
In January, 1895, a number of Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians and a few
haole attempted an armed uprising with the intention of restoring Queen
Lili 'uokalani to her throne. Dole declared martial law, the uprising was put
down and about one hundred persons taken prisoner or arrested, including Queen
Lili 'uokalani. A special military tribunal, headed by Circuit Judge William
Austin Whiting, now a Colonel, began its trials, thus avoiding the requirement
that Hawaiians be tried in the criminal courts by native juries. On February 5
the Queen was brought to trial for" misprison of treason, " prosecuted by William
A. Kinney and defended by Paul Neumann. Among other things Neumann
challenged the legality of the entire proceeding, using the argument that Garner
Anthony would later use in the United States Supreme Court during World War
II (Anthony, 1955), that "if there was any necessity for martial law it had long
ceased to exist" and that the civilian courts were open and being employed for
all other offenses, including those committed during the so-called war. The
Queen was convicted.
Protests arose in several foreign capitals about these "trials" and by
January 1, 1896, all but one of those imprisoned had been released havina
pledged not to join or abet any movements against the Republic. The Q~een did
not receive her full pardon until October, 1896, at which time she sailed for the
United States to oppose annexation (Loomis, 1976:103-215).
ANNEXAnON BY THE UNUED STATES
On July 7, 1898, President McKinley signed a joint resolution by the
United States Senate and House of Representatives approving the proposed
Treaty of Annexation of Hawaii and the "transfer of sovereignty" took place on
August 12, 1898. A special joint committee was sent to the islands to review
all the laws to determine which might be repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States. The ethnic jury system of Hawaii was among the first provisions
designated as "inconsistent."
THE ORGAN[C ACT: REPEAL OF THE ETHNliC JURY STATUTES
When the United States Congress enacted the Organic Act of April 30,
1900, which in effect became the constitution of the Territory of Hawaii, it
repealed sections 1329, 1331, 1332, 1347 to 1354 of the Hawaii Civil Laws of
1897 (United States, 1900:sec. 7). The native/foreign jury system in criminal
cases and the native/foreign/mixed jury system in civil cases were gone. The
last clear vestige of the sovereignty of the kanaka maoU 0 Hawaii nei and one
of the last legal recognitions that they and the haole represented at least two
different nations within a single sovereign state were gone. Issues of ethnic
representation on juries in Hawaii would henceforth be determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of the State of
Hawaii.
NOTES
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INTJROJ[)UCTION
In his history of the "Boys' Training School" in Hawaii from 1865 to
1939, which was based largely upon official reports, Myron Thompson (1953:
14, 15) noted that "there was no mention of reasons for commitment before
1871" and that systematic breakdowns of reasons for commitments did not begin
until the report of the Board of Education in 1897, although the President of the
Board did report in 1884 that a large proportion of the commitments were for
"larceny and truancy." Recently Kuniyoshi (1989:62-68) demonstrated that one
could begin to fill this gap by utilizing original commitment documents preserved
in the Hawaii State Archives. 1
However, that demonstration was based upon the then available
commitment papers for only each 5th year between 1865 and 1884 and thus
included only sixty-two juveniles, roughly 17 percent of the estimated 354
commitments between those years. This new analysis of the commitments and
the juveniles committed is based upon documents for 278,2 about 72 percent of
the estimated 385 total commitments between March, 1865, and January, 1886.
As shown in Table 1, this includes about 87 percent of the commitments for the
time periods 1865-69 (87%), 1870-74 (85%) and 1882-86 (90%), which will be
treated as the three periods for purposes of comparing time periods. Letters for
only twelve juveniles have been found for the calendar years 1875-1881, which
is probably only about 13 percent of the commitments for that period, and these
years will be omitted from the time series analyses presented in this paper.
These commitments will be examined regarding (1) the committing
courts, (2) the complaining agents, (3) the types of offenses or grounds for
commitment, (4) the terms (duration) of commitment, (5) the age, (6) sex and
(7) ethnicity of the juveniles committed, and (8) any changes of these variables
over time. However, first will be presented a brief history of the establishment
of the Industrial and Reformatory School, followed by a presentation of the
statutorily authorized grounds for commitment to the Reformatory.
TlHlE ESTABLISlHlMENT OF TlHlE REFOJRMATOJRY
In 1864, Kamehameha V (Lydecker, 1918: 102) informed his Legislature
that "A Reformatory Industrial School for young persons who are not subject to,
or who disregard, parental authority, is very much needed, and a plan for the
establishment of such an institution will be submitted to you. "
Table 1 A Comparison of the Numbers of Admissions Reported by the
Board of Education and the Numbers of Letters of Commitment
by Bienniums and Calendar Years, 1864-1886
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'The "Biennium Years" begin on April 1 of the first year and end on March 31 of the last year.
"The Reformatory's population at the end of each biennium and the number of admissions during
each biennium were obtained from the biennial Reports to the Legislature by the President of
the Kingdom's Board of Education. .
'The cumulative frequencies are for each of the major time periods indicated by the honzontal
lines.
dThe commitment letters are from the Miscellaneous Letter File of the Board of Education at the
Hawaii State Archive, Honolulu.
eThe number of admissions for 1884-86 are not included in that Biennial Report. The number
for this period (31) is an educated guess.





BIENNIUM' & BD. OF EDUC. REPORTS
(CALENDAR) Pop.at Number Cum.
YEARS Endb Admitb Freq'
STATUTORY GROUNDS ]FOR. COMMKTMENT
Although the 1864 Act (Sec. 9) authorized the Board to establish "branch
schoo]s" on the other islands "when said institution proves to be self-supporting,
and a surplus of funds accruing from the labor of the children, is on hand," and
the 1870 Act (Sec. 3) authorized additional schools "in any part of the Kingdom,
when the same shall be deemed necessary, and when funds shall be available by
Legislative appropriation," no additional schools were established.
The 1864 enabling act stated that the sole purpose of the Reformatory
was "the detention, management, reformation, education, and maintenance of
such children as shall be committed or surrendered thereto," and the 1870 Act
added the words, "as Orphans, Vagrants, Truants, living an idle or dissolute life,
who shall be convicted of any crime or misdemeanor, who shall be surrendered
to the Board of Education as guardians thereof, for the term of their minority or
who shall be received at such Schools as hereinafter provided" (Laws, 1870:60).
In the latter instance, the child was surrendered for the term of his or her
minority (1864 Act, Sec. 7; 1870 Act, Sec. 7). The 1870 Act (Sec. 8) also
authorized the Board "in its discretion" to receive "the children under fifteen
years of age, of parents, guardians or adoptive parents, who desire the same,"
and to charge fees for such children when such was "proper."
The judicial route contained several distinctions. First, although the
Penal Code of 1850 (Ch. IV, Sec. 2) declared that between the ages of seven
and fourteen years "competency to commit any alleged offense" was to be
"determined by the evidence of the case, without any general presumption for
Thus there were two routes to the Reformatory, one judicial and one
parental. That is, a child could be committed by a Police or District Judge or
could be "surrendered" by the parents or guardian.
The Legislature responded by passing" An Act Authorizing the Board of
Education to Establish an Industrial and Reformatory School, for the Care and
Education of Helpless and Neglected Children, as [sic] also for the Reformation
of Juvenile Offenders," and it was approved by the King and took effect on
December 30, 1864 (Laws, 1864-1865: 32-35). This statute was repealed and
replaced by an Act of July 21, 1870, which was effective September 21, 1870
(Laws, 1870:59-63). While this 1870 Act made a number of changes in the law,
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"determined by the evidence of the case, without any general presu~pti.on for
or against the same," the 1864 Act (Sec. 4) provided: "if, up~n ~ny tnal, It shall
appear to [the Police or District Judges] tha.t theyerson on tnal IS under the age
of thirteen years, and had done an act, which, If done by a person of full age,
would warrant a conviction of the crime or misdemeanor charged, then they
shall have power to commit such child to the ... School." Thus in the c~ses .of
children between the ages of seven and twelve, the Judge did not have to mqUIre
into their competency if he exercised his discretion to comm.it. them t? the
Reformatory without a formal criminal conviction, and this provIsion applIed to
both misdemeanor and felony charges. However, this provision was completely
repealed in the 1870 Act (Sec. 1).
Second in the cases of "all offenders under fifteen years of age" who
were "duly con~icted" of an offense within the jurisdiction of a Police or Di~trict
Court (that is, misdemeanors, including vagrancy), the judges could comr~l1t the
offender to the Industrial School "in all cases where they deem such commItment
to be more suitable than the punishment now authorized by law" (1864 Act, Sec.
4; 1870 Act, Sec. 5, with minor language changes).
These cases could include the offense of "continued, willful and obstinate
disobedience" by a child over ten years of age. Under the Civil C:0de of 1859
(Sec. 757)3 such a child, upon the complaint of the ~are~t or guardIan, could b~
sentenced by a Police or District Judge to ten days Impnsonment at hard labor,
but beginning in 1865 such a child between the ages of eleven and fourteen could
be given an alternative commitment to the Reformatory.
Third the Police and District Judges could "sentence" to the School "any
child under fifteen years of age, who lives an idle or dissolute life, whose
parents are dead, or, if living, from drukenness [sic], ~r other vices or caus~s,
neglect to provide any suitable employment, or exerCIse any ~alutary conti 01
over such child." Application for such a "sentence" or commitment could be
made by "any member of the Board of Education, or their. agents, the Attorn~y
General or his Deputy duly authorized, the Marshall, Shenff, or Deputy Shenff
on any Island, or of any three subjects of this Kingdom" (1~64 Act, Sec. 4).
The 1870 Act (Sec. 6) eliminated the three subjects of the Kmgdom as lawful
applicants.
A short time later the Legislature passed "An Act To Repeal Chapter 10
of the Civil Code And To Regulate The Bureau Of Public Instruction" (Laws,
1864-5:43). It 'continued mandatory school attendance of chi~dren (first
legislated in 1840), but it lowered the upper age by one year. SectIOns 20 and
21 made attendance at "some lawful school, public or private," mandatory for
all children "from their sixth to their fifteenth years." The teacher, school agent
or Inspector General was to file a complaint with the Police or District Judge
whenever a child "shall persist in absenting himself from school," and the child
and the "father or mother, or guardian or adoptive parent" were to be summoned
before the JUdge. If it was proved that the child's truancy was because the adult
"has not used proper diligence to enforce the child's regular attendance at
school," the adult was to be fined up to five dollars, and in default of payment
to be "subjected to imprisonment at hard labor for a term not to exceed fourteen
days." If the truancy were found to be the fault of the child, the statute directed
that "~e Police or District Justice shall send him to a Reformatory and
IndustrIal School, for a term not less than one month, or more than six months,
or otherwise sentence him to a fine not exceeding two dollars, or imprisonment
at hard labor for a term not exceeding ten days." This act was approved on
January 10, 1865, and took effect on March 10, 1865, but on July 6, 1866, it
was amended to change the term of commitment to the Industrial school from
one to six months to "a term not less than six months nor more than two years"
(La,,:s, 1866:7-8). Thus, if the behaviors of the child included truancy or
persistent absence from school the age of eligibility for commitment extended to
those fifteen.
ANALYSES AND lFINDINGS
The General Commitment Rate
. . It is important to consider our findings with the general demographic
situatIOn of this time period in mind. According to the official censuses of these
years, the total population of the Kingdom was 62,959 in 1866 and 80,578 in
1884, and there were 8,721 males and 7,957 females "under the age of fifteen"
in 1866 and 11,704 males and 10,819 females "fifteen and under" in 1884. At
the same time, given our estimate of a total of 385 commitments between 1865
and 1885, the~e was an average of only about 25 commitments per year, which
would approximate a rate of about six per thousand youngsters between the ages
of six and fifteen years of age.
The Committing Court
As indicated, the committing courts were to be the Police and District
Courts of the islands of the Kingdom, and fully 74 percent of the commitments
were from such courts on Oahu, even though judging by the censuses from 1866
to 1884 Oahu contained only about 31 percent of the juvenile population of the
Kingdom. Hawaii with about 33 percent of the juveniles contributed 12 percent
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of the total commitments; Maui with 26 percent contributed 8 percent; and Kauai
with 10 percent contributed 6 percent.
Table 2 Frequency and Percentage Distributions of the Grounds For the
278 Commitments: 1865-:1886
Moreover, 99.5 percent of the Oahu commitments were from the
Honolulu Police Court. There are several possible explanations for the
disproportionality of the commitments: (a) neighbor island judges may have been
very hesitant to send children so far from their homes; (b) the systems of formal
supervision may have been greater in Honolulu, thus increasing the likelihood
of the children's delinquencies bringing them into court; and (c)
"adventuresome" neighbor island children may have been drawn to the
excitement or opportunities of the major port city where they were subsequently
picked up as "street children." At the same time it must be kept in mind that the
Honolulu Police Court had an islandwide jurisdiction and the commitment letters
do not indicate the parental place of residence. Thus, the Honolulu
commitments cannot be classified on the basis of the parents' places of
residence by the districts of Oahu or even between Oahu and the Neighbor
Islands.
Whatever the causes, this dominance of the Honolulu Police Court
appears to have persisted throughout the time period, with 72 percent in
1865-69, 78 percent in 1870-74 (when Maui fell to 4%), and 70 percent in
1882-86 (when Hawaii rose to 20% and Kauai fell to less than 2 %).
Grounds for Commitment
One or more grounds for commitment were specified for 276 of the 278
juveniles. These are provided in Table 2, where they have been grouped in the
four general categories which will be used hereafter. The first three categories -
- Larceny, Public Disorder, and Vagrancy -- represent conduct proscribed by the
Penal Code and thus could have brought the juveniles before a court had they
been adults. The fourth category, Truancy, represents the Status Offenses of
that period. "Disobedience," which was also a status offense, did not appear as
the sole ground for commitment in any of these cases.
In Table 2 we see that 39.6 percent of the commitments contained the
single ground of a "larceny." When we combine these larceny cases with the
small numbers of "burglary" and "larceny plus" cases (only three of which were
truancy), the Larceny Category reaches 43.5 percent.
Another 31.6 percent of the commitments contained the sole ground of
"truancy," and when these cases are combined with "truancy plus disobedience"
the pure status offense category of Truancy reaches 33.8 percent. The Larceny
and Truancy categories combined total 77.3 percent of the cases.
GROUND f Percent
LARCENY
121 43.5Burglary 4 1.4Larceny
110 39.6Larceny + Vagrancy 4 1.4Larceny + Truancy 3 1.1




49 17.6Idle & Dissolute,
Vagrant, + Disobedient. 20 7.21& D + Truancy. 29 10.4
TRUANCY






" "':~ile. another 10.4 percent of the commitments included the ground of
"truancy, "thls}ruancy a~pears to be presented as one element in the juveniles
v.agranc~ or Idle and dIssolute" lifestyle, and this latter charge has been given
pnmacy m the ~lacement of these cases in the major categories. This Vagrancy
Category contame~ ~7.6 percent of the cases, leaving only a small 4.3 percent
for the offenses wlthm the category of Public Disorder.
Changes in the Grounds Through Time
Util.izi.ng t~ese four primary offense categories, one finds considerable
yearly. vanatlOn m the numbers of commitments and the grounds for
commItment. As shown i? Figure 1, within the three major time periods, the
annual number of commItments varied from 7 to 22 (1865-69), 14 to 37
(1870-74), and 10 to 22 (1882-1886). Similar changes were found in the
grounds for commitment. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, Larceny was the ground
,;;--"
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in 59 percent of the commitments in 1866, but this fell to 37 percent in 1867 and
20 percent in 1868, after which it rose each succeeding year until it hit 87
percent in 1874. Similar year-to-year volatility can be seen for the ground of
Truancy.
However, as shown in Figure 2, there is less change when the grounds
are compared for the three grouped time periods. Larceny is clearly the modal
ground in the first two periods, but it falls to second place in 1882-85. Truancy
is tied with Vagrancy for second place in the first time period, but it then
increases until it is the modal ground in 1882-85. On the other hand, Vagrancy
shows a steady decline, falling to the bottom in 1882-85. Public Disorder
offenses hardly exist as a ground until the last period, when they account for 11
percent of the commitments.
One must be hesitant, however, to assume that these changes in grounds
were a measure of changes in the behaviors of the juveniles or a heightened
sensitivity of the officials to truancy per se. For the three time periods the
combined totals for Vagrancy and Truancy were 57.5 percent, 47.5 percent and
53.1 percent. It is possible that the steady decline of Vagrancy and the steady
rise of Truancy as the stated ground for commitment represented a change in the
"administrative style" of the committing judges, wherein the relatively easy
Committing COllrt and Grounds for Commitment
We may ask whether or not the r d t .
which made 74 percent of the . g oun s or commItment of Oahu courts
commItments varied fro th '
by the Neighbor Island courts? A .' m e grounds employed
the combined Neighbor Islands cou:panson of the Oahu commitments with
PI
. commitments produced ver "1
acmg the Oahu percentage first th y sImI ar patterns.
Larceny 43.4/43.8' Public D' ' d e ~ercentages of grounds were as follows:
34.2/32.9. Howe~er. there ~~~roenr ·t4(k6.. 8; Vagrancy 18.5/15.1; Truancy
1 I d
., e s n mg variation amo th N' h
s an courts; fully 50 percent of th' ng e elg bor
Vagrancy category, compared to only ~ commltfments fro~. Kauai were in the
Maui. percent rom Hawall and 5 percent from
The Terms of Commitment
As the review of the statutes indicated, a variety of parties might be the
complainant or the petitioner in these juvenile cases, and one would expect the
relationships of these parties to the juvenile to vary depending upon the grounds
for commitment. As shown in Table 3, these persons were identified by name
and/or relationship in 127 (46%) of the cases, and 60 percent of these were an
identifiable police officer, 27 percent a parent or relative, and 13 percent a
teacher or other school official.
The letters could speci fy one of two kinds of term of commitment, either
for the period of a youngster's minority or for a specific number of months, and
the term was specified in 274 (98.6%) of the commitments. Of this total, 49.6
percent were minority commitments, 2.9 percent were one to three months, 11.7
percent for six months, 8.0 percent for one year and 22.6 percent were for two
years. This left a small 5.2 percent with various straight sentences in years
ranging from three to seven and one-half years.
When these categories are related to the grounds for commitment in these
127 cases, the pattern is as one would expect under the statutory scheme. Thus,
an identifiable police officer was the complainant in 98 percent of the Larceny
commitments and in 83 percent of the Public Disorder cases, but in only 30
percent of the Vagrancy and Truancy cases. A parent or relative was the
petitioner in 2 percent of the Larceny, 17 percent of the Public Disorder, 38
percent of the Truancy, and 61 percent of the Vagrancy commitments. Finally,
a teacher or other school official was the petitioner in 9 percent of the Vagrancy
and 32 percent of the Truancy commitments.
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Table 3 ]Frequencies of Commitment Tenus
Commitment and TYlPe of Petitioner
!by Grounds for
TERM & PUBLIC
PETITIONER LARCENY DISORDER VAGRANCY
ONE TO THREE MONTHS TRUANCY TOTAL
Unspecified 4 0 2Police 1 70 0 0Relative 0
0 0
0 0 0Teacher 0 0
0
Subtotal 1 0 I4 0 3
S][X MONTHS 1 8
Unspecified 17 0 2 8Police 271 0 0 0Relative 0 10 0 0Teacher 0 00 0 4Subtotal 18 4
ONE YEAlR
0 2 12 32
Unspecified 6 0 5Police 4 151 2 0Relative 1
0 3




Unspecified 4 0 4Police 22 303 1 2 3Relative 0 90 7 9Teacher 160 0 0Subtotal 7
6 6
1 13 40 61TImEE YEAlRS TO SEVEN AND ONE HALF YEARS
Unspecified 3 1 0
5 9Police 2 0
Relative 0 0 ~ 0 3
Teacher 0 0 1 1 1
Subtotal 5 1 0 1
IVJI]NOlRITY 2 6 14
Unspecified 34 5 12Police 7 5843 2 4 11Relative 0 1
60
6 7 14Teacher 0 0 0 4Subtotal 77 48 22 29TOTAL 119 13612 48 94Unspecified 68 2736 25 47Police 50 5
146
7 14Relative 1 761 14 18Teacher 0 340 2 15 17
SOClIAL PROCESS lIN HAWAn
As shown in Table 3, the terms of commitment varied considerably by
offense. Of those charged with Larceny, 65 percent received minority
commitments and 28 percent were sentenced to either six months, one year or
two-year terms, and the same pattern was found for Public Disorder cases. On
the other hand, minority commitments were found in only 31 percent of the
Truancy commitments, with 43 percent being for two years and 20 percent being
one year. Vagrancy cases fell in between, with 46 percent receiving minority
commitments and most of the rest divided between one year and two year terms.
The one and two year terms in these Vagrancy cases were quite frequent when
the commitment letter included the additional ground of truancy.
The Complainant and the Grounds
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Those cases where "truancy" was stated as the sole ground for
commitment but in which the commitment is for something other than "a term
not less than six months nor more than two years" constitute a special problem.
As shown above, the truancy statute was quite specific after 1866 in providing
this sentence for truancy, and the statute did not mention any other alternative
such as a commitment for the period of a juvenile's minority or for a specific
period in excess of two years. The data in Table 3 show clearly that such a
strict reading of the authority of the judges would mean that at least 37 percent
of the juveniles committed for the sole ground of truancy were given an unlawful
term of commitment.
Several possible explanations of this inconsistency were examined. The
first possibility was that these 35 children were orphans. However, only five of
the 278 commitments specified that the juvenile was an orphan and, although all
of these orphans were committed for the period of their minority, only one of
them was a Truancy commitment, the other four being for an "idle and dissolute
life. " A second possibility was that they were committed at the request of a
parent or guardian, and such a person is identified in 8 or 23 percent of these
29 cases, but a relative was also identified in 17 percent of the Truancy
commitments with terms of two years or less.
Finally we may note on the basis of the available evidence that in
Truancy cases the likelihood of a minority commitment increased considerably
when a specific police officer was identified in the commitment letter. In these
instances the minority commitment rate shot up to 79 percent, in contrast to 22
percent when there is no identifiable officer. This finding suggests that
something more than truancy plus being an orphan or truancy plus a parental
request was involved in at least some of those cases in which a youngster was
given a minority commitment on the sole ground of truancy.
However, it should be noted that the term of commitments were not a
measure of the actual duration of the commitments and this information is not
known except for isolated cases. Two examples of minority commitments being
released early are recorded in these letters: 1) Kalike who was committed in
1865 was released by the judge in 1866, and 2) Thomas who was committed in
1866 was released in 1867. Section 6 (Laws, 1864-1865: 32-35) cited the
judges' power to discharge a juvenile for the following reasons: 1)
apprenticeship, 2) adoption, and 3) application by parent or guardian.4
The Ages of the .Juvenile Committees
Reasonably precise ages were given in 199 (72 %) of the commitments.
Most of the other commitments included an age reference, such as "under
fifteen" or" d t "b. un er en, ut these ambiguous cases were excluded from this
analysI~. The 199 ~ases. were grouped into four age categories which
approXImate fou~ quartIles: SIX to nine (24.6%), ten (21.6%), eleven and twelve
(26.1 %), and t~Irteen to fifteen (27.6%). These age brackets broken down b
offens~ categones, the percentage within each age-offense cell given minorit~
commItments,. and the mean, median and modal ages for each offense category
are presented III Table 4.
Table 4 Percentage Distributions of Ages by Grounds for Commitment
and o~ Grounds by Ages, and Percent givel1l Minority




TERM Larceny Disorder Vagrancy Truancy Total
6-9 Yrs. 19.54 0.00 22.58 34.29(34.69) ( 0.00) 24.62(14.28) (48.00) (100.00)Minority 82.35 0.00 71.43 50.00 62.27
10 Yrs. 20.69 25.00 29.03
(41.86)
18.57 21.61( 4.65) (20.93) (30.23) (100.00)Minority 83.33 50.00 44.44 30.77 55.81
11-12 Yrs. 26.44 37.50 16.13 28.57
(44.23) 26.13( 5.77) ( 9.62) (38.46) (100.00)Minority 69.56 67.67 60.00 25.00 50.00
13-15 Yrs. 33.33 37.50 32.26 18.57 27.64(52.73) ( 5.45) (18.18) (23.64) (100.00)Minority 68.96 67.67 50.00 61.54 63.64
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00(43.72) ( 4.02) (15.58) (35.18) (100.00)Minority 74.71 62.50 54.84 41.43 58.83
AGES
Mean 11.30 12.25 10.87
Median 11.95
10.55 10.9812.50 11.00
Mode 10.88 10.3810.00 14.00 10.00
NUMBER 87.00 10.00 10.008.00 31.00 70.00 199.00
. The range of ages was six years to fifteen years, but there were only two
SIX year olds and two fifteen year olds, so 98 percent of the children were
- - -- -- - -- -- - -
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between seven and fourteen years of age. The modal age was ten years for all
offense categories except Public Disorder, where it was fourteen, but there was
a clear pattern for the juveniles committed for either Larceny, Public Disorder
or Vagrancy offenses to be older than those committed for Truancy. Thus one-
third or more of the Larceny, Public Disorder and Vagrancy commitments
involved juveniles thirteen to fifteen, while one-third of the Truancy
commitments were children six to nine years old.
Fifty-nine percent of these 199 youngsters were given minority
commitments. In general Larceny commitments were most likely and Truancy
commitments least likely to receive a minority commitment regardless of age.
Thus, three quarters of the children committed for larceny were given minority
commitments, with this sentence being given to over 80 percent of those between
six and ten and about 70 percent of those between eleven and fifteen. Similarly
71 percent of the youngest Vagrancy commitments involved minority
commitments in contrast to only 50 percent of the other Vagrancy cases, and two
thirds of the juveniles eleven years old and older committed for Public Disorder
received minority commitments. The minority commitments for Truancy had a
peculiar age pattern, with the highest percentages of minority commitments in
the youngest and the oldest age brackets. It was suspected that this peculiar
pattern within the Truancy cases might have been due to the older truants also
having the additional ground of "Disobedience," but an examination of the
individual cases found this not to be the case.
'fhe Ethnic Names of the Juveniles
The commitment letters do not specify the ethnicity of the juveniles.
Therefore, each individual was assigned an ethnicity only on the basis of his or
her name, noting at the outset that 224 (81 %) of the names consisted of a single
word, such as "Keoni" or "Thomas." This procedure could not distinguish part-
Hawaiians who conceivably could be in any of the name groupings. Four ethnic
name categories emerged, which were distributed as follows: Hawaiian 89.9
percent, Haole 8.3 percent, Chinese 1.4 percent, and Portuguese 0.4 percent.
The first Chinese name case appeared in 1872 and the only Portuguese case was
in 1885 (seven years after the beginning of the Portuguese immigration). This
should not be interpreted to mean that Portuguese youngsters had a low level
truancy. According to the Board of Education Report of 1886, nonattendance
of Portuguese children was seen as a serious problem, but the cause was the
resistance of the parents to send their children to school and not the fault of the
children.
The percentages in the Hawaiian and Haole categories were quite stable
in the three comparative time periods and only the Hawaiian (250) and Haole
(23) name groupings were of a sufficient size to ' .
two groups were rather similar r' attempt any compansons. The
note that the H" egardmg the grounds for commitment with a
awanan category was sl' htl .' '
Larceny (44% to 32%) slightl I I'k If Y more IIk~ly to be committed for




y to be commItted for Public Disorder
° 0 10 an the Haole category W'h'
to the.terms of commitment, 64 percent of the Haole .' . It res?ect
I11monty commitments in contrast to onl 48 name gIOl~pmg received
exp lanation for this last may be found i~ th/!a~~~nt~of the Hawanan. ~ partial
a lower median age (10 5 to 11 4 d at the Haole groupmg had
police officer identified' in the ~ol~~:~e~~ I;t~~. 730;'~ l~ke~6~tave a specific
other school officials appeared as named petitioners onOly ~n H:w'aii~~~:s:rs~ or
The Sex Compositiol1l of the Juveniles
One may have become curious h tI d' .
regularly included analyses on the basiswol 1e ISC.us.slOns to this point have not
letters included only eleven girls th t' sexi ThiS IS because the commitmentsmall number is not a result of a d' a IS, .on y four percent of the total. This
for the females, for the Board of ~rop~rtl?nateloss of the commitment letters
stated that u to that tin . u~atlOn s report to the Legislature in 1884
School. Sin~e the last CO~1:~:~en~~1~ ~Ir!s ~adt: been ~ommitted to the lndustrial




a. em~le IS dated January, 1882, the
b I· e eelS ale two more th h Be [eved had been committed durin th t' . . an t e oard
g e rme penod of thiS study.
The girls were not separated out of th . .
characteristics of the girls are generall . ~ ~;ecedmg analyses because the
boys. Thus 64 . ~ qUIte SimI ar to the characteristics of the
, percent wei e committed b th H I I .
r;r:'~~~~~~~ ~~:~~~tt;~r~~~tL:~~~1Y, 9 perce~t fo:' .PUob~~C l~:s:r~d~~~ 2;0~~'~~e~~
period of their minority While th ~uancy. .Two-thlrds were committed for the
their minority terms ap~ear high' elr comn:ltmen~s for Truancy appear low and
lose almost all their significanc~1 ~~:~:~rs~~ With the boys, these diff~rences
occurred prior to 1873 h th . . percent of these commitments
w en e ploportlOn of pe .
was lower than in 1882-1886 and th. rs.ons committed for Truancy
likely to receive a minority commit~~~~ ~~~~ ~~mmltted for Larceny were more
ose sentenced for Truancy.
Still a note should be made of thre d·ft: '.
clearly less likely to be committed than :0 I er~.nces for the gIrls:. girls were
committed after 1873 and, . ys, gnls were very unlIkely to be
evidence is scant, bu~ althov:~K ~eU~o~~I~r~~:a:~~S:e:~hnot comm~tted. The
ages were given is ten years, the same as th . e seven girls whose
a stated age below ten although 26 e boys, there are no cases found with
ten. ' percent of the boys were below the age of
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It should be stressed that there can be no straightforward comparison of
the data presented above with the composition of the current population of the
Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility (HYCF) because of the very substantial
differences in the statutory grounds for commitment in 1865-1886 and 1991
(Isaac and Griffin, 1989).
The Industrial and Reformatory School opened in 1865, and the statutes
provided for the commitment of children (1) who had committed offenses which
would be crimes if committed by an adult, 5 (2) who were improperly supervised
or vagrant and "living an idle and dissolute life," (3) who were regularly truant
from school where the fault did not lie with the responsible adult, and (4) who
were "surrendered" to the school by their parent or guardian.
Throughout the period under study a vast disproportion of the
commitments were ordered by the Honolulu Police Court. The ground for most
of the commitments was either larceny or truancy, but there was an apparent
shift over time from a predominance of larceny to a predominance of truancy,
and the evidence suggests that this may have reflected an administrative practice
based upon the fact that it was quite easy for the police to establish the fact of
truancy even though the case might also have involved elements of "an idle and
dissolute life" or suspected criminality. Youngsters committed for a criminal
offense were far more likely to be committed for the period of their minority
than those committed for truancy, with the vagrants falling in between.
However, over a third of the truancy commitments exceeded the statutory
maximum of two years, and the only explanation we can offer is the
administrative innovation referred to above. The ages of the youngsters ranged
from six to fifteen, with a median and mode of about ten years. About ninety
percent of the youngsters had singular or Hawaiian names and another eight
percent had Haole names. Finally, only four percent of the commitments were
of girls, only one girl was committed after 1873, and no case was found of a girl
under the age of ten. However, the profile of offenses or grounds for
commitment of the girls was very similar to that of the boys for the early
periods.
It is our hope that at some future time additional commitment letters will
be located in the Hawaii State Archives so that further documentation of the
commitment process can be made for the periods 1875-1881 and 1886-1893.
1. We would like to thauk Herbert Ara' (A h" H ..






e Archives) for locating the
. re are etters for 278 juveniles.
2. Thirty~eight of the letters were translated from Hawal'I'all
(H T to English by Jason Achiuawanan ranslator, Hawaii State Archives).
3. In Kuniyoshi (1989: 51), it is incorrectly cited as tile Penal Code of 1850.
4. In another set of unindexed files which were titled "L tt "h
requested boys to be apprenticed for plantation work. e ers, t ere were letters which
cov~r:~~:~~~s i;~~:~c:::nt~::l~~yCh:rge Pfr~~ess occurred right after the end of the period
- our 0 lUe teenagers were discha d t
members and the band of the H .. I rge 0 serve as crew
awan nava vessel H M S Kaimiloa h K' K
Prime Minister Walter Murra Gibso . . " . w en mg alakaua and
(Bailey 1980' 208' Adl Yd K nwere seekmg to establish a confederation with Samoa
, . , er an amms, 1986· 180-182) Th' .
reflected in the resident popUlation figures for March 1888' and 118s9dOevelohPment 1s
T
clearly
, , as sown mabie 1.
5. During this time period, there was no "Juvenile Court" " '.
not automatically sent to the Refo . pel se and a Juvell1le offender was
documents several cases with J'uvenil:~abtory for a crlldlllnal offense. Kuniyoshi (1989)
R c • emg committe to the prison at h' d I b Ielormatory was a disposition alternative. . ar a or as t le
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9 GamblTIng, Lotteries and the
Law in 19th Century Hawaiill
PAUJL H. SHANER KU
Editor's Note: This article is the product of Mr. Shaner's
continued research on a topic which he researched for an
undergraduate term paper that received the Hormann Award in
1990.
If Socrates and Plato had trouble defining what morality
was, how can people come along, just like that, and lay down
that gambling is immoral?
--Meyer Lansky
KNTRODucnON
During the last decade several bills have been introduced in the
legislature of Hawaii to do what many other states have done and establish a
state lottery, but no state lottery bill has passed. Many charitable organizations
in Hawaii would like to run bingo games and raffles to raise money, but such
activities are illegal. Each year many residents of Hawaii travel to Las Vegas
to gamble in the casinos, but every effort to legalize casinos in Hawaii has been
rejected, and in 1990 the state legislature extended its prohibitions to include off-
shore gambling operations on cruise ships using Hawaii ports.
On the other hand, "social gambling" is legal in Hawaii and no one who
has resided in Hawaii for long would doubt that gambling in a variety of forms,
some quite commercial, is widespread.
In this article I examine the law and gambling, especially lotteries and
other commercial gaming, in nineteenth century Hawaii. I look at the practices
of the indigenous population, the impact of the missionary morality and the
continuing struggles as other immigrants brought new forms of and attitudes
toward gambling. Finally it is in this context that I examine the discriminatory
law enforcement policies, the problem of the corruption of the police, the role
of a proposed international lottery in the overthrow of the monarchy and the
consequent prohibition imposed by the United States Congress against any
Territorial legislature legalizing a lottery.
GAMJBUNG AND THE KNDIGENOUS HAWAUAN CUJLTURE
Although the Hawaiians had no written descriptions of their cultural
practices prior to the arrival of foreigners, the weight of the evidence indicates
that the Hawaiians had a deep fascination in engaging in highly competitive
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contests and games and that gambling (piliwaiwai) was an integral part of these
activities. This "gambling culture" served the purposes of both recreation and
social solidarity. It was socially accepted, even expected by ali'i and
maka 'ainana, that one would wager on specific games or events and one could
gain status by being recognized as an expert in the art. Thus, Kaneakama,
identified as "a great gambler," was a central figure in the oral tradition of the
origins of Kalaipahoa, the great poison god (Ellis, 1963:53). According to Malo
(1951 :219-233) the games and contests associated with gambling included
running races (kukini), rolling of stones (maika), surf riding (he'enalu) and
sledding (holua). He described the process when bets were taken at a running
race
Those who thought one man was the faster runner of the
two bet their property on him, and those who thought the other
was faster, bet their property on him. When people had made
their bets, the experts came to judge by physical examination
which of the two runners was likely to win, after which they
made their bets. One man, after staking all his property, pledged
his wife and his own body (pili hihia), another man bet property
he had borrowed from another (pili kaua). When all the pledges
had been deposited (kieke, literally bagged), the betting was at an
end. (Malo, 1951:219)
GAMRUNG AND THE FJIJRST FORElIGNJERS
The foreigners who came to the islands beginning in 1778 brought new
games, especially card games, which were also associated with gambling. These
men, ship captains, seamen, traders and artisans in the service of Kamehameha
I, gambled both among themselves and with the natives. Corney (1896: 106),
who visited the islands in 1816, reported, "The natives are very great gamblers,"
and noted that the chiefs had also taken to the Western card games: "They are
fond of cards, and play whist, all-fours, and nosey, extremely well. They often
gamble away houses, lands, canoes, and even the clothes off their backs."
'f][JrE OVlERTHROW OF THE ][NDKGENOlJS lREUG][ON
In 1819 as part of the process by which Liholiho succeeded Kamehameha
I as ali'i nui and one of Kamehameha's queens, Ka'ahumanu, became kuhina nui
(co-authority with the king), there took place the well known "abolition of the
kapu," which constituted a major change in the political and religious
constitution of the kingdom (Davenport, 1969).
AMERJICAN PROTESTAN'fJISM AS TIHIE NJEW STATE lREUGJION
While the Hawaiians were in the initial process of adjusting to the vast
changes associated with the abolition of the kapu, the first company of American
missionaries arrived in 1820. These missionaries were Calvinist fundamentalist
and their austere beliefs immediately clashed with many of the native practices.
Their core tenets of the "spirit of labor" and the immorality of idleness, and
even most play, came into direct conflict with the gaming and gambling morality
of the Hawaiians. The missionaries looked upon gambling as sinful in its intent
of seeking wealth without productive labor and immoral in its consequences.
It is clear that the mere arrival of the missionaries had no effect upon the
enjoyment of gambling of the Hawaiians, especially the chiefs. The layman
printer of the mission described one game (Noah or Poohenehene):
....A description of this play in which the king, and chiefs spend
much time, may not be uninteresting. Five bunches of tappa
folded up are laid close to each other on the ground. One man
then takes a stone, and passing his hand under each of the
tappas, leaves it under one of them. Another man then strikes on
top of the bunches, and if he avoids the one which has the stone
under it, he wins. Eight or ten men divided into two parties are
usually engaged at one game, at which they generally bet some
thing. (Loomis, April 6, 1821)
On more than one occasion the engagement of an important ~hief in a
gambling game interfered with the efforts of the missionaries to bring them to
religious services or to begin their reading lessons. In January, 1822, Hiram
Bingham invited several of the chiefs to attend Sunday service, most of whom
declined. According to Bingham, the Prime Minister (Kalaimoku),
....Kalanimoku, engaged in gambling, offered an
excuse unrivalled as to its frankness, ingenuity, and
courteousness, from a heathen or a gambler, saying, "I
have business and cannot go -- my heart will be with
you, though my body is here." (Bingham, 1847:157)
The conversion process of the chiefs by the missionaries was facilitated greatly
by the arrival of several English and Tahitian missionaries in the spring of 1822.
The ability of the Tahitians to read and write in Tahitian had a considerable
impact upon the Hawaiian chiefs. In April, 1822, two of the English
missionaries visited the house of one of the queens, where the Tahitians were
staying.
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....we found three woman and a man playing at cards
(whist), for money, with all the cool, keen interest, and stern
self-possession, of inveterate gamblers. One of the persons
sitting by said that these games often ended in quarrels, when not
hands only, but clubs, were furiously employed. He confessed
that it was a bad custom, but that they knew no better, not
having received "the good word," as the Tahitians had. One of
the queens coming in threw herself upon the floor, yet with an
air of no unconscious superiority, and professed a desire to learn
the things which had been taught to the South Sea islanders,
observing, that if the king would give his consent they should all
be willing to be taught. (Tyerman and Bennet, 1832: 40-1)
The queen who was so eager to learn to read was probably Kamamalu, but the
same could not be said for the more powerful Ka'ahumanu, who found it
difficult to suspend her card playing to engage in serious reading lessons. It was
August, 1822, before the missionaries reported any success in this respect, but
thereafter in characteristic fashion she ordered all her attendants to learn to read
(Bingham, 1847: 164-5).
William Ellis, the English missionary who led the English and Tahitians
in Hawaii in 1822-23, had some sympathy for the games and sports of the
Polynesians but no tolerance for the gambling associated with them.
There are some few who play merely for pleasure; but the
greater part engage in it in hopes of gain.
Were their games followed solely as sources of amusement,
they would be comparatively harmless; but the demoralizing
influence of the various kinds of gambling existing among them
is very extensive....
We have seen females hazarding their beads, scissors, cloth-
beating mallets, and every piece of cloth they possessed, except
what they wore, on a throw of the uru or pahe.
In the same throng might be frequently seen the farmer with
his 0-0, and other implements of husbandry; the builder of
canoes, with his hatchets and adzes; and some poor man, with a
knife, and the mat on which he slept, -- all eager to stake every
article they possessed on the success of their favorite player; and
when they have lost all, we have known them frantic with rage,
tear their hair from their heads on the spot. (Ellis, 1963: 135-6)
However, Ellis was a man of hope. After noting that since the beginning of
Christian instruction the games were observed "much less followed than
formerly," he wrote:
...we hope the period is fast approaching, when they shall
only be the healthful exercises of children, and when the time
and strength devoted to purposes so useless, and often injurious,
shall be employed in cultivating their fertile soil, augmenting
their sources of individual and social happiness, and securing to
themselves the enjoyment of the comforts and privileges of
civilized and Christian life. (Ellis, 1963: 136)
Ellis' optimism was not entirely misplaced. In December, 1823,
Kalanimoku "commanded the observance of the Sabbath and ... forbid the people
to cook their food on the Sabbath or so much as kindle a fire" (Chamberlain,
Dec. 21, 1823). According to Marin, the proclamation prohibited "gaming,
going in canoes, & all kinds of work on the Sabbath" (Marin, Dec. 21, 1823).
However, no move toward a general prohibition of gambling (pili
waiwaz) would take place until the late 1820's. Liholiho had died in England
and been succeeded by the adolescent Kauikeaouli (Kamehameha III). The
dominant chiefs, led by Ka'ahumanu, had been converted by the missionaries
and the kingdom was now a theocratic state. It was the duty of the chiefs to use
their authority to enforce the dictates of the new god so far as this was possible
and prudent.
THE IF'J[JRST LAW lP'JROHHlBJ[TJrNG GAMlBUNG: :1.827
The first printed criminal code of the kingdom consisting of six sections
was enacted by the King and his Chiefs in Council on December 8, 1827 (He
alela na ke kanawai). Section VI read:
This is the sixth; we forbid gambling (pili waiwai); The one
who gambles shall be imprisoned in irons.
Shortly thereafter Ka'ahumanu reported to the missionaries that she was
appointing judges to enforce the laws.
JREAlP'lF'J[JRMATJrON OlP' THE PJROHUUTJrON: :1.829
The prohibition against gambling was reaffirmed by the King as part of
his decision in the famous Cow Case of 1829.
---------------------------------~./
186 SOCKAL PROCESS JIN HAWAU Shaner GAMlBUNG, LOTTlE]IUlES AND THlE LAW 187
This ... is my proclamation, which I make known to you, all
people from foreign countries: - The laws of my country prohibit
... amusements on the Sabbath day, gambling and betting on the
Sabbath day, and at all times. If any man shall transgress any of
these laws he is liable to the penalty; the same for every
foreigner, and for the people of these islands -- whoever shall
violate these laws shall be punished.
A lPEllUOD OF STJRIJGGLE ABOUT "THE LAWS": 1830-35
However, the proclamation of a rule does not mean that it will be
enforced and the years 1830 to 1835 were marked by a continuing struggle
between the king and his followers and a substantial block of the chiefs, led by
Kuakini and Kinau, the Kuhina Nui, over what the laws would be and how
vigorously they would be enforced. The situation changed regularly. In April,
1831, Kuakini assumed the governorship of Oahu, rebuked his predecessor for
not enforcing the laws, and announced that persons, including foreigners, who
operated gambling houses would have their property seized a~d their hou~es
burned (Chamberlain, April 1, 1831). In March, 1833, a cner for the kmg
proclaimed the abrogation of all the old laws except those with respect to murder
and theft; a member of the mission noted that although nothing specific was said
about the Sabbath, "it has been predicted that the meeting house will be
deserted" (Chamberlain, March 9, 1833). Shortly thereafter a major ahaolelo
(council of the chiefs) was held which began a slow process of reconciliat~on
among the chiefs. Things calmed a bit, but there is "more of sport, gamblmg
and intemperance still remaining than has existed for many years" (Chamberlain,
March 22, 1833). A kapu was placed on sports in the village of Honolulu,
though allowed elsewhere, but gambling was not prohibited; "groups of native~
are seen playing atpuu" (Chamberlain, April 4, 1833). In August, 1833, MaUl
Governor Hoapili visited the king and an agreement was reached for
consultations between the king and the chiefs concerning the laws (Chamberlain,
August 31, 1833), Shortly thereafter a crier went through Honolulu proclaiming
that "the laws are again in force" (Chamberlain, Sept. 2, 1833). Nevertheless,
the struggle to dominate the king continued and it was only on January 1, 1835,
that an ahaolelo committed the government of Oahu and the administration of
the laws (kanawai) to Kinau. In July, 1835, it was announced that the chiefs
were preparing to publish the new laws (Chamberlain, July 29, 1835).
GAMBUNG OMllTTlED FROM THlE NEW PlENAL CODlE: 1835
The new code of 1835 (Olelo No Ka Kanawai 0 Ko Hawaii Nei Pae
Aina Na Kauikeaouli Ke Alii) contained five sections and it did not include any
prohibition of gambling. This is consistent with the available statistical reports
of the Native Magistrates Courts in Honolulu for 1838 and 1839; there were no
convictions for gambling reported (Schmitt, 1966:328). The king and chiefs
had reached agreement upon an elaboration of the laws respecting homicide,
plotting the death of the king, theft, adultery, fornication, prostitution,
drunkenness (especially when it involved riotous behavior or property damage),
and "deception." It seems clear, however, that the chiefs had not been able to
reach any kind of agreement concerning gambling. It was not illegal.
However, if gambling in itself was not prohibited, the evidence suggests
that winning at gambling by cheating was. The section on "deception," which
included perjury and worshipping an idol, was aimed primarily at someone
gaining the property of another by deceptive or fraudulent means, which
included cheating at gambling. Thus there is a report of the following trial in
January, 1841:
... A Native took the Chinamen's Schooner, because they
owed him gambling money. It appeared on trial, that they had
rolled nine pins. The Native had one of his boys with a string
so contrived, when the Native rolled, as to haul all the pins
down. He had to give up all his winnings and pay ten dollars
fine. The boy who used the twine, ten dollars for lying.
(Reynolds, Jan. 1, 1841)
lPROHUnnON RIE][NSTllTUTlED KN 1841
However, between the publication of the laws of 1835 and the case of
deception just described, some important events had taken place in Hawaii. In
response in part to threats from outside powers, the king and his chiefs had
undertaken the study of "political economy" under the tutelage of Rev. William
Richards, had promulgated a constitution for the kingdom, and established a
legislature which added elected commoners to the council of chiefs. At the same
time the occupation of New Zealand by the British in 1840 had resulted in a
movement of many of the Pacific whalers from a wintering port there to
wintering at Lahaina and Honolulu, with its attendant impact upon the economy
and the numbers of foreigners in Hawaii.
From 1839 to 1842 the king and his chiefs and then his legislators were
busily enacting statutes to cover a wide range of social relations and behaviors.
They returned again to the question of gambling, and on May 11, 1841,
established a law which clearly reflected the views of their missionary teachers
and advisers.
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The preamble or enabling clause of this 1841 "Law Respecting
Gambling" (Kingdom, 1842: Ch. 29) gave the following reasons for the passage
of the act:
Whereas there are many people who neglect profitable
business, which would be of advantage to themselves, their
children and the country, and spend their time in employments
which waste their property and do injury to their children, it
therefore becomes the duty of the law to ward off these evils and
seek to promote the greatest good....
The body of the statute consisted of three sections. The first section prohibited
gambling and specified the fines, the second doubled the penalties for gambling
on the Sabbath and the third dealt with gambling by children under the age of
fourteen years.
1. If two persons gamble and one win of the other; if the sum
be actually paid down before the face, they shall each pay a fine
equal to the full amount of the wager. But if they merely make
mention of property as a mere symbol, then they shall each pay
a fine of five dollars. But if the property thus symbolically
mentioned be very small, then the fine may be diminished in
proportion to the value of the property spoken of.
2. If gambling be done on the Sabbath day then the fine shall be
double what is mentiohed in the first section.
3. If children below the age of fourteen years gamble, then the
punishment shall be committed to the parents, but if they do not
inflict any, then the law will be applicable.
JPROSEcunONS lIJNDER THE 1841 ACT
Clearly the mere passage of this act did not induce enthusiastic
compliance among the population, and this appears to have been so especially
among the foreign and Hawaiian elite. Thus only six months after its passage
there was a publicized race between the horses of China John and Stupplebean.
One observer reported, "John's won with ease. Many private side bets"
(Reynolds, Oct. 16, 1841).
However, the very limited information available shows that there was
some enforcement of the 1841 act. The translations of the minutebook of the
District Court of Honolulu for 1844 include six cases (between April 29 and
June ~8) .involving twenty persons (18 Hawaiians and 2 haole) in which
gambling IS part of the description of the case. One of these six is an assault
c~se wh~,ch arose w~en the haole loser in the bowling game refused to "buy the
pltche:s ~or the Winners. Of the sixteen persons specifically charged with
gamblmg In five cases, seven in two cases were given small fines and there is
no report of the outcome in the other three cases (Mookini, n.d.).
T~e.available statistical materials report that there were a total of thirty-
one convictIOns for gambling on Oahu in 1845, and that between April 1, 1846
a~d ~arch 31, .1847, there were thirty-seven gambling convictions by Native
DIstnct Judges In Honolulu, none by the Police Court of Honolulu, and a total
of fifty-seven in the entire kingdom (3.8% of all convictions) (Schmitt 1966:
329-331). '
lFEE SKMPLE OWNERSlFUJP OlF LAND: 1846-49
However, the most significant and consequential event, or series of
events, of the years 1846-1850 was the transformation of the legal system with
respect to the rights or interests in land. By the end of the decade the prior
s~stem had bee~ converted into one based upon the concept of alienable fee
sImple ownership. While the King and the former subordinate landlords were
now the holders of a majority of the land, "the government" had also become the
0.wner of about one-third, with the proviso that no alien could acquire land in fee
simple. Of course, this also created the possibility that a person's land was a
valuable which could be lost in gambling.
THE MASTER. AND SERVANT ACT AND THE RIE:MOVAL OlF THE
mSAlBliUTY OlF AUENS TO OWN LAND liN lFEE SliMJPLE: 1850
.. Closely connected to this transformation of the land system were two
additIonal statutes passed in 1850 as part of a program of economic
deve!o~ment. ?riven by the continuing decrease of the Native population, even
predIctIOns of ItS complete disappearance as a "pure race," the Master and
Servant Act established the basis for the importation of term contract laborers.
Anot~~r. a~t removed the prior disability of aliens to acquire land in fee simple,
thus InItlatmg a process for the sale of the government land to aliens. The initial
effort to import laborers was targeted upon laborers from China.
NEW GAMJaUNG JPROVliSliONS liN THE JPENAL CODE OlF 1850
The 1850 legislature also adopted a new penal code which had been
produced by William Lee, then the Chief Judge of the Honolulu Superior Court
of Law and Equity, who had also played a leading role in the other changes just
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discussed. For the most part this Penal Code of 1850 was a simplified version
of a proposed penal code for Massachusetts (Phillips & Walcott, 1844).
However, the proposed Massachusetts code did not contain any proh!bit,~on ~f
gambling, and it is not clear whether Lee created "Chapter XL: Gammg or If
he drew upon an existing statute elsewhere.
Section 1 provided a general definition of gaming: "Whoever by playing
at cards, or any other game, wins or loses any sum of money or thing of value
is guilty of gaming. "
Sections 2 to 4 established two degrees of gaming and provided the
penalties for each. Gaming in the first degree was ill:!Y. gaming on "the Lord's
day" or where the game involved winning or losing twenty-five d?llars or more
at one sitting or time (Sec. 2). The penalty was a fine up to ten tImes the value
of the money or thing won or lost or imprisonment at hard labor up to sixty days
(Sec. 3). All other gaming was in the second degree (sec. 2), with a penalty
of a fine up to five times the value of the wager or imprisonment at hard labor
up to thirty days (Sec. 4). These penalties were much greater than those of the
1841 act.
Section 5 provided that any losing player or side better "may sue for and
recover the money or value of the thing so lost and paid or delivered, from the
winner thereof," but Section 6 added that if the loser did not do so within three
months, "it shall be lawful for any constable or other officer or person to sue for
and recover, treble the value of such money or other thing, with full costs of
suit, the one half of which shall go to the person so prosecuting, and the other
half to the government, for the use of common schools. Section 8 provided that
any person could be compelled to give testimony in a suit brought under Section
5, "but the testimony of any such person shall not be used against him in any
suit or prosecution authorized by any of the [other] provisions" of the chapter.
Section 7 was an extraordinarily complicated section which clearly was
motivated in part by the conversion of land interest into the alienable fee simple
form. Its basic purpose was clearly summarized in the margin note of the 1869
edition of the penal code: "All notes, bills, conveyances of land, etc., tainted
with gaming are void. "
A CHllNESE ]!H.JSl' UNDER l'JHIE NEW CODE: 1850
The new code took effect in September, 1850, and within one month The
Polynesian (Oct. 5, 1850) announced the first major enforcement action to stop
this "pernicious vice," the arrest of some Chinese men gambling at a table game,
probably fan tan, pai kau or sup chai, which were popular Chinese table games
(Glick, 1980: 145).
GAMBLING.- Complaint having been made to the Sheriff
that certain Chinamen were engaged in gambling, on Sunday last,
he proceeded to the house and found them in the act, and took
possession of the deposits upon the table, amounting we hear, to
some $70 or $80. This, by the Penal Code, Chap. 40, is gaming
in the first degree, and we hope to see it promptly punished
accordingly. This is a vice of some pernicious a character, that
it should be punished with the utmost rigor of the law; and all
honest men will sustain the authorities in so punishing it. It is
folly to talk about a man's liberty being restrained. So is a
thief's and a murderer's, and who complains? The gambler is a
corrupter of public morals. He takes his neighbor's money
without an equivalent as much as a thief. He deprives a man of
the ability to support those dependent upon him, and of paying
his honest debts. Let the custom, then, never become
fashionable in Honolulu, or respectable, even; for it is
destructive of all confidence, and lends to irretrievable ruin, and
often toLsuicide. (Polynesian, Oct. 5, 1850)
However, if these gamblers were convicted in the Honolulu Police Court, they
were only fined and paid their fines immediately, for there is no entry for them
in the "Record of Prisoners at the Fort" (Kingdom, 1850-63: October).
HAW JUliAN JUDGES CONVHCl' HAWAHAN GAMBLERS: 1851-52
Moreover, the rhetoric of the editor in itself suggests that there was no
consensus in the community regarding how vigorously the gaming statute should
be enforced. The "Record of Prisoners," which appears at that time to serve as
a general record of persons fined and/or imprisoned, shows eight gambling
convictions in Honolulu in 1851 and eleven in 1852 (less than one percent of all
1852 convictions). Of these nineteen, four were convicted by Police Justices
Bowlin and Harris and received fines ranging from fifty cents to five dollars.
The remaining fifteen were convicted and sentenced by Justice Kaukai; four
received fines of fifty dollars and eleven were sentenced to imprisonment at hard
labor for one month. All nineteen of the persons convicted in Honolulu in
1851-52 were Hawaiian.
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THE ARRIVAJL OF CHINESE CONTRACT JLABORERS
In 1852 two hundred and ninety-three Chinese male contract laborers
from Amoy were added to the small Chinese community in Hawaii and through
1863 an additional 1,247 Chinese males, mostly contract laborers, along with
fifty-four women and five children, came from China. Many members of the
community were highly supportive of the initial arrivals (Lydon, 1975 :22).
However, by the mid-1850's the general tone in the community had
begun to shift. The Chinese were overwhelmingly single men and Hawaiian
men resented the additional competition for Hawaiian woman. Many of Chinese
immigrants came from districts near Macao and Hong Kong, where gambling,
prostitution, and opium trafficking and smoking were major enterprises (Glick,
1980:144). As contracts expired and more of the Chinese men concentrated in
Honolulu, their presence was seen as increasingly problematic by some of the
authorities. Thus in January, 1856, John P. Griswold, the Police Justice of
Honolulu, asserted:
....The position which the coolies hold among us -- half
freemen, half slaves; their language intelligible to few; and their
moral perversion unrestrained, save by fear of the penalty of
law, render them a class of citizens for whom it is difficult to
legislate. At home, ground under despotism, visited with cruel
and sanguinary punishment for slight offenses, and devoid of
culture and education, they possess a degree of cunning which it
is hard to penetrate. (Quoted in Rep. of Chief Justice, 1856: 13)
However, Griswold was primarily concerned with burglaries, especially
burglaries to acquire opium, by the Chinese. He made no specific mention of
gambling, even though in the same month he convicted ten Chinese men caught
in a gambling raid and sentenced them to a fine of $15.00 plus $1.30 costs
(Kingdom, "Record of Prisoners at the Fort, 1850-1863: Jan. 8, 1856).
Moreover, the English language press made no report of this case.
The anticipation of the expiration in February, 1860, of "the last of the
Coolie contracts" led Charles G. Hopkins, editor of The Polynesian (Dec. 3,
1859), to warn Honolulu of "a still further increase of liberated laborers from
the plantations on the other islands, to swell the crowd of Chinamen already
prowling about Honolulu without any apparent means of livelihood." This
editorial was accompanied by a story of a crackdown on a Chinese gambling
house.
Chinese Hells,
Or gambling-houses, have apparently become regular
institutions and fixed facts here in Honolulu. Now and then the
police succeeds in ferreting out and breaking up one or other of
these schools for the gallows; but generally the difficulty of
proving the gambling permits the escape of those implicated. On
Thursday evening, however, Deputy Sheriff Jourdan, having
received information of the whereabouts of one of these hells in
Maunakea street, above Hotel street, went there with a strong
(orce of constables and found some twenty-two or three
Celestials deeply engaged in various games of gambling. At the
unwelcome intrusion of Mr. Jourdan there ensued a rather
ludicrous scene of confusion, as two-and-twenty Chinamen, not
"all in a row," endeavored to escape through the doors, windows
and partitions, and, like frightened pigs, with their tails erect, ran
hither and thither, only to fall into the extended arms of the
dreaded police. After a smart scramble for several minutes
during which some of the Chinamen hurt themselves by breakin~
out through the windows, eleven of the gamblers were persuaded
to accept the invitation of Mr. Jourdan to spend the night at the
Station and explain themselves next morning before Judge Davis.
We rejoice in the capture of this villainous crew. For it is
these gambling places which are the nurseries of burglaries,
murders and arsons. But how to deal with a class of people, -
living amongst and upon, but not with us, and governed by their
own language, manners and morals, -- will rather exercise the
ingenuity of the next legislature.
Upon their trial at the Police Court, four Chinamen were
convicted and fined $49 and costs, or imprisonment at hard labor
until paid. The keeper of the house, another Chinaman, was
sentenced to $13 and costs. (Polynesian, Dec. 3, 1859)
The next week the paper explained that the keeper of the house had received a
lesser fine because it was his first offense and "his evidence was used as State's
evidence, without which the others could not have been convicted" (Polynesian,
Dec. 10, 1859).
CIVIJL CODE OF 1859
The same year the legislature adopted a Civil Code, many provisions of
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twenty"five dollars if any keeper of a hotel or victualing house" shall suffer any
person, in or about the same, to practice gaming with any dice, cards, bowls,
billiards, quoits, or other implements used in gaming," while Section 80
provided the sa-me penalty for any keeper of a billiard table or bowling alley who
"shall suffer the same to be used on Sunday, nor allow any gaming on such table
or alley."
Table :J. NumbeR' of Gambling Convictions, Percent of Aln Convictions
for Gambling, and Percent of Gambning Arrests Convicted in
Hawaii fOJr Two Year Periods, 1852-1899, and 1900
MINIMAL ENfORCEMENT: 1850'S & 1860'S
Despite this sporadic enforcement and the tendency of the press to
highlight the convictions of Chinese, it is clear from the data in Table 1 that the
enforcement of the gaming laws was not a high priority in the 1850's and
1860's. For the bienniums 1852-53 through 1868-69 the total number of
convictions in the entire Kingdom ranged from a low of 29 in 1854··55 to a high
of 75 in 1868-69. Moreover, as shown in Table 2, the distributions of these
small numbers among the different Judicial Circuits were highly variable from
biennium to biennium.
• Because the biennial reports were inconsistent in whether or not Master and Servant Act cases
were included among criminal offenses, they have been removed for any period in which they
were so included.
Source: Biennial Reports of the Chief Justice to the Legislature.
• First Circuit - Oahu; Second Circuit - Maui, Molokai and Lanai; Third Circuit - Hawaii;
Fourth Circuit - Kauai and Niihau.
Source: Biennial Reports of the Chief Justice to the Legislature.
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A SliNGlLE PENAlLTY: 1870
However, it appears that the 1870 Legislature did recognize one difficulty
with the 1850 "Gaming Act," in which gaming was in two degrees and the
maximum fine for the more serious degree was contingent upon the amount of
money won or lost. It now repealed sections 2, 3 and 4 of Chapter 39 of the
Penal Code and replaced them with the following: "Whoever is guilty, shall be
punished by fine, not exceeding One Hundred Dollars, and by imprisonment at
hard labor, not exceeding sixty days" (Kingdom, 1870:Ch. 5).
MOIRE ClHIKNESE lLABORERS
The collapse of the whaling industry in Hawaii in the late 1860' s and the
expansion into sugar plantations in the 1870's again established a pressing need
for additional imported labor and with considerable reluctance the government
and the planters again turned to the Chinese. The number of Chinese, mostly
single males, would jump from about 2,000 in the mid-1870's to about 18,000
in 1884, and most would spend their initial period working on plantations.
The initial build up of the Chinese was accompanied with increased
convictions for gambling, from 121 in 1872-73 to 564 in 1878-79 (See Table 1).
While there are no statistics by ethnicity for this period, the newspaper coverage
indicates that the primary target was the Chinese. For example,
GAMBLING. -- Thirty-nine Chinamen were arrested in one
haul this week for gambling at Buffum's Hall. They were fined
from $10 to $15 each, with two days hard labor, with the
exception of the "bankers," who were fined from $50 to $100
and ten days each hard labor. The owner of the house was fined
$200. (Advertiser, March 17, 1877)
CHINESE GAMBLERS. -- A party of Chinese in a
tenement on Nuuanu street commenced "a little game" on last
Sunday evening, which became so interesting that it was
continued until 2 o'clock in the morning, at which hour officer
Dodd knocked at the window and requested "less noise;" whereat
one of the players, probably conscience smitten, jerked away the
cloth on which were the implements of the game and the stakes,
while the rest of the gang made for the doors. Some got away,
but five were arrested and bailed at the station-house for $10
each, which was forfeited by their non-appearance in the Police
Court. (Advertiser, March 30, 1877)
A RAID ON GAMBLERS. -- The raid made upon a
Chinese gambling den on last Wednesday evening, and the
capture of a number of those engaged, reflect credit upon the
police force, and shows that they are awake to the live issues of
the day. The Celestials were present in force as usual, and a
further investigation in this particular direction would
undoubtedly meet with like success. (Advertiser, May 31, 1879)
GAMBLERS CAPTURED. -- A squad of police under the
direction of Captains Bartholemew and McKeague, made a raid
upon the Chinese Theatre, on Thursday evening, after the
performance, and succeeded in capturing thirty-five Celestials
who were engaged in gambling. A lot of opium was also
captured, but the owners are unknown. This is a move in the
right direction. (Advertiser, Feb. 21, 1880)
While all of these cases occurred in Honolulu, Chinese gamblers became
increasingly active among the increasing numbers of Chinese laborers on the
Neighbor Islands. Frank Damon, who was a missionary who worked among the
Chinese, wrote the following about his visit to a plantation at Hanamaulu in
1882.
Here we found quite a company of Chinamen. As we came
into the main room of their house I was led to feel that to some
at least we were not very welcome guests. There has arrived
before us, one of those gambling "tramps", who earn an
infamous livelihood by going around from plantation to
plantation, leading the laborers to waste their hard earned wages
in gambling. This vice seems to have a tremendous power over
the Chinese. It is especially prevalent on the sugar plantations
where the men are left to do pretty much as they wish, after they
have left the field and mill.... We had the pleasure at
Hanamaulu of breaking up an evenings sport. The men
themselves seemed kind and received us pleasantly -- while the
disappointed "Gambler" left us the field. (Damon, 1882:76,
quoted in Glick, 1980:38-39)
THE C1HIliNESE lLOT'fERKES
None of the above reports provides an indication of the kind of games
which the Chinese gamblers were playing, but what evidence is available suggest
that it is during this period, 1876 to 1884, that the Chinese lotteries became an
important, if not the most important, component of gambling among the Chinese
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-with the accompanying concern among those in authority who held a
paternalistic attitude toward the Hawaiians that it would spread to the Hawaiians.
Two Chinese lottery games were popular: pak kap pia (bark gup biu,
pakapia) and chee ja (cheja). Pak kap pia, translated as "white pigeon ticket"
or the "dove lottery," was described as follows (The King vs. Yeang Ting, 6
Haw. 576):
[In Pak Kap Pio a] cloth is hung up on which are tacked
eighty small squares of paper, on each of which is written a
Chinese character. Tickets are sold, having corresponding
characters upon them. The holder of the ticket marks off on his
ticket ten of such characters as he thinks may win. The
manager, when all the holders of the tickets have completed their
marking, takes down the papers from the cloth and rolls each one
up in a ball so that the character on it cannot be read, mixes
them up in a pan, then puts them promiscuously in four bowls,
twenty in a bowl. The holders of tickets select and withdraw one
bowl and contents. Sixty characters then remain. The manager
then selects one bowl, and its contents, twenty characters, are the
winning numbers. These are tacked on to the cloth and again
hung up, and holders of tickets having characters on them which
they have marked off, corresponding to the characters exhibited
on the cloth, are winners, according to the number of characters
so marked off. To illustrate: In the cheapest class of these
lotteries, the one cent game, if a man pays ten cents he is entitled
to mark ten numbers.
If he marks 6 of the winning numbers he wins.. $ 1.50.
If he marks 7 15.00.
If he marks 8 75.00.
If he marks 9 150.00.
If he marks all or 10 300.00.
A record is kept showing the number of tickets sold, to
whom, and the amounts received.
Drawing upon several sources (The Queen vs. Jim Kaka, 8 Haw. 305; Chun,
1983:23), the Chee Fa lottery was operated as follows:
Chee ja was a name or phrase game. The principals or
bankers propounded a riddle and a list of thirty-six words (poetic
phrases or names of two characters), one of which was the
winner. A player was shown the riddle and he then marked or
"dotted" his choice or choices among the thirty-six on "the
ticket." Thus, for ten cents a player might mark one name or
phrase at ten cents of two at five cents each. The payoff was
thirty to one: three dollars for a ten cents winner. At a
designated time the bankers opened a selected envelope and
announced the winner.
Chinatown in Honolulu now became the center for a network of
gambling operations which spread throughout the islands. The "banks" of the
lotteries were typically in Chinatown, along with certain stores which handled
tickets and bets. But in addition agents or "runners" for these banks were
?per~ting on all the islands (Glick, 1980: 145). Hawaiians were increasingly
Identified as lower echelon agents and as players of the lotteries.
THE JAJPANESE GOVJERNMEN'f'S CONCERN WUH
"'fHE CHINESE PROBLEM"
. By the early 1880's the "Chinese problems" -- opium and gambling,
especially the lotteries -- had convinced many in the government of Hawaii that
a different source of plantation laborers had to be found. The favorite candidate
was Japan, a choice facilitated by the belief among some of the Hawaiian elite
~hat th~ Japanese were a "cognate people" and "much like us," especially in their
mdustnousness and their opposition to opium.
However, the negotiations to bring Japanese contract workers were made
more complicated by the presence in Hawaii of the large number of Chinese.
The Japanese government insisted that the Japanese workers would be kept
separate .from the Chinese and that the government of Hawaii would begin a
systematic program to halt further immigration by the Chinese and to reduce the
numbers of Chinese already in the Kingdom (Kuykendall, 1967:ch. 6).
The government intensified its efforts to control gambling, with a special
focus upon the Chinese lotteries, and the number of convictions for gambling in
1884-85 was almost 25 percent higher than in the previous biennium (see Table
1).
In February, 1885, the first company of Japanese laborers arrived at
Honolulu.
.. £. JjJ .£ Ii
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IS A JLO'f1rlEJRY A VIOJLAHON OF 'fHlE "GAMING" S'fA'fU'fE?
The intensified public pressure, led by the editor of The Pacific
Commercial Advertiser, on the police to shut down the gambling dens and
lotteries now led the lottery operators to initiate a legal challenge to their
prosecution. In 1885 Yeong Ting was convicted in the Honolulu Police Court
under the gaming statute for being the manager of a Pak Kap Pio operation. He
then appealed for a trial de novo to the Intermediary Court, a court consisting
of one of the Supreme Court Justices in chambers (sitting alone without a jury)
(The King vs. Yeong Ting, Intermediary Court No. 467, Archives of Hawaii).
In July the case came before Chief Justice Alfred Judd. The government
was represented by Attorney General Paul Neumann, who had come to the
Kingdom from California in late 1883, become a denizen of the Kingdom and
been appointed Attorney General on December 14, 1883. He was widely
recognized to be a "Spreckels' man." Yeong Ting was represented by Alfred
S. Hartwell and William A. Whiting. At the outset the defense demurred to the
charge.
It is urged by the defendant's counsel that this is a lottery,
a device by which by a simple chance a man may win something,
and that it is not within the "Gaming Act" of this country,
although its evils may be within the evils sought to be prevented
by the Act. If one takes a chance in a raffle or a lottery he plays
no "game." (6 Haw. 576, 577)
Justice Judd noted that it was "remarkable" that in thirty-five years
section one of the "Gaming Act" declaring, "Whoever by playing cards or any
other game wins or loses any sum of money or thing of value is guilty of
gaming," had "never received judicial construction. "
Examining various authorities, Judd noted that Bishop's Statutory Crimes,
Sec 857, stated: "A contest of chance or of skill disconnected from the idea of
useful production, wherein the party in whose favor the result appears is termed
the winner, and the other party is termed the loser."
Taking note that some persons distinguished between games of skill,
games of chance, and games which mixed chance and skill, Judd found Pak Kap
Pio to be a "game of chance," but held that this made no difference: "Our statute
is silent as to whether the game, to be within the law, shall be one of skill, of
chance, or of both... "
Since the playing of games was not gaming unless money was won or
lost, Judd then found that there was sufficient evidence that Yeong Ting was the
manager, that "the chances of his winning money were exceedingly great" and
that "he did win money by this game. "
One question remained: Did Yeong Ting "play at the game?" Here Judd
wrote:
....He conducted the lottery and had an interest in its almost
certain gains. But I do not think it necessary to hold that he
must be shown to have personally manipulated the apparatus or
devices used, in order to hold him a player of this game. He
must be shown to have participated in it so far as to have risked
money or a thing of value upon the contingency of success or
loss. Our statute does not particularize the games which are
unlawful, as in some countries. I must believe that the
Legislature did not enumerate the games then in vogue, in order
that the law might be comprehensive enough to include every
description of game, which, if played for money, the law
condemns. Human ingenuity is constantly inventing new games
and new names for old games. But under our sweeping law it is
not necessary that there should be new legislation to meet each
new invention. The test is whether the player wins or loses
money thereat.
In reaching this last conclusion, Judd took special note of the decision of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts wherein it had considered the question whether
the game known as "the policy or envelope game" was a lottery. There the
court had found it to be a "lottery" and "a game," and that the "playing" of it
was "by a person choosing a number and playing for it, and the rest of the game
was executed by the conductor of the lottery" (Commonwealth vs. Wright, 137
Mass. 250).
Chief Justice Judd then found Yeong Ting guilty and sentenced him to
pay a fine of $100 plus costs and to be imprisoned at hard labor for ten days.
Yeong Ting did not appeal further to the Supreme Court en banc for a
review of the Chief Justice's decision in the Intermediary Court. Although the
case was determined in July, 1885, it would not be published in the Hawaii
Reports (6 Haw 576) until 1887. It was also not a binding decision upon the
Circuit Courts of the other islands.
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Thus it should have been no surprise when the question was raised in the
Supreme Court in the January term, 1886, in the case of The King vs. Ah Lee
and Ah Fu (5 Haw. 545; Supreme Court Criminal Case No. 1132, Archives of
Hawaii; Second Circuit Criminal Case No 174, Archives of Hawaii). In
December, 1885, Ah Lee and Ah Fu were convicted of gaming in the Circuit
Court at Lahaina, Maui. Aki testified that on October 26 he gave money to Ah
Mau for a lottery ticket and later received the ticket produced as evidence in the
court. Ah Mau testified that he bought the ticket for $2.95 from Ah Fu, who
gave the money to Ah Lee, who then gave the ticket to Ah Fu, who gave the
ticket to Ah Mau, who gave it to Aki. Aki testified that later he presented the
ticket to Ah Lee and was told that he "had not drawn anything." On October
29 Deputy Sheriff H. G. Treadway, with a search warrant, entered the premises
of the defendants at Wailuku and seized money, record books, stamps, lottery
tickets and other lottery apparatus. Ah Lee denied all the allegations and
asserted that he did not know either Aki or Ah Mau. Ah Fu did not testify but
it was stipulated that his testimony would be the same as Ah Lee's. The jury
found the defendants guilty.
Before the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Judd and Associate Justices
McCully and Preston) the crown was represented by Attorney General Neumann,
while the defendants were represented by Clarence and Volney Ashford, who
had excepted to the verdict as "against the law and contrary to the evidence." On
the questions of evidence the Supreme Court found that in this instance it was
"entirely a question for the jury as to whether they believed the defendants or the
witnesses for the prosecution." On the argument that the verdict was against the
law, the decision, written by Justice Preston and issued March 2, 1886, simply
asserted, "A lottery is a game within the meaning of [Section 1 of the Gaming
Act]. "
A NJEW STA'fUTJE AJIMED AT THJE LOTTJEJRJIJES: CH. 41, 1886
However, if Chief Justice Judd was correct that the legislature has been
wise to keep the gaming act very broad rather than to engage in specifying every
activity which constituted gaming, it was clear in 1886 that the lottery operators
were increasingly appearing with sharp legal counsel in the lower courts and
appealing for jury trials when convicted in the lower courts. The number of
arrests had increased, but the conviction rate had declined.
Moreover, only a little over a month after the Supreme Court had issued
its decision in the case of Ah Lee and Ah Fu, Honolulu was devastated by a fire,
the origin of which was believed to be a Chinese gambler. According to Chung
Kum Ai, a successful Chinese businessman who headed the United Chinese
Society from 1901 to 1906,
The Great Fire of April 16, 1886, a Sunday, started at three
in the afternoon....
The fire had been started very carelessly. A Chinese
gambler who loved his bark-gup-biu (picking the right
combination of words from a printed list) had purchased a pair
of candles to burn at the altar of the Goddess of Chance. He
was careless in handling the candles. They set the altar curtains
on fire, and in no time the conflagration had spread to other parts
of Chinatown, from the lower part of Beretania down Nuuanu to
River and King Streets ....
In the fall of 1886 the Legislative Assembly moved to provide legislation
that would be supplementary to the Gaming Act with a clear purpose of making
it easier to arrest and convict any person who in any way was associated with
a Chinese lottery. The statute, approved October 15, 1886, was entitled, "An
Act Supplementary of Chapter XXXIX of the Penal Code Relating to
Gambling," and became known simply as "Chapter 41 of 1886." For the
purposes of this article, the most significant portions were Section 3 and 5.
Section 3: Any person who shall establish, commence or be
a partner in any lottery or in any scheme by which prizes,
whether of money or of any other matter or thing are gained,
drawn for, thrown or competed for by lot, dice or any other
mode of chance, or who shall sell or dispose of, or purchase or
have in possession, any ticket or other means by which
permission or authority is gained or given to any person to throw
for, compete or have any interest in any such lottery or scheme,
and any person who shall manage or conduct or assist in
managing or conducting any such lottery or scheme shall for
every offense forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding five hundred
dollars, and for any second offense, besides such penalty shall be
liable to imprisonment with or without hard labor for any term
not exceeding six months.
Section 5: Any person who shall have unlawfully in his
possession any tool, device, implement or ticket used or which
can be used for the drawing, carrying on or playing at any
lottery, game of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge et noire
or any other banking game played with cards, dice or any device
shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars
for the first offense, and for every subsequent offense by a fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars and imprisonment with or
..'/
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without hard labor not exceeding three months, and such tool, Table 3 Percent Distributions of Gambling Convictions by Circuit and
device implement or ticket shall be forfeited and destroyed. Etlmicity, 1886-1900
It was now quite clear that the establishment, banking, conducting, managing or %Among
assisting of a lottery was prohibited. Moreover, the possession of any item Year Chinese Japanese Hawaiian Portuguese
Other Circuit
1886-7 59.2 0.7 31.6 0.9 7.6 100.0
associated with the operation or playing of a lottery, including the possession of
Oahu 55.7 0.0 26.4 3.8 14.1 24.5
simply one ticket was prohibited. A first offender could be fined up to $500. Maui 75.0 0.0 19.4 0.0 5.6 24.9
A second offender in the first category could receive an additional imprisonment Hawaii 45.9 0.0 51.4 0.0 2.0 34.2
Up to six months, while those in the second additional imprisonment up to three Kauai 66.2 4.2 16.9 0.0 12.7 16.4
months. 1888-9 65.2 12.8 19.9 0.2 0.6 100.0
Oahu 96.2 0.8 3.0 0.0 0.0 28.8
Maui 68.9 24.8 5.4 0.4 0.4 27.3
As shown in Table 1, the passage of this act was followed by sharp Hawaii 35.4 15.9 47.2 0.3 1.0 34.7
increases in the numbers of persons arrested and convicted of gambling. Kauai 80.0 2.7 16.0 0.0 1.3 9.2
Comparing the period 1886-87 with 1888-89, arrests increased from 771 to 1890-1 33.3 40.2 24.3 0.2 1.8 100.0
1,285 and convictions from 434 to 813, while as shown in Table 3 the Oahu 60.6 6.4 28.7 0.0 4.2 12.1
percentage of persons convicted who were Chinese increased from 59.2 to 65.2. Maui 34.2 46.6 13.0 1.4 4.8 19.2
Hawaii 27.6 43.4 28.4 0.0 0.6 61.3
Kauai 35.1 57.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 7.4
TJHIE "BAYONET cONsnrunoN" OF :8.887 1892-3 28.7 54.9 13.7 1.8 0.8 100.0
Oahu 62.8 9.9 26.4 0.8 0.0 20.2
The armed uprising in 1887 by the haole establishment in reaction to Maui 24.8 61.0 9.9 0.7 3.5 23.6
certain policies and practices of King Kalakaua and his Prime Minister, Walter Hawaii 15.8 73.8 6.4 4.1 0.0 40.8
Murray Gibson, resulted in the adoption of a new constitution by the king which Kauai 27.9 54.8 17.2 0.0 0.0 16.4
greatly restricted suffrage, made the House of Nobles elective, reduced the 1894-5 49.1 39.9 9.2
0.5 1.2 100.0
Oahu 75.7 12.5 4.0 0.0 1.0 34.5
power of the king and put the cabinet under the control of the legislature, Maui 47.6 33.9 14.7 0.4 3.2 18.8
provided for new elections and assured that the Reform Party would control the Hawaii 15.5 75.1 7.6 1.2 0.7 24.7
cabinet. This meant that it was most unlikely that there would be any major Kauai 46.2 48.5 4.0 0.6 0.6 22.0
change in government policy with respect to gambling and especially the Chinese 1896-7 55.0 33.8 9.0 0.4 1.5 100.0
lottery. Oahu 71.5 11.4 12.9 0.9 3.4 27.6
Maui 48.1 42.5 8.6 0.1 0.7 26.2
Hawaii 56.1 35.1 7.2 0.6 0.9 16.0
TJHIE PROBLEM OF POLJICE CORRUnlION
Kauai 46.0 46.2 6.7 0.0 0.9 30.2
1898-9 61.3 24.7 12.5 0.5 0.9 100.0
However, the "successes" in the "war on gambling" were not achieved Oahu 69.8 3.4 23.7 0.9 2.0 34.8
without problems. Increasing numbers of defendants appealed for jury trials and Maui 74.1 15.8 10.1 0.0 0.0 16.2
the jurors, haole or Native Hawaiian, were reluctant to convict in gambling cases Hawaii 49.5 39.2 9.0 1.0 1.0 20.8
(Nelligan and Ball, 1992: Table 2). Second, a number of cases taken to the Kauai 52.2 45.0 2.8
0.0 0.0 28.2
1900 54.2 30.8 12.6 1.3 1.0 100.0
Supreme Court indicate that the police and prosecutors sometimes became Oahu 62.8 14.5 17.8 2.7 2.1 43.7
confused concerning how the charges should be specified when considering both Maui 64.1 23.6 12.2 0.0 0.0 17.7
Chapter 39 of the Penal Code and Chapter 41 of 1886 (In re Ah Hook and Hawaii 39.6 49.2 7.4 1.8 1.8 18.5
Chock Hin, 6 Haw. 664; The King vs. Lum Hung, 7 Haw. 344). Kauai 39.8 55.4 4.5 0.0 0.0 20.1
Especially important at this time were the allegations which circulated Source: Biennial Reports of the Chief Justice to the Legislature.
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the police. While Chung Kum Ai is not entirely correct about his dates, his
overall assessment of the situation is probably accurate.
It was gambling then that had caused the Great Fire of
1886, and gambling was one of the great evils that cursed the
Chinatown of that day, the other being opium-smoking. At one
time the Hawaiian Government did nothing against these two
evils, reasoning foolishly perhaps, that inasmuch as it affected
only Chinatown and the Chinese there, the Government should
not interfere with what the Chinese themselves did, even if they
were headed straight for privation and damnation.... In 1883
[sic], however, the Hawaiian Government legislated against
gambling and opium-smoking. King Kalakaua appointed John H.
Soper, Marshal of the Kingdom, with definite instructions to
clean up Chinatown of its gambling and opium-smoking. Soper
took his responsibilities seriously. He went out personally to
make arrests. Chinatown gamblers and opium-smokers hated
Soper worse than poison, for when Soper was present at the
raids, his subordinates did not dare accept bribes ....He once told
me a story that was typical of the man. He was passing along
King Street one day when a well-known gambler pulled him into
his office and gave him five hundred dollars. Soper took the
money, returned to his office immediately, told his story and
handed the five hundred dollars to his superior. His superior
kept the money, did nothing about the bribery charge, never
mentioned the money again.... (Chung, 1960:97-98)
Soper did serve as Marshal of the Kingdom twice, 1884 to 1886 and 1888 to
1890, and it was during this second period that Honolulu did witness the much
intensified police crackdown on Chinese gambling described above. Comparing
1886-87 with 1888-89, we see in Table 3 that the percentage of the convictions
which took place on Oahu increased from 24.5 to 28.8 percent, but even more
significantly the percentage of those convicted on Oahu who were Chinese
increased from 55.7 percent to 96.2 percent.
WHY ONJLY THE CmNESE?
This last development led the editor of the Advertiser, a newspaper which
now spoke for the leading businessmen, to raise some questions about the
enforcement policy of the police (May 19, 1888). In a general editorial aimed
at the "practice of living beyond one's income," he commented upon the role of
gambling, said to be second only to "easy credit" in producing this practice.
....A great deal of it is also to be accounted for by the
prevalence of gambling, especially among young men. Gambling
among Chinese is put down by the strong arm of the law
whenever an opportunity arises, but it very rarely happens that
gamblers of other nationalities are interfered with by the police.
This is to be regretted not only in the interest of society, but the
offenders themselves, for in this way a general looseness as
regards monetary obligations is generated, culminating in some
cases in actual criminality. The latter is rarely developed in an
individual otherwise than gradually, and causes tending to
promote it might often be removed. Prevention is better than
cure, and the removal of temptation is one of the best means of
prevention.... (Advertiser, May 19, 1888)
A week later "S" wrote a letter to the paper which endorsed the general
position of the editor, but also went beyond him to protest the manner in which
the enforcement practices also constituted serious violations of the civil rights of
the Chinese.
Police Court reports that there is considerable gambling
going on in Honolulu, and strange to say it seems to be nearly
all, if not all amongst the Chinese; in all other countries, if we
are to believe the newspaper reports, other people gamble; here
it is otherwise and we ought to be very grateful. Gambling is a
vice that leads to others, and however much or little of it may
be done in what is known as "social play" has a tendency to that
which is bad, and never to that which is good.
"Rumor," if she could be believed, asserts that there is
gambling and social gambling going on in Honolulu amongst
others than Chinese; carried on in private houses as well as
public houses, and that the police would have no more if as
much trouble to find it as they have with the Chinese. Some
entertain the idea that the police have no right to enter private
premises-that is family residences, to look for such. The police,
however, do not think so, for they do enter a Chinaman's castle
day or night by front door, back door or any other way, and
sometimes find a ticket that has or is supposed to have a
gambling air about it, or find some at the game of backgammon
with "chips" on the table. This is called a raid and the
Chinamen and the chips are carried away and fined fifteen
dollars or thirty days. This may be according to law and right,
but if so why overlook other respectable nationalities.
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If done as now for the few dollars fine and the little credit
attached to it, would it not be better and just to fly higher, get
bigger game and bigger credit.
It seems to me, and I have reasons to know that it does
many others, that this idea of pouncing on a few poor Chinese
who are amusing themselves quietly in their own house should
be let alone unless all are to be served alike. (Adveniser, May
25, 1888).
JAPANESE LABORERS AND GAMBUNG
As noted above the first company of Japanese laborers arrived at
Honolulu in 1885 and their population would increase to include at least 10 000
adult males by the end of the decade. Most of these Japanese were sent t~ the
outer islands to work on the plantations, where they also developed a plantation
gambling lifestyle similar to that of the Chinese. Gambling took place
practically every pay day when a professional class of gamblers would infiltrate
into the camps and set up games for all who wanted to play (Miyamoto,
1964:151). Most of these games were of the dice variety and Cho-han or 7-11
were the most common.
However, these professional gamblers were not privileged to operate
unless appropriate payoffs were made to yakuza leaders who had begun arriving
with the first Japanese laborers and who had other yakuza and retired sumo
wrestlers for their bodyguards and enforcers. Kazuo Miyamoto, whose parents
worked in the area, has provided a description of the organization as it existed
on Hawaii in the 1890's. He stresses that in this portion of his book, "The
characters are composites and thus resemble no one in particular" (Miyamoto,
1964:9), but there is no reason to doubt the general depiction he presents.
There were quite a few lodgers at the hotel. These had
been domiciled in Hawaii for some years and were men who
detested work and chose to live by using their wits and nimble
fingers. This parasitic class was considerable in number and
even the remotest plantations were not overlooked in their
systematic scheme of exploitation. On pay days they would
swarm to the plantations and gather in the silvers from the
laborers. There was a famous gangleader in Hilo, Funakoshi
Tatsugoro by name, who had twenty or more henchmen to do the
business in the different plantations on the Hamakua coast. The
island of Hawaii was divided up into different spheres of interest
among the gang leaders and gambling games could not be held
unless sponsored by this gangster.
On the afternoon of the monthly pay day, in order not to be
caught by the manager, the gamblers infiltrated into the camps by
twos and threes. Wada was a representative of the gang at
Waipunalei and towards evening, would open the game in his
bunk and see to its orderly conduct. He was a gambler from
Japan, and to attest to his former exploits his body was covered
by a tattooed dragon. He was from Kobe and there was a rumor
that he escaped capture by the police after a murder case in
which suspicion was directed his way. He had a year more of
his contract to serve.
On the matted floor, the players sat cross-legged in a circle.
Two dice were placed in a smooth tea cup without a handle, and
after jiggling, the cup was placed face down on the floor. The
dice were thus covered and betting followed. The winner was
the one who guessed the sum total of the face of the dice. The
game was fast and stakes could reach enormous figures. Wada
had a wooden box which was padlocked and had a hole big
enough to admit a silver dollar. This was the "kitty" and went
to Funakoshi of Hilo, a tribute he exacted from the sporting
elements of plantation workers. Such games might continue for
several nights on a plantation and the intervening idle days
between pay days in different plantations were spent by
professionals at a neutral zone such as Laupahoehoe or Hilo,
where they lived peacefully in hotels away from the capitalistic
scrutiny of plantation policeman. (Miyamoto, 1964:122).
However, this pattern had already become firmly established by the end of the
1880's. In May, 1889, Soryu Kagahi, a Buddhist priest recently arrived from
Japan, visited the camps on the east coast of Hawaii.
.... He went from plantation to plantation comforting his
countrymen who were under "heavy burdens both in the physical
and spiritual [and who were] distressing and wandering, as
sheep not having a shepherd." To his great dismay, the Buddhist
priest discovered that the Japanese, who had expected to
accumulate money fast and return to Japan, had in fact
accumulated very little money and a great deal of bad karma.
Gambling had become such a prevailing vice among the Japanese
that many would have "no funds at the expiration of their
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contracts, to return to their homes, if they [paid] their gambling
debts .... (Hunter, 1971:42-43).
MOJmFHCATHON OF TlfHIE SENTENCHNG PROVHSHON
OF "THE GAMHNG AC'f"
If the target of the gambling enforcers on Oahu was almost exclusively
the Chinese, this new development on the plantations on the other islands now
made the Japanese gamblers a target of the law enforcers there. In 1886-87 no
Japanese were convicted of gambling on Oahu, Maui and Hawaii, and they
constituted only 4.2 percent of the convictions on Kauai. However, in 1888-89
their percentages increased to 24.8 percent on Maui and 15.9 percent on Hawaii
(Table 3).
Most of these convictions were under the general "Gaming Statute,"
Chapter 39 of the Penal Code. As noted above that statute had been amended
in 1870 to provide for a sentence of fine and imprisonment. However,
plantation managers were not interested in having their laborers in jail. In 1890
the Legislature amended the sentencing provision of Chapter 39 to read:
"Whoever is guilty of gaming shall be punished by fine, not exceeding One
Hundred Dollars or by imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding sixty days"
(italics added) (Kingdom, 1890, Chap. 41).
As shown in Table 3, the biennium of 1890-91 was the first period in
which some group other than the Chinese constituted the largest percentage of
those convicted of gambling and this group was the Japanese, who made up 40.2
percent of those convicted in the Kingdom, 46.6 percent on Maui, 43.4 percent
on Hawaii and 57.9 percent on Kauai. This general situation was even more
pronounced in 1892-93, when 54.9 percent of those convicted of gambling were
Japanese, being 61.0 percent on Maui, 73.8 percent on Hawaii and 54.8 percent
on Kauai.
However, the overall surpassing of the Chinese by the Japanese was due
in no small part to a dramatic decline in the number of convictions for gambling
on Oahu, where the Chinese still constituted about 60 percent of those convicted
(see Table 3), with a resultant decline in the total for all islands combined (see
Table 1). In 1890-91 the number of convictions on Oahu had fallen to 94 from
234 in 1888-89 and there were only 65 convictions in 1892.
QUEEN UUUOKALANH'S MARSHAlL: CHARILES B. WHILSON
The anti-gambling faction attributed this situation to the deliberate
inaction or incompetence of the Marshal of the Kingdom, Charles B. Wilson,
regarding the enforcement of both the gambling and opium laws. Wilson, of
British and Tahitian ancestry, had been appointed by Queen Liliuokalani very
shortly after she succeeded King Kalakaua in January, 1891. Wilson followed
Charles L. Hopkins, who had served about one year following the second stint
of Soper as Marshal. Wilson's performance was widely criticized by both the
haole establishment and Hawaiian leaders, but the Queen was insistent through
numerous cabinet changes that he remain in office. In August, 1892, Marshal
Wilson published a letter in which he defended his record regarding gambling
arrests and convictions, asserting that his record was as good as his predecessor.
However, this was quickly turned against him by the opposition press. The
Advertiser (Sept. 2, 1892) editorialized:
. ...Assuming that the figures given are correct, which, after all, is a wild
assumption, they condemn the Marshal hopelessly, for they show that he has
made no more arrests than his predecessor. As gambling is ten times as
common as it was then he ought to have made ten times more arrests ....
(Advertiser, Sept. 2, 1892)
TIHIE "ILOmSHANA ILOTTERY BHILIL": 1892-93
This was the general situation when persons arrived in Honolulu to
promote what was in effect the movement of "The Louisiana Lottery" to the
Kingdom. This lottery had been operating out of New Orleans for over two
decades. It made use of the mails to extend its scope of operations throughout
the United States. At this time the United States government had taken action
to prohibit the use of the mail service by the lottery and its operators were
seeking a new home. According to Kuykendall (1967:544-5):
.... It is not known when the promoters of the project came
from the United States and began to work in Hawaii, but early
in June [1892] the scheme was presented to Queen Liliuokalani
and won her firm support. It is a curious story unfolded in the
pages of her dairy. In this period the Queen was studying
German; her instructor was a Miss Wolf, who was also a
medium who read "messages" in cards and brought to her royal
pupil fascinating "revelations" from the spirit world about the
noble European ancestry of the late Prince Consort John 0
Dominis and about other matters of more immediate and
mundane interest, including advice on cabinet appointments. In
the early morning hours of July 8...Miss Wolf came with her
cards to the queen and told her that at ten o'clock a gentleman
would call on her with a "bundle of papers where it would bring
lots of money across the waters. She says I must have the House
La; 7
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[legislature] accept it -- it would bring 1,000,000 [sic] ." Sure
enough, the man came, a Mr. T.E.E, and at this time and in
later visits, always foretold by Miss Wolf, he explained the
lottery project, gained the queen's support for it, and discussed
with her the problem of getting it accepted by the legislature.
It is clear that the queen looked upon a lottery franchise as
a means whereby the government would obtain revenue -- half a
million dollars a year -- for public works, immigration, and other
objects; she thought it would free the government from its too
frequent dependence on the local banks for temporary loans; she
either did not know about, did not believe, or deliberately
disregarded the... objections to such an enterprise as a legalized
lottery. One of the messages relayed to her by the medium
(August 16) was that as long as the lottery continued in operation
she would receive $10,000 or $15,000 a year "for pocket
money" from the head of the company.... (Kuykendall,
1967:544)
On August 30 Representative William White ofMaui introduced "An Act
Granting a Franchise to Establish and Maintain a Lottery. "
[The bill would] grant to a group of five men, including
three Honolulu residents, an exclusive franchise to establish and
maintain a lottery for a period of twenty-five years. The
grantees would be required to pay to the government $500,000
each year, this sum to be used to subsidize the laying of an ocean
cable to the American coast and the construction of a railroad
around Oahu and one along the Hilo-Hamakua coast of Hawaii,
and for harbor improvements, roads and bridges, and
encouragement of industries, tourist travel, and immigration....
(Kuykendall, 1967:550-1)
The promoters initiated a newspaper-brochure, The Golden Era, to carry their
arguments to the public, but no one could find out who Mr. T.E.E was. 2
Immediately the opposition organized their counterattack. A number of
public meetings were called at which resolutions in opposition to the bill were
presented, discussed, passed and converted into signed petitions to be presented
to the legislature. Typical of these was one called by the Young Men's Christian
Association (Y.M.C.A.) and reported extensively by The Advertiser (Sept. 5,
1892). The resolution opposed the bill on numerous grounds: moral ("contrary
to the laws of God and mankind"), social (it would bring undesirables to the
Kingdom), political (the gamblers would control the Kingdom) and commercial
(contrary to genuine economic development).
However, several of the comments by supporters of the resolution are
particularly significant. President Hosmer of Oahu College said, "We place it
in the same category as the saloon." H.P. Baldwin noted, "We have only to
look on the game of che fa for its results." Rev. S.E.Bishop asked, "Are we
going to do something which will bring the anger of the United States upon us?"
Finally W. O. Smith warned, "If this thing gets hold of us here, we can't get it
off except by revolution and foreign interference. "
Newspaper notices appeared advising persons where they might sign
petitions in opposition to the bill, such as the offices of W. G. Irwin and Co.,
Theo H. Davies and Co. and Lewers and Cooke (Advertiser, Sept. 6, 1892).
Petitions were also submitted by numerous women's organizations, including
Hawaiian woman and Portuguese women.
At least one of the comments to the newspapers took the form of a poem
by J.B. entitled, "When the Lottery Comes" (Advertiser, Sept. 7, 1892).
The little tin gods with little tin mills
Will all troop over the eastern hills,
To grind out cash to pay our bills,
And give McKinley congestive chills,
When the lottery comes.
All on the move, with cash machines,
Old plug uglies from New Orleans,
Hard-favored Yankees filled with beans -
And they'll be Hawaii's kings and queens -
When the lottery comes.
The heavenly fellows '11 come in swarms,
And gobble our city and gobble our farms,
And all wear diamonds and big gold charms;
And the Fort Street folks will buy burglar alarms -
When the lottery comes.
The planters '11 then feel capital's claw,
And Christians, the weight of the devil's paw;
No use for morals, or love or law,
For the race '11 wind up with a big hurrah,
When the lottery comes.
....
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The extant petitions to the legislature currently in the Hawaii State Archives
number fifty-five, with fifty-three in opposition and two in favor of the lottery
bill. But in addition there is a handwritten letter, dated Sept. 20, addressed
directly to the queen and signed by Juliette Cooke and the other members of
"We the Women."
To her majesty Liliuokalani, by the grace of God queen of
the Hawaiian islands.
Your Majesty, In the view of the fact that a bill has been
brought before the legislature asking a franchise for an
international lottery companY,and if such bill pass the assembly
it must come before our majesty for signature, we, loyal subjects
of your majesty, and residents of this fair land, beg to submit to
your consideration a few reasons why, in our estimation, the
nation would suffer were such a bill become law.
We esteem your majesty as one who loves her people and
earnestly desires the nation's prosperity. We believe that you are
jealous of the nation's integrity, and feel a pride in the fact that,
though one of the least of the nations of the earth, she is
regarded by all with respect. Strong in this belief, we are made
bold to come before your majesty with our plea, knowing that
the promoters of this scheme will spare no pains to press their
arguments, and feeling sure that your majesty, as a fair minded
woman, will wish to look at the question from all sides, that you
may be better able to decide wisely if the bill shall be brought
before you for decision.
First. We beg your majesty to call to mind the terrible
struggle through which the great state of Louisiana has just
passed. Twenty five-years ago, under the pressure of a financial
depression far greater than that of Hawaii nei at present, this
state granted a franchise to the Louisiana Lottery Company. It
was argued that large sums of money would be brought into the
state, and thus business would be increased. What has been the
result? After twenty-five years of experience, it is found that the
men who have been enriched are the exceptions, while those who
have been impoverished are a great host. Business has been
demoralized, and gamblers and sharkers have come into the state
to the exclusion of a more desirable class of citizens. No age
sex or condition is respected, but men, women, and little
children have been swept into this maelstrom and destroyed.
Now this great commonwealth, with a population of more than
nine-hundred thousand, finds she is powerless to force herself
from this gigantic evil and calls for aid upon the whole unions of
states. Can we reasonably hope that such an influence will be any
better for Hawaii? And if we in spite of this example, open our
doors to this evil, where can we look for help when the burden
becomes too heavy for us to bear. If under our restrictive laws,
so many of our people are already given over to gambling, how
many will escape when we have covered it with a mantle of
respectability by granting it the protection of the law?
Secondly, Your Majesty will notice that the bill calls for an
international lottery; this, as we understand it, includes other
lands. Naturally our nearest neighbor and closest friend, the
United States of America, will be the principal field of operation.
Is there not danger of seriously affecting the pleasant, friendly
relations now existing between Hawaii nei and the great Republic
if we open here a refuge for the enemy she has just driven out
with a great struggle? The leaders of the Louisiana lottery stand
convicted in their own words of carrying on "a business
reprobated by law, and contrary to public policy and good
morals" . If we permit this "business" we must expect a
population of lawless character, whose presence will keep out
those who would help to build up, on a solid foundation, a
prosperous community, and our isolated position would make the
situation harder for us than it has been for Louisiana.
Finally: An honorable man can receive no greater insult
than the offer of a bribe, and this proposed company offers just
that to an honorable nation. They care nothing for Hawaii,
except to make a convenience of her. So they bring a bribe
having in it a semblance of benevolence to make it attractive, but
a bribe pure and simple. They offer to buy the nation for a
price, and we are asked to sell ourselves to a company of
gamblers. As they have done elsewhere they expect to do here,
to own the legislature and every purchasable power and
individual. This it has been in other lands, it is the history of
lottery companies, and we cannot expect our case to be
exceptional.
We cannot believe that the legislature will really accept this
humiliating proposition, but if, dazzled for the moment by the
seeming brilliancy of the offer, they do fail to recognize the fact
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that it is only a bribe and pass the bill, it will then come before
your majesty for signature. With your majesty then will lie the
power to save the nation, for it cannot be possible that Hawaii's
Queen will lend her honored name to so iniquitous a measure,
thereby placing this nation before the nations of the world as one
whose integrity can be bought and sold.
Your Majesty, we who make this plea before you are the
wives, the mothers, and the sisters of the land we plead for our
homes, for our children, for the nations honor. We pray you to
pardon any thing which may have the semblance of unseemly
warmth, and remember only that we come to you as loyal
women who accept the nation's motto in its fullness, Ua mau ka
ea 0 ka aina i ka pono.
The women closed with, "God save the queen" (underline is in original).
The legislature was fractured between three different parties and
members shifted positions around a number of significant issues. Between the
time of the introduction of the lottery bill and its final approval, a period of three
and a half months, there were five different cabinets. Much of the jockeying
revolved around the opium and lottery bills, although there were other important
issues.
On the day the lottery bill was introduced, August 30, it was placed on
the table. Nothing more happened until October 10 when a motion to postpone
it indefinitely was defeated and it was referred to a select committee headed by
Representative White. The cabinet headed by George N. Wilcox, which had
assumed office on November 8, had publicly declared its opposition.
....But on January 10 (Tuesday), when several of the
opponents of the bill were absent, Representative White brought
in a report signed by five members of the committee
recommending it passage with certain amendments. * [*It cannot
be said that opponents of the bill were taken by surprise. On the
preceding day, in response to a question by Rep. W.O. Smith,
Rep. White had stated that the committee would probably report
on Tuesday ...] A motion to postpone indefinitely both the report
and the bill was defeated (17 ayes, 20 noes, 14 absent), the
report was adopted, and the bill passed its second reading .... On
Wednesday [Jan. 11] the bill was up for third reading. Great
excitement prevailed, the legislative hall being crowded with
spectators. After a debate of several hours and after some
amendments had been adopted, a motion to pass the bill was
carried by a vote of 23 to 20.... (Kuykendall, 1967:579-80)
The issue now moved to the queen and her cabinet, but the next day the
Wilcox cabinet was given a vote of no confidence and on January 13, 1893, it
was replaced by a cabinet consisting of Samuel Parker, John F. Colburn,
William Cornwell and Arthur P. Peterson, who advised the queen to sign both
the lottery and the Chinese opium den bills, which she did, although it had been
clearly established by the Supreme Court of the Kingdom that the right of the
sovereign to veto was not limited in any way by the advice of the cabinet (7
Haw. 229). The next day Queen Liliuokalani made William White a Knight
Commander of the Order of Kalakaua.
Some months after the overthrow of the monarchy in a written statement
given to the person sent by the President of the United States to investigate that
event, the deposed queen stated that Rep. White "watched his opportunity and
railroaded the [opium and lottery] bills through the house" and that the "same
day of their appointments [the new ministers] advised me to sign the opium and
lottery bills ....1 had no option but to sign" (Blount, 1893:396).
THE OVERTHROW OF THE MONARCHY: 1893
On the same day the Queen desisted from her intention to promulgate a
new constitution, one which would limit the franchise to her subjects (native
born and naturalized) and increase the powers of the monarch. However, this
was seen in some quarters as only a temporary delay. Some prominent haole
businessmen and professionals, centering around the law offices ofW.O. Smith,
organized a Committee of Safety and began preparations to overthrow the
monarchy. Marshal Wilson assured the Committee that he would not permit the
Queen to proclaim a new constitution even if he had to lock her up, but the
Committee proceeded with its plans (Kuykendall, 1967:592). It called upon the
United States Minister to provide military protection because, "the public safety
is menaced and lives and property are in peril" (Quoted in Blount, 1893: 118).
The Minister landed United States marines even before they were requested by
the Committee and on January 17 the monarchy was overthrown.
The last resister was Marshal Wilson, who refused to surrender the
police station to Major Soper of the Honolulu Rifles until visited by the members
of the last cabinet with a copy of the queen's protest to the United States
government and a signed order to surrender.
--- -- -- -- - ~--
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TJHIE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: 1893
On January 17 the Committee of Safety proclaimed the establishment of
a Provisional Government headed by President Sanford B. Dole, with W. O.
Smith as Attorney General. An Advisory Council of fourteen members
constituted the legislature. Smith immediately appointed F. W. Wundenberg as
Marshal of the Provisional Government, though later that year he would be
succeeded by Edward G. Hitchcock. A delegation immediately left for
Washington, D.c., to seek a speedy annexation of the islands by the United
States government.
ACT 2:D.
Act 21 then replaced all the repealed legislation with a new encompassing
statute. It began by targeting lotteries. Section 1 prohibited setting up,
maintaining or conducting a lottery or assisting in such. Section 2 provided a
detailed definition of a "lottery scheme" whether it be called "a lottery, raffle,
Che fa, pakapio, a gift enterprise or by whatever name." Section 3 prohibited
any person from buying, giving, receiving, possessing or dealing with in any
manner any ticket or other paper or instrument purporting to represent an
interest in a lottery.
Section 6 took up table games. It prohibited any person as owner or
employee from operating any "banking or percentage game played with cards,
dice or any device," specifically including "faro, monte, roulette, tan and fan
tan." It also prohibited any betting, side betting, or even being present at such
a game. Section 6 prohibited three card monte, the shell game, and slight of
hand or fortune telling games whereby any person was defrauded.
Section 9 prohibited any person from permitting his building or vessel
to be used for any of the above activities. Sections 7 and 8 provided for
compulsory testimony, while granting immunity from prosecution to persons so
compelled. Section 4 provided for forfeiture to the government of "[alII moneys
or property offered for sale or distribution in violation of any of the
prohibitions" of the act, though this was aimed primarily at lotteries.
All the prohibited acts were defined as misdemeanors punishable by "a
fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment at hard labor not
exceeding one year" (Sec. 10). All were triable by a District Magistrate (Sec.
11).
Act 21 and the retained sections 6 through 8 of Chapter 39 would remain
the gambling laws of the period of the republic and after annexation by the
United States (Republic, 1897: Ch. 39; Territory, 1905: Ch. 217).
While these changes in the laws were taking place attorneys Alfred
Hartwell' and Arthur Peterson sought to raise technical issues in defense of
Chinese convicted under Chapter 41 of 1886. Ah Hum had been convicted in the
Honolulu Police Court in July, 1892, of being involved in the operation of aChe
fa lottery. He appealed to the First Circuit Court and in February, 1893,
Hartwell and Peterson moved to dismiss the charge on the ground "that there is
no law in force under which he can be prosecuted" because the enactment of
"An Act granting a franchise to establish and maintain a lottery" on January 13,
1893, had "repealed by implication" Chapter 41 of 1886. Circuit Judge Whiting
denied the motion and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, where the
case was argued April 5. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Judd, the
Supreme Court held that it was unnecessary to consider any argument about
"repeal by implication" because the Provisional Government had explicitly
repealed Chapter 41 of 1886 on March 7 in Act 21. The Court then ruled that
Section 12 of Act 21, the saving clause, governed and returned the case to the
First Circuit Court for trial. (The Queen v. Ah Hum, 9 Haw. 97; Supreme
Court Criminal Case No. 1657, Archives of Hawaii).
TJHIE .REPUlBUC o.r lHIAWAU
When the Provisional Government was unsuccessful in bringing about the
immediate annexation of the islands by the United States it called for the election
of delegates to a convention to adopt a constitution for "The Republic of
Hawaii." The delegates were elected by an extremely limited electorate which
included even persons of European extraction who were not citizens, while
excluding Hawaiians who refused to take an oath of loyalty to the new regime
and all Chinese and Japanese. Thus the Republic of Hawaii came into existence
in 1894. Edward G. Hitchcock continued as Marshal, a position he held until
the next year when he was replaced by Arthur M. Brown.
Marshal Hitchcock intensified the campaign against gambling, or more
especially the lottery operations of the Chinese in Honolulu. As shown in Table
1, the number of convictions in the republic in 1894-95 was double that of
1892-93 and, as shown in Table 3, this increase was most marked among the
Chinese in Honolulu, with some numerical increase for the Japanese and
Hawaiians and again almost no convictions of Portuguese or "Other Foreigners."
Twenty of the persons convicted on Oahu in 1894-95 were given prison
sentences, twelve of whom were Hawaiian and all of whom had been convicted
for Che fa operations (Oahu Prison, 1885-98). Chief Justice Judd took
p:--------------------
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cognizance of the crackdown on the Chinese lotteries in his 1896 report to the
legislature: "In Honolulu alone, the arrests [were] 1,593 as against 587 for the
former period, an increase of 1,006, or nearly 43 percent of the whole number
throughout the islands." However, he also felt compelled to explain why
Chinese and Japanese were so prone to conviction in stark contrast to the
Portuguese and the haole: "The forms of gambling at which our laws are
directed are those which are prevalent amongst the Asiatics, and it is [thus]
among them that the increase of convictions have mainly occurred" (Republic,
1896:9).
The same general pattern would continue under Marshal Brown in
1896-97 and total convictions would increase another 22 percent (Table 1). In
this period there is another publicized report of a police raid on a gambling
house which illustrates how difficult it had become to conduct a successful raid,
but also shows that there were Chinese in the community who were cooperating
with the police in their efforts to suppress the gambling houses.
One of the cleverest raids ever made on a gambling den in
this city was made by Captain Parker and a squad of five men
yesterday and as a result 19 Celestials are now in the toils of the
law, caught red-handed.
For some time the police have been aware of a fan tan and
opium joint in operation in the neighborhood of the new Chinese
theater. Just where to look for it they did not know. An officer,
placed and watching became suspicious of a two story building
in the rear of the Chinese theater and a close watch was placed
on it. To be sure a game was going on inside was one thing, to
catch the players in the act another.
The assistance of three Chinese confederates was secured by
the officers and yesterday afternoon armed with sledge hammers
and crowbars a swoop was made on the building. It is enclosed
by a high board fence and built over the water. The place was
surrounded and a combined rush was made by the officers
headed by Captain Parker.
The fence was broken down and the two doors heavily
barred and the only avenues of escape were opened after being
nearly battered to pieces. The confederates on the inside
contrived to hamper the players in the use of the trap doors made
to secrete the implements of the game and opium smoking outfits
and the police controlled the only avenues of escape, catching the
Pakes like rats in a trap. Two of the men were caught smoking
opium and the others playing fan tan. They were placed under
guard and marched to the police station.
The nineteen prisoners were soon released on bonds
supplied by countrymen in the business (Advertiser, Dec, 10,
1897).
However, Chief Justice Judd faced a more difficult task when he reported
to the legislature in early 1898. The Republic of Hawaii was negotiating a treaty
of annexation with the United States. On the one hand, Judd had to portray a
picture of the government continuing to pursue an aggressive policy against
organized gambling, especially lotteries, which was highlighted by the
convictions of Chinese. On the other hand, he had to inform the world that this
lawlessness of the Chinese did not constitute a major threat to public order. His
effort to balance the two is seen in the following from his report: "The Chinese
head the list, 17.36 percent of their whole number having been convicted [of
some offense] , " but "the larger part of the offenses recorded against that race are
the minor ones of gambling and possession of opium" (italics added) (Republic,
1898:10).3
ANNJEXATD:ON
A treaty of annexation was negotiated and approved in an unusual
procedure by the Congress of the United States. The formal "transfer of
sovereignty" took place on August 12, 1898. However, the formal
reorganization of the government of the Republic into the government of the
Territory of Hawaii would not be accomplished until the passage of the Organic
Act by the United States Congress in 1900.
During the interim Marshal Brown continued his past enforcement
policies and the established pattern continued through 1898-99 (See Tables 1 and
3). The obvious discrimination against the Chinese is accentuated even more
when one converts the numbers into convictions per 1,000 adult males, as shown
in Table 4. In 1898-99 this rate was 55.0 for the Chinese, while the next
highest was 16.7 (the Hawaiians). In 1899 a huge buildup occurred in the
numbers of adult Japanese males brought into Hawaii, so even though the
number of convictions was substantial their rate per 1,000 fell to 14.1. The
rates for "Other Foreigners" and the Portuguese were 4.2 and 1.4, respectively.
The editor of the Star seemed quite satisfied that only one haole would be
vigorously prosecuted, but he called for a continuation of the campaign against
gambling even though it was "a vice innate."
The government of the Territory of Hawaii was officially reorganized
with the passage by the United States Congress of "An Act to Provide a
Government for the Territory of Hawaii" (The Organic Act), which received its
final approval on April 30, 1900. Section 55, entitled "Legislative Power,"
specified what the Territorial legislature could do and what it could not do. The
latter included, "nor shall any lottery or sale of lottery tickets be allowed." The
222 SOCJIAL PROCJESS JIN HAWAU
Table 4 Number of Convictions per 1,000 Adult Mal.es by JEthll1idty,
1886-1900'
Year Chinese Japanese Hawaiian Portuguese Other Total
1886-7 8.2 0.4 4.6 0.5 4.6 5.1
1888-9 17.3 6.9 5.7 0.2 0.8 9.0
1890-1 8.5 14.6 6.9 0.2 2.3 8.1
1892-3 10.8 24.3 6.1 2.2 1.6 11.7
1894-5 35.1 29.0 8.2 1.2 4.6 21.7
1896-7 45.3 24.5 9.8 1.0 6.6 24.3
1898-9 55.0 14.1 16.7 1.4 4.2 23.7
1900 46.6 12.1 17.4 2.4·· 18.6
• Each biennium has been averaged to produce the average annual rate for each two-year period.
··For 1900, it is not possible to separate the Portuguese from the Other category.
Source: Biennial Reports of the Chief Justice to the Legislature.
This did not mean that haole gamblers were never arrested, but what
evidence there is suggests that they were rarely arrested unless they were trying
to conduct a commercial operation. Thus in December, 1898, The Hawaiian
Star reported "A Sensational Arrest." The customs officers had alerted the
police that a roulette table had been passed through addressed to H.D. Rivers
and the police had been on the lookout for it to be used. Finally they struck.
The place of the arrest was the upstairs room of the Hotel
street entrance to Fowler's yard. This is immediately over the
Chinese restaurant at that place. The room is nicely fitted up and
carries gas lights. It has been known for some time that there
was a roulette table in the neighborhood and the particular room
was suspected.
At [11:00 o'clock] last night Deputy Marshal Charles
Chillingworth, Captain Kanae and Patrolman Nigel Jackson went
to the place. They figured that it was nearly time for the saloons
to close and there would probably be some "game in the trap."
Gardner was met at the door. Seeing the officers he touched an
alarm button, but was too late. The police pushed him aside and
rushed into the room.
[H.D. Rivers, L.H. Dee, A. Buchanan and Gardner] were
the sole occupants of the room. They were arrested. The
roulette table was taken charge of. With it were several hundred
counters and some $40 in cash. A loaded revolver was in one of
the drawers.
Shaner GAMJBUNG, LOTTJERJIJES AND THJE LAW
The gaming table was a cheap affair. A Frenchman who
examined it this morning said it could be bought in Europe for
five francs, but that in Denver it would cost $100. With the
cloth and "chips" the outfit is complete. It does not have the
appearance of being much used.
The owner of the outfit is known to the authorities, and they
will endeavor to give him the worst of the deal. Little attention
will be given to the others (The Hawaiian Star, Dec. 14, 1898).
The capture of a complete gambling outfit before it has gone
very far in its nefarious career is satisfactory. There is nothing
worse for a city than gambling dens, be they fine in outfits or be
they low hovels. The harm that has been done by them, the ruin
that they have brought to the youth of generation after generation
in this world's history is incalculable.
Gambling is a vice innate in human nature. We find the
savage gambling his shells and food away. The Greek loved it,
the Roman loved it, it was the vice of Queen Anne's day, and it
is the vice of the present. Laws against gambling have been
enacted in every civilized language, and yet it is carried on in
spite of what the law may say.
But however innate the vice may be, there is no doubt in
anyone's mind that the state should protect its weaker citizens
against its baleful influence. It is a plague incarnate and no stone
should be left unturned to put a stop to what are known in
Europe and America as gambling hells (The Hawaiian Star, Dec.
14, 1898).
TJHIJE ORGANJIC ACT: LOTTJERliJES PROHJlJBJITJEll)
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Congress had reaffirmed the grievance against the Lottery Bill as it had served
to legitimate the overthrow of the monarchy. Marshal Arthur M. Brown now
became the High Sheriff of the Territory.
As shown in Table I, the overall enforcement effort in the Territory
remained at the same high level as in 1898-99, but it shifted even more to Oahu,
which accounted for 44 percent of the convictions (Table 2), with 63 percent of
those convicted there being Chinese (Table 3). For the Territory as a whole,
over half of those convicted were Chinese, almost a third were Japanese and
about an eighth were Hawaiian. The rate per thousand in 1900 was 47 for the
Chinese, 17 for the Hawaiians and 12 for the Japanese (Table 4). By contrast,
The Portuguese and "Other Foreigners" made up about two percent of the
convictions and had a combined rate per thousand of 2.4. Chief Justice Walter
F. Frear, now an appointee of the President of the United States, in his 1901
report to the legislature, commented wryly, "Probably a smaller proportion of
the actual gambling is brought before the courts in the case of other races than
is the case of Asiatics and Hawaiians" (Territory, 1901:xxxi).
SEJRENmPHY
While this research set out to end with 1900, a few items located in the
process ought to be included to facilitate any person who wishes to extend the
time period. The first makes clear that substantial members of the Chinese
community also wished to see an end to the gambling houses. The second
presents the High Sheriff's explanation about the difficulty of eliminating the
lottery operations.
In March, 1901, Hee Feart, a very substantial rice planter on Kauai,
whose main operation employed 150 laborers, sought to obtain "a commission
to make arrests of gambling without first obtaining consent of the Sheriff [of
Kauai] and to serve without pay." He sought this because gambling "makes his
as well as others' laborers idle and they do not work regularly, causing loss,"
and because (he alleged) the law enforcers, with the one exception of W.H.
Rice, Jr., had been bribed by a hui, headed by one Tai Lan, to ignore their
gambling houses at Hanalei, Kapaa, Kapaia, Koloa and Hanapepe. The bribes
were paid monthly; the Sheriff got $1,500, the deputies $150 to $350, and the
policemen five dollars and up. Hee Feart also alleged that the police had
conspired with the hui to falsely convict three Chinese planters, Lee Che Ahu,
Lee Quon and Kum Sin, of assault and battery with a deadly weapon when the
three tried to break up the gambling at Hanalei (Archives of Hawaii, FO & Ex,
Doc. 94). It is not known who submitted this report for Hee to the Governor's
office, but a notation makes it clear that the informant's name was to be
protected.
In the second document High Sheriff Brown is responding to Governor
Dole to complaints about gambling, including one from Ah Lum. Now the
courts, the juries and the gamblers' attorneys had become obstacles to the
successful prosecution of the lotteries.
In reply I beg to state that certain lotteries among the
Chinese, known as Pakapio, are being maintained at Waipahu.
I am so informed and so believe, but to no greater extent than
has existed for the last two years.
Prosecutions for Che Fa or Pakapio tickets in possession are
useless. There are no tickets used in Pakapio. The
memorandum used in Pakapio the courts have ruled does not
represent an "interest in or depending upon the event of a
lottery. "
Only the agents come in contact with the Bankers, and it is
next to impossible to secure convictions against the latter. To
convict the Agents it is necessary to hire informers whose
testimony the Courts and Juries look upon with doubt and almost
invariably acquit the defendants.
Ordinary gambling games where two or more persons get
together and play games at which money is lost or won are easily
broken up and convictions obtained. Chinese lotteries are
conducted by the advice of Attorneys, in such a way that
convictions are next to impossible.
If any person will furnish information other than hearsay I
shall be only too willing to prosecute, and if AH LUM can
testify to any banking game or lottery now being carried on, or
that has been carried on, I will do my best to secure a conviction
(Brown to Dole, Sept. 16, 1892, FO & Ex, AH).
Not long after this Brown would conduct a raid upon a gambling operation in
Waipahu, in the course of which a Chinese gambler was shot and killed. The
dead man never would be identified and the precise circumstances about his
death would remain a mystery (Chung, 1960:98-99).
SUMMARY
With the end of the Kapu system the Kingdom was subjected to a new
system of morality brought by the Christian Missionaries. These missionaries
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saw gambling as an act which was clearly immoral, possibly sinful, and contrary
to the economic development of the kingdom. Laws were thus enacted to
suppress gambling in all its forms. The arrival of larger numbers of single
Chinese males, beginning in 1852, intensified the gambling problem generally,
but also brought a new threat -- the Chinese lotteries. This problem became
particularly acute when the gambling of the Chinese became a major issue in the
willingness of the Japanese government to permit Japanese contract laborers to
come to Hawaii. New statutes were passed and a vigorous enforcement effort
was instituted against the Chinese gamblers. This campaign included Hawaiians
as a target, especially if they were involved in lotteries, either Chinese or their
own. It was extended to the Japanese when it became clear that their plantation
gambling had become organized by criminal gangs. Throughout the period
enforcement efforts were directed toward haoles only when there was evidence
of a commercial gambling enterprise. The evidence of discriminatory
enforcement, prosecution and conviction is abundant. The symbolism which the
lottery issue had acquired became very clear when the Queen's approval of a bill
which would have moved the Louisiana Lottery to Hawaii became one of the
primary public justifications of the annexationists and the United States Minister
to Hawaii for the overthrow of the monarchy. This action was reaffirmed after
annexation when the Congress of the United States denied to the legislature of
the Territory any power to legalize a lottery.
Hopefully others will interest themselves in continuing this research
through the territorial period and into the present statehood era. It is not clear
whether the present gambling situation in Hawaii is one of ambivalence or
calculated compartmentalization. It is widely practiced in several forms, and
these forms are not only condoned but even encouraged. "Everybody gambles."
However, there is also widespread support for the proposition that those forms
of gambling which would be subject to the control of outsiders should be
prohibited. Many believe that these forms are great fun and ought to be
available -- but in Las Vegas. However, the issues of a state lottery and bingo
games and raffles by charitable organizations are still very much alive.
NOTES
1. I wish to thank Professor Harry V. Ball for his encouragement and assistance in the
execution of this research.
2. "Mr. T.E.E" is now known to have been T.E. Evans.
3. For a detailed discussion of the law and opium in 19th century Hawaii, see Lim-Chong and
Ball, 1992.
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SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAII: EDITORIAL POLICY
Social Process in Hawaii is a journal published by the University of Hawaii at
Manoa Department of Sociology with the objective of disseminating to scholars,
students, and the community the results of outstanding social science research on
the people and institutions of Hawaii.
Since its inception, the Department of Sociology has taken the view that the
Hawaiian community offers a rich and varied opportunity for observing the in-
terplay of social processes which maintain stability and provoke social change. It
is our hope that the journal might stimulate social research in Hawaii, provide
materials for instruction of students, and enhance the understanding of the com-
munity among those who live and work here.
With the support of the Andrew W. Lind Social Process in Hawaii Fund, we
welcome suggestions and submissions for special issues (thematic edited works,
small monographs) in addition to occasional issues of a more general character.
Contributions are encouraged from University faculty, graduate and under-
graduate students in Sociology and other disciplines as well as other knowledge-
able persons in the community. Preference will be given to research based upon
sound methodologies and systematic evidence. Articles should employ a mid-
level of writing and minimize technical terms. The presentation of complex
statistical techniques should be kept to a minimum, and where used, should be
accompanied by a clear textual description of the technique and its results.
Manuscripts are evaluated by the editors and other referees. Editors may occa-
sionally solicit manuscripts, but in general most selections will be from among
unsolicited manuscripts.
Authors interested in submitting manuscripts for consideration should send
three copies to SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAII, Department of Sociology,
Porteus Hall 247, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822. The
following guidelines should be observed in preparation of the manuscript:
1) Due to space limitations, short articles are preferred. Manuscripts should not
exceed 15 double-spaced pages. Photographs, charts and graphs are wel-
come.
2) Preparation of copy and the format for references should follow the guide-
lines of the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. In the case of un-
usual problems consult the Editor.
3) Manuscripts submitted to the journal should be of final draft quality; the edi-
tor reserves the right to make minor editorial changes.
4) The University of Hawaii guidelines for allocating credit for research and
writing should be observed.
